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ABSTRACT  
 
Social policy outcomes of Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Program (FTLRP): A case 
study of Kwekwe District 
This thesis explores social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. The thesis comes from an 
appreciation that there has been a lot of attention that has been given to the process and 
outcomes of the FTLRP. Various and sometimes antagonistic analytical frameworks have been 
employed by different scholars who come from different epistemological standings resulting 
in academic polarity on the subject of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe. This thesis transcends all the 
analytical frameworks to provide a unique perspective of the extent to which the FTLRP 
achieved social policy outcomes. Some of the scholars who have written on this subject have 
grappled with some of the social policy outcomes without however a deliberate focus on social 
policy outcomes.  
 
The main contribution of this thesis to the body of knowledge is its exploration of the extent to 
which the FTLRP has been a social policy tool that has achieved social policy outcomes. This 
is important because for a long time land reform has not been generally considered as a social 
policy tool in the main stream social policy literature. The reason for this is that social policy 
literature has been dominated by OECD scholars who naturally focused more on social policy 
tools that are more relevant to their contexts. In the process they have sought to transpose the 
tools that are more prevalent in their contexts to Africa. Consequently, social policy tools from 
the global south, such as land reform, have not featured in any significant way in mainstream 
social policy literature.  
 
The thesis used the transformative social policy framework in both the research and analysis 
of the data. The conceptual framework identifies five functions of social policy namely 
redistribution, production, protection, reproduction and social cohesion. Using a mixed 
methods approach, the thesis interrogated the extent to which the five functions of social policy 
were realised by the FTLRP. Research findings have shown that the major outcome that was 
unequivocally realised was redistribution. This is so because the country’s agrarian structure 
 vi 
dramatically changed from a bi-modal set up where 6000 white farmers owned more than 35 
percent of the arable land to a new structure where about 180 000 households of diverse 
backgrounds, inter alia former farm workers, people from communal areas, civil servants, war 
veterans, pensioners, government senior civil servants and the unemployed, now work and live 
on the same land. The other four social policy functions were achieved to varying degrees. 
Lastly, the research looked at the human development outcomes of the FTLRP by focusing on 
the state of education in the resettled areas. The research observed that the FTLRP increased 
both primary (13%) and secondary (31%) education accessibility for the children of land 
beneficiaries. Due to the abrupt nature with which education services were on demand, the 
quality was compromised. 
 
Key Words 
Social Policy; land reform; transformative social policy; social policy outcomes; social 
cohesion; social protection; reproduction; redistribution; production; education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DEDICATION......................................................................................................................... iv 
ABSTRACT v 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................. xii 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................. xiii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................. xv 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Land reforms in a global context ............................................................................. 2 
1.3 Historical Background to land reform in Zimbabwe ............................................ 3 
1.4 Post-Independence Land Reform ................................................................................. 5 
1.5 Wedded To Monopoly-Finance Capital .................................................................. 7 
1.6 Statement of the problem ....................................................................................... 11 
1.7 Scope Of The Research ........................................................................................... 14 
1.8 Research Questions ................................................................................................. 14 
1.9 Research Objectives ................................................................................................ 15 
1.9.1 Primary research objective ................................................................................. 15 
1.9.2 Secondary research objectives ........................................................................... 15 
1.10 Limitations To And Scope Of The Study .......................................................... 15 
1.11 Importance Of The Study ................................................................................... 15 
1.12 Organisation Of The Thesis ................................................................................ 16 
1.13 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 24 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................... 25 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 25 
2.2 Right of conquest justification for redistribution................................................. 25 
2.3 The fast track land reform process ........................................................................ 27 
2.3.1 Organisation of the FTLRP ................................................................................ 27 
Table 2.1: Mode of land access for beneficiaries ............................................................. 31 
2.4 Diction of ideological framing ................................................................................ 32 
2. 5 Approaches To FTLRP Outcomes Debates .......................................................... 32 
2.5.1 The neopatrimonial approach ............................................................................ 33 
2.5.2 The human rights approach ................................................................................ 36 
2.5.3 Right to development ......................................................................................... 39 
2.6 The ‘Two Lefts’ ....................................................................................................... 39 
2.6.1 The livelihoods approach ................................................................................... 40 
2.6.2 The political economy approach ........................................................................ 47 
 viii 
2.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 48 
CHAPTER 3: Conceptual framework: Transformative social policy .............................. 50 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 50 
3.2 Returning to the wider social policy vision ........................................................... 50 
3.3 Transformative Social Policy Conceptual Framework........................................ 54 
3.4 Development and Social Policy: A Nexus .............................................................. 56 
3.4.1 Conceptualising Development ........................................................................... 57 
3.4.2 Social development indicators and social policy outcomes ............................... 60 
3.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 65 
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................... 67 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 67 
4.2 Positivism ................................................................................................................. 67 
4.3 Interpretivism .......................................................................................................... 69 
4.4 Emic and etic approaches in research ................................................................... 71 
4.5 Background information on research site- Kwekwe District .............................. 72 
4.6 Kwekwe Demographics........................................................................................... 74 
4.7 Research design ....................................................................................................... 75 
4.7.1 Mixed methods approach ................................................................................... 75 
4.7.2 The ethnographic study of Kwekwe District ..................................................... 77 
4.7.3 Study sample ...................................................................................................... 79 
4.8 Research techniques ................................................................................................ 81 
4.8.1 In-depth interviews ............................................................................................ 81 
4.8.2 Key informant interviews .................................................................................. 82 
4.8.3 Focus group discussions .................................................................................... 83 
4.8.4 Observation, interaction and informal questioning ............................................ 85 
4.9 Data analysis ............................................................................................................ 86 
4.10 Administration of the study ................................................................................ 86 
4.11 Ethical considerations ......................................................................................... 89 
4.12 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 89 
CHAPTER 5: IN THE YEAR 2008… ................................................................................. 91 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 91 
5.2 First phase: 2000-2006 ............................................................................................ 91 
5.3 Second phase: 2007-2008 ........................................................................................ 93 
5.4 Sanctions .................................................................................................................. 94 
5.5 Historical inflation................................................................................................... 97 
5.6 Political polarity ...................................................................................................... 99 
 ix 
5.7 Social policy in crisis times? ................................................................................. 100 
5.7.1 The Basic Commodities Supply Side Intervention (BACOSSI) ..................... 100 
5.7.2 Farm mechanization program .......................................................................... 102 
5.7.3 Interventions on the Cholera Outbreak ............................................................ 103 
5.8 Phase 3: 2009 to current ....................................................................................... 104 
5.8.1 Dollarization in 2009 ....................................................................................... 104 
5.9 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 106 
CHAPTER 6: REDISTRIBUTIVE social policy OUTCOME OF THE FTLRP .......... 108 
6.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 108 
6.2 The redistributive function of social policy......................................................... 109 
6.3 The new agrarian structure .................................................................................. 110 
6.4 Land access in Kwekwe District .......................................................................... 116 
6.5 Profiles of land beneficiaries ................................................................................ 120 
6.6 Educational levels of land beneficiaries .............................................................. 123 
6.7 Ages of land beneficiaries ..................................................................................... 124 
6.8 Gender composition of land beneficiaries ........................................................... 125 
6.9 Land ownership versus land access ..................................................................... 127 
6.10 Gender dynamics amongst farm workers on the resettled farms ................. 128 
6.11 The tsewu ............................................................................................................ 129 
6.12 Place of origin of Kwekwe land beneficiaries ................................................. 131 
6.13 Farm residency and homesteads ...................................................................... 132 
6.14 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 134 
CHAPTER 7: PRODUCTION OUTCOME OF THE FTLRP ....................................... 136 
7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 136 
7.2 Production and productivity- whose productivity? ........................................... 136 
7.4 Tobacco production............................................................................................... 143 
7.5 Maize production................................................................................................... 145 
7.6 Agricultural Inputs and financing ....................................................................... 148 
7.7 Livestock production patterns ............................................................................. 151 
7.8 Agricultural labour ............................................................................................... 152 
7.9 Support services for production........................................................................... 156 
7.10 Media and production ....................................................................................... 159 
7.11 Agricultural markets ......................................................................................... 160 
7.12 Non-farm income generating activities ............................................................ 163 
7.13 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 166 
CHAPTER 8: LAND REFORM AS AN EX ANTE SOCIAL PROTECTION TOOL . 168 
 x 
8.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 168 
8.2 Social protection conceptual handle .................................................................... 169 
8.3 Land reform as a social protection tool ............................................................... 171 
8.3.1 Shelter from vulnerability ................................................................................ 172 
8.3.2 Food ................................................................................................................. 173 
8.4 Beyond livelihood diversification to accumulation ............................................ 175 
8.6 Food sovereignty and social assistance ................................................................ 180 
8.7 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 181 
CHAPTER 9: SOCIAL COHESION ................................................................................. 182 
9.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 183 
9.2 What is social cohesion? ....................................................................................... 183 
9.3 Social cohesion in the African context ................................................................. 185 
9.4 Social organisation in the aftermath of the FTLRP ........................................... 186 
9.5 Strangers all around! ............................................................................................ 187 
9.6 Witchcraft .............................................................................................................. 189 
9.7 Agency and norms of solidarity ........................................................................... 190 
9.7.1 The water project at Umlala farm .................................................................... 191 
9.7.2 The secondary school project in Sherwood Farm ............................................ 192 
9.8 Horizontal agency in action .................................................................................. 193 
9.9 Whose water?......................................................................................................... 195 
9.10 Social organisation and agency ........................................................................ 196 
9.10.1 The role of chiefs in social cohesion ............................................................... 198 
9.10.2 Role of rural authorities in fostering horizontal cohesion ............................... 200 
9.10.3 Churches and mutual aid societies ................................................................... 202 
9.11 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 204 
CHAPTER 10: EDUCATION OUTCOMES OF THE FTLRP ...................................... 206 
10.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 206 
10.2 Education as an ex ante social policy tool ........................................................ 207 
10.3 Education in Zimbabwe .................................................................................... 208 
10.4 Education legislative framework in Zimbabwe .............................................. 209 
10.5 State of education in satellite schools ............................................................... 211 
10.5.1 Availability ...................................................................................................... 211 
10.6 Accessibility ........................................................................................................ 221 
10.6.1 Distance to schools .......................................................................................... 223 
10.6.2 Early childhood development education (ECD) .............................................. 224 
10.6.3 The Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) ......................................... 226 
 xi 
10.7 Acceptability....................................................................................................... 228 
10.7.1 Fluid curriculum .............................................................................................. 228 
10.7.2 Language of instruction ................................................................................... 230 
10.7.3 What exposure? Whose exposure? Why exposure? ........................................ 231 
10.8 Adaptability ........................................................................................................ 232 
10.9 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 234 
CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION.......................................................................................... 236 
11.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 236 
11.2 Summary of the discussions .............................................................................. 236 
11.3 Contribution to debates and knowledge .......................................................... 244 
11.3.1 Land reform as a social policy tool .................................................................. 244 
11.3.2 From bi-modal to tri-modal agrarian structure ................................................ 245 
11.3.3 Reproduction in the resettlement areas ............................................................ 246 
11.3.4 The concept of musha ...................................................................................... 247 
11.3.5 Livestock as a safety net .................................................................................. 247 
11.3.6 Grain marketing board as a social protection tool ........................................... 248 
11.3.7 The symbiosis between economic and social policies ........................................ 248 
11.4 Policy Recommendations......................................................................................... 249 
11.4.1 Land audit ........................................................................................................... 249 
11.4.2 Land tenure security ............................................................................................ 249 
11.4.3 Agricultural financing modalities .................................................................... 250 
11.4.4 Strengthening agronomic services ................................................................... 250 
11.4.5 Investment in irrigation services ...................................................................... 251 
11.4.6 Access to inputs and product markets .............................................................. 251 
11.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 252 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 253 
Published and unpublished academic materials ........................................................... 253 
Government Reports, Legislation and Policy Directives.............................................. 287 
NGO and Farmer Unions Reports ................................................................................. 290 
Newspaper and Internet Articles .................................................................................... 290 
Press Statements and Correspondence .......................................................................... 291 
ANNEXURES 292 
Annexure 1: Schedule of Interviews ............................................................................... 292 
Annexure 2: Schedule of the Focus Group Discussions ............................................... 293 
End Notes .......................................................................................................................... 294 
 
 xii 
LIST OF TABLES  
 
Table 2.1 Mode of land access for the beneficiaries 
Table 4.1 Summary of samples 
Table 4.2 Disaggregation of in-depth interviews 
Table 5.1 Foreign Currency market rates annual averages: Zimbabwe Dollars to one 
USD 
Table 5.2 BACOSSI distribution total reach 
Table 5.3 Farm Mechanisation program equipment distributed 
Table 6.1 Kwekwe District Agrarian Structure 
Table 6.2  Tri-modal Agrarian Structure 
Table 6.3 The new national agrarian structure  
Table 6.4 Redistribution patterns in selected provinces of Zimbabwe 
Table 6.5 Professions of land beneficiaries in 6 districts surveyed by AIAS 
Table 6.6 Education Levels for Kwekwe District FTLRP plot owners 
Table 6.7 Place of origin for land beneficiaries 
Table 6.8 Residency of plot owners in newly settled areas by settlement type 
Table 7.1 National tobacco sales in 2013 and 2014 
Table 7.2 Disaggregation of the distribution of tobacco growers 2014/2015 season 
Table 7.3 Access to productive tools at national level for A2 model-2013 
Table 7.4 Kwekwe District sources of agricultural credit for farmers in 2013 
Table 7.5 Wage determination methods in Kwekwe District 
Table 7.6 Marketing channels used by A2 farmers 
Table 8.1  Household source of food by settlement type in Kwekwe District 
Table 8.2 Source of household income by settlement type in Kwekwe District 
Table 8.3 Livestock sale patterns in newly resettled and communal areas of Kwekwe 
District 
Table 8.4 Number of households receiving food aid by settlement type in Kwekwe 
District 
Table 10.1 Book to pupil ratio at Mupamombe Secondary School 
Table 10.2 Sherwood Primary School catchment area 
 
 xiii 
LIST OF FIGURES  
 
Figure 2.1 Sustainable rural livelihoods: A framework for analysis 
Figure 3.1 Transformative Social Policy Conceptual Framework 
Figure 4.1 Locating the mixed methods approach in research paradigms 
Figure 5.1 Phase 1 Agricultural performance 
Figure 5.2 Zimbabwe periodic loan inflows 
Figure 5.3 Trends on FDI flows since independence 
Figure 5.4 GDP trends for Zimbabwe 
Figure 5.5 Zimbabwe Growth rate 2009-2015 
Figure 6.1 Year of formal land allocation for newly resettled land beneficiaries in 
Kwekwe District 
Figure 6.2 Kwekwe District land holding for A1 beneficiaries 
Figure 6.3 Kwekwe District A2 land beneficiaries 
Figure 6.4 Age distribution of land beneficiaries in Sherwood Farm 
Figure 6.5 Gender disaggregation of land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District 
Figure 6.6 Farm residency trends in Kwekwe District 
Figure 7.1 Production trends for maize, tobacco and sorghum 
Figure 7.2 Land beneficiaries’ crop production affected by drought 
Figure 7.3 Time series showing the extreme rainfall years in Zimbabwe 
Figure 7.4 Maize production for the first decade of the FTLRP 
Figure 7.5 Production grievances for Kwekwe District 
Figure 7.6 Bank loans by sector in 2014 
Figure 7.7 Cattle ownership in Umlala Farm 
Figure 7.8 Hiring of farm labour in Kwekwe District 
Figure 7.9 Kwekwe District farm workers perceptions of working conditions 
Figure 7.10 Contact with government agencies for resettled land beneficiaries in Kwekwe 
District 
Figure 7.11 Sources of agricultural information in newly resettled areas 
Figure 7.12 Involvement in non-farming income generating activities 
Figure 8.1 Land reform beneficiaries’ residency on farms 
 xiv 
Figure 8.2 Number of meals consumed per day by settlement type in Kwekwe District 
Figure 9.1 Place of origin of land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District 
Figure 9.2 Cooperation among resettled households in Kwekwe District 
Figure 10.1 Number of schools between 1999 and 2015 in Kwekwe District 
Figure 10.2 National Budget Allocation to education in Zimbabwe, 2009-2015 
Figure 10.3 Ministry of Education, Sport, Art and Culture expenditure categories, 2010 
Figure 10.4 Gender dynamics at Sherwood Primary School enrolment, 2015 
Figure 10.5 Enrolment figures for Mupamombe Secondary School 
Figure 10.6 Bonstead Secondary School and national Ordinary Level pass rate comparison 
Figure 10.7 Sherwood Primary School Grade 7 Results 
Figure 10.8 Mupamombe Secondary School Pass Rate 
Figure 10.9 Bonstead Secondary School 2014 results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am sincerely indebted to many individuals and institutions for the assistance and cooperation 
extended to me during the course of this study. First of all, I would like to give honour and 
praise to almighty God who is responsible for all the successes in my life.  
 
I am indebted to Professor Jimi O. Adesina (DST/NRF SARChI Chair in Social Policy) for the 
conceptual rigour that he provided. Thank you for the investment of your time and intellectual 
capital into me so that I can make some contributions to the body of knowledge.  
 
My  research  benefited  immensely  from the wisdom of the late  Professor  Sam Moyo  of  the 
African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS) who provided me with grounding on land reform. 
It is unfortunate that he is no longer around to read the final draft of some of his contributions. 
I however have no doubt that his works will continue to live on despite his physical absence 
from this world.  
 
The staff at AIAS also made my work easy when I was conducting fieldwork. Mukoma Walter 
Chambati was very instrumental in providing me with access to Kwekwe District. The other 
comrades, Freedom Mazwi, Rangarirai Gavin Muchetu and Toendepi provided a platform to 
bounce my ideas thoughts and perspectives. What came out of there were well thought 
arguments that formed part of the contributions which this thesis is making. 
 
When I was in the field, my experience was very different from what I had heard from those 
who had gone before me. This can be attributed to the counsel that I got from the Kwekwe 
District Agritex team led by Mai Mare, the District Agritex Officer. She assisted me to identify 
the sites that I used. She also introduced me to Mukoma Nyama who worked with me 
throughout the research in Umlala Ward. He used his personal contacts and sometimes 
resources to make the research a success. I learnt quite a whole lot from VaNyama, not only 
about my subject of research, but also about life. At the other site in Sherwood, I worked with 
Madam Mombeshora. She would avail her time over the weekends without demanding 
payment. I am grateful for this Agritex team and may God grant them the desires of their hearts.  
 xvi 
 
I am grateful to the resettled farmers at Umlala Farm and Sherwood Block in Kwekwe for their 
help and support during my time with them, and for allowing me to get involved in their daily 
activities during the data gathering process. They opened their lives to me and shared their 
aspirations in farming. 
 
Acknowledgement also goes to my colleagues in Pretoria under the SARCHI Chair. These 
have been a surrogate family in this journey which may be lonely sometimes. The aspect of 
social solidarity cannot be over emphasised- it kept me going. My comrades namely Madalitso 
Zililo Phiri, Bongani Nyoka, Clement Chipenda, Newman Tekwa, Austin Omoruan, Oluranti 
Samuel, Tom Tom, Marion Ouma, Ashley Sarimana, Abebe Alemu, Olayinka Akanle, and 
Kola Omomowo. 
 
Last, but not least, I am greatly indebted to my loving wife Mabel, for the peace she brings into 
my life.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xvii 
 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AGRITEX   Agricultural Technical and Extension Services 
AIAS     African Institute for Agrarian Studies 
AIDS    Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome 
ARDA   Agriculture and Rural Development Authority 
AREX   Agricultural Rural Extension Services 
ART    Anti-Retroviral Treatment 
BEAM   Basic Education Assistance Module 
BIPPA   Bilateral Promotion and Protection Agreement 
CA    Communal Areas 
CBO   Community Based Organisation 
CEO    Chief Executive Officer 
CFSS    Commercial Farm Settlement Scheme 
CFU    Commercial Farmers Union 
CIO    Central intelligence Organisation 
CSO   Central Statistical Office 
Cottco   Cotton Company 
DA    District Administrator 
DAC    District Aids Committee 
DAEO   District Agricultural Extension Officer 
DCC    District Coordinating Committees 
DDF    District Development Fund 
DLARR   Department of Land Acquisition and Rural Resettlement 
DLC    District Lands Committee, 
DLIC    District Land Identification Committee 
EMA   Environmental Management Agency 
ETF   Education Transitional Fund 
FCTZ    Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe 
FLI   Farm Level Institutions 
FTLRP   Fast Track Land Reform Program 
GAPWUZ   General Agriculture and Plantation Workers Union 
 xviii 
GMB    Grain Marketing Board 
GNU    Government of National Unity 
GoZ   Government of Zimbabwe 
GPA   Global Political Agreement 
Ha   Hectare 
HIV    Human Immuno Deficiency Virus 
ICA    Intensive Conservation Area 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
JAG    Justice for Agriculture 
LSCF    Large Scale Commercial Farms 
MDC    Movement for Democratic Change 
MDC    Movement for Democratic Change 
MLRR   Ministry of Lands and Rural Resettlement 
MP    Member of Parliament 
NAC   National Aids Committee 
NGO    Non-Governmental Organisation 
NRAs    Newly Resettled Areas 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PLIC    Provincial Land Identification Committee 
RBZ    Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
RDC    Rural District Council 
SADC   Southern Africa Development Community 
SAFIRE  Southern Alliance for Indigenous Resources 
SIRDC  Scientific Industrial Research and Documentation Centre 
TIMB   Tobacco Industry Marketing Board 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund 
UZ   University of Zimbabwe 
VIDCO   Village Development Committee 
WAC    Ward Aids Committee 
WADCO   Ward Development Committee 
WB   World Bank 
ZANU-PF   Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front 
 xix 
ZESA    Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Company 
ZFU   Zimbabwe Farmers Union 
ZIDERA  Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act 
ZIJRI    Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative 
ZIMPLATS   Zimbabwe Platinum Mines 
ZNA    Zimbabwe National Army 
ZNFU    Zimbabwe National Farmers Union 
ZNLWA   Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association 
ZRP    Zimbabwe Republic Police
 1 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
There have been several land reforms that have happened around the world in the last century. 
Some of the most prominent ones were in Latin Americas, East Asia, India, and Ethiopia and 
most recently in Zimbabwe. The fast track land reform program that happened in Zimbabwe 
from around 2000 to 2004 has been a subject of immense academic curiosity (see for instance 
Kinsey, 2004;  Moyo and Yeros, 2005b, 2007a, 2007b; Helliker, 2006; Sadomba, 2008a; 
Alexander, 2003; Moore, 2003; Murisa, 2010, Matondi, 2011; Munyuki-Hungwe, 2011; 
Scoones, 2011, 2015; Chiweshe, 2012; Mkodzongi, 2013).  These scholars have been covering 
the subject using different ideological approaches. Some of the scholars such as Raftopolous 
(2003), Moore (2003), Kinsey (2004), and Zamchiya (2011) have used the neo patrimonial 
approach which emphasised the democratic deficits of the process. The other angle was the 
livelihoods approach which was used by scholars such as Scoones et al. (2010). Moyo and his 
counterparts have been instrumental in providing the political economy perspective of both the 
process and outcomes of the FTLRP (see Moyo and Yeros, 2005b; Moyo, 2004, 2005, 2011a, 
2011b; AIAS, 2009, 2014).  
 
In light of the voluminous literature available on the FTLRP, this study is concerned with the 
social policy outcomes of the process. Reading through the scholarly works, it can be argued 
that the land reform achieved some social policy goals. The purpose of this thesis is to create a 
self-conscious body of knowledge on the social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. The thesis will 
use transformative social policy framework. The framework is made up of five social policy 
functions namely production, redistribution, protection, reproduction and social cohesion.  
 
The study uses primarily an emic approach where it places premium on the experiences of the 
farmers and their perspectives on the outcomes of the land reform. The thesis pays particular 
attention on what the land beneficiaries have reason to value, which many scholars have not 
given much attention to because of the etic approach they have used.  The focus on 
beneficiaries’ experiences and introspective interpretation of their new reality sheds more light 
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on the tangible outcomes of the land reform considering the fact that this research has been 
done fifteen years after the fast-rack phase of land redistribution started. The aspect of looking 
at how the land reform has improved the beneficiaries’ lives is coherent with social policy 
objectives, whose primary purpose is ensuring that each citizen in a given territory can have a 
life of dignity regardless of status, gender, ethnicity, age, etc. (Adesina 2009). 
 
1.2 Land reforms in a global context 
There have been several land reforms around the world prior to the FTLRP that took place in 
Zimbabwe. In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, land reforms preceded any significant 
industrialisation with 33.3%, 27.3%, and 26.9% of arable land being redistributed in the three 
countries respectively (Binswanger, et al., 1995). The land reforms were a key ingredient to 
the subsequent success of the industrialisation that later took place (Kay, 2002). In Latin 
America the post-colonial states inherited highly unequal patterns of land ownership dominated 
by latifundios that were established in most situations through expropriation of indigenous 
community lands in Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras (De Janvry, 
1981). To correct the skewed agrarian structures, in El Salvador, 27.9% of the arable land was 
redistributed while Bolivia redistributed 32.3% and Mexico, 13.5% (Ibid). Besides inheriting 
a skewed agrarian structure, the other driver for land reforms Latin America were the high rates 
of rural poverty despite increased urbanisation of major cities in the region. Most of the land 
reforms therefore were led by the rural social movements in the spirit of claiming restitution of 
ancestral territories that had been annexed by the colonialists. A different allocation mechanism 
was employed in Brazil, Colombia and the Philippines. These countries used ‘market-assisted’ 
mechanisms which were brokered by the states (Borras, 2003; Deininger and Binswanger, 
1999). In this variant of redistributive reform, land transactions between large landowners and 
aspiring smallholders took place (at least partly) through markets, facilitated by favourable loan 
programs offered by the government (Sikor et al., 2009).  
 
The land reforms did not have similar results. In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the land reforms 
helped improve productivity and set the stage for an impressive increase in non-agricultural 
development (Jeon and Kim, 2000). In the Philippines, the land reforms benefited more than 
half a million households and improved household welfare (Otsuka, 1991). The land reform 
also increased investment and human capital accumulation (Deininger and Olinto, 2001). In 
Latin America however, the land reforms distributed relatively large amounts of land but did 
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not manage to improve productivity of the land beneficiaries hence the reforms did not 
successfully assist in overcoming deep-rooted structural inequalities (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 
1989). In the context of Africa, countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia (see Rahmato, 1984) 
undertook their own land reforms. Most recently, South Africa has been embarking in the 
process using the restitution approach. The progress has not been as significant compared to 
Latin American countries, for instance. The most pronounced land reform process in the 
context of Africa has been in Zimbabwe. The proceeding section traces the historical land 
distribution imbalances in Zimbabwe. 
 
 
1.3 Historical Background to land reform in Zimbabwe 
Colonisation of Zimbabwe started around the 1890s when Cecil John Rhodes and the ‘Pioneer 
Column’ crossed the Limpopo River in search of gold fields. This movement by the early 
settlers toward the north of South Africa was driven by massive gold discoveries on the Rand- 
now Johannesburg around the 1870s (Lebert, 2003) In pursuit of this second rand (Nyandoro 
and Nyangoni, 1979), the white settlers’ expectations were not met in Zimbabwe. They 
however started expropriating land as they deciphered that the climate was conducive for 
agriculture and most of the land was fertile for viable agriculture. The colonialists were coming 
from Europe where land ownership was a preserve of the aristocracy. They saw the opportunity 
to own land as a short cut into higher social classes to which they did not belong in their 
countries of origin. Land expropriation started with the British South Africa Company (BSAC) 
being granted the Royal Charter in 1889. Building on that, draconian laws such as the Land 
Apportionment Act of 1930 and the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 were then promulgated 
(ZANU, 1963, quoted in Nyandoro and Nyangoni, 1979). By 1910, the colonialists had 
annexed about 23% of all fertile land while allocating only 26% to blacks as native reserves 
(Herbst, 1987).  
 
By 1920, more than 104 separate native reserves ranging in size from 2 100 to 625 000 hectares 
had been created (Akwabi-Ameyaw, 1988).  Masilela and Weiner (1996) observed that the 
period prior to 1920 could be summed up as the land alienation period, which was characterised 
by expropriations of land and mining rights. The Land Apportionment Act ‘allocated fixed 
Reserves—generally poor, remote and inadequate—to the people’ (Douglas, 1984: 137). The 
alienated lands of Africans became ‘European areas’ (Elich, 2002). Kinsey (2004: 2) further 
noted that for some 90 years that the country was a settler colony, the adoption of 
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discriminatory agricultural policies and the alienation of most of the fertile, well-watered land 
to European settlers resulted in the oppression, marginalization and impoverishment of 
indigenous people (Cheater, 1988; Mamdani, 1986, Kinsey, 1999; Moyana, 2002).  
 
The productive capacity for the blacks was curtailed through the promulgation of restrictive 
laws like the Maize Control Acts of 1931 and 1934 and the Cattle Levy Acts of 1931 and 1934 
(PCA, 1980). The Maize Control Act was instituted to limit the marketing options for the 
indigenous population when they would have wanted to sell their produce. The Cattle Levy 
Act was introduced as a mechanism to expropriate the indigenous people’s cattle (Masilela and 
Weiner, 1996). The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 was promulgated. The objective of 
this Act was: 
To provide for the control of the utilisation and allocation of land occupied by natives, 
and to ensure its efficient use for agricultural purposes; and to require natives to 
perform labour for conserving natural resources and for promoting good husbandry.  
 
The purpose of this law was to confer individual tenure rights to a specified parcel of grazing 
or arable land which contradicted the customary basis of African land tenure where the land 
and its resources belonged to the community of which every full member had an inalienable 
right of avail (Thomas, 1991). Further, in 1969, the Tribal Trust Land Act was put in place. 
This Act sought to provide stricter prohibitions of land claims in white settler areas by blacks. 
The Act legally defined races as European and Africans and divided the whole country into 
two halves for the two races (Sullins, 1991) despite the fact that whites were 5% of the total 
population (PCA, 1980).  
 
Due to the lucrative prospects that were in Africa, the immigration of white settlers increased 
from 80 000 to 220 000 between 1945 and 1960 (Palmer & Birch, 1992). This engendered 
‘wholesale forced removal of African people to make room for white farming up to the 1950s’ 
(Cliffe, 2000: 36). The indigenous black people continued to be forced from their land right up 
to the 1970s (McGreal, 2002).  
 
The aforementioned legislative regime effectively created a bimodal agrarian structure 
involving large scale farms and marginal small capitalist and peasant farms was tied to 
industrial interests wholly owned by local white minority and foreign capital (Moyo, 2009). 
The agrarian structure which the colonial state created facilitated accumulation using large 
scale estate farming which were supported by the state through irrigation facilities, dams, rural 
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electrification and other infrastructure. The accumulation was meant to reduce importation of 
agricultural produce like sugar and wheat (Moyo, 2011). This import substitution and export 
led development agenda continued to serve a skewed socio political system where the white 
minority enjoyed a lion’s share (Stoneman 1988). 
 
The colonial state had grafted Zimbabwe into the world capitalist system albeit serving the 
interest of the white minority. The political system created unequal relations and a repressive 
agrarian structure which was the embodiment of the colonial state (Moyo, 2009).  As has been 
postulated, the repression and inequality were structured through laws, land dispossessions, 
extra economic regulation, and taxes. Subsequently, these initiatives made Zimbabwe into a 
labour reserve economy (Amin 1972) for the minority white capitalists. The blacks found 
themselves compelled to work on the farms and mines for meagre wages so that they could 
meet the colonial state’s demands of exorbitant taxes (Arrighi, 1973). 
 
Consequently, the land became more emblematic of the national liberation struggle (Palmer, 
1977; 1990). Nationalist leaders during the liberation struggle continued to remind people that 
the primary purpose of the liberation struggle was the restoration of the land expropriated by 
colonial settlers. Subsequently, a legitimate expectation was created in the masses at 
independence that there will be recovery of this significant resource from the colonial settlers. 
Mafeje (2003) noted that the issue of land was more than ‘a physical solum’, but was 
considered to be a social endowment that in principle was inalienable. The land was treated as 
a permanent part of human existence with inestimable value. It is against this background that 
communities sent their sons and daughters to fight a common enemy who had stripped them of 
their dignity and essence of their lives.  
 
1.4 Post-Independence Land Reform  
When Zimbabwe obtained its independence in 1980, the country ‘inherited a highly skewed 
land distribution structure, with around 6,000 white commercial farmers and a number of large 
agro-industrial estates occupying more than a third of the country’s land area’ (Weiner 1988: 
74).  The remaining indigenous communal farmers — about 700,000 households — subsisted 
on 16.4 million hectares.  This was less than half of the country’s agricultural land. Of particular 
significance was that 75 per cent of the land owned by communal farmers was in agro-
ecological regions 4 and 5, which are drier and less fertile.  There was therefore a keenly felt 
sense of historical injustice and deprivation, focused on land (Sachikonye, 1992:20). 
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With this discrepancy, the post-colonial government wanted to execute its promise 
immediately of returning land to the black people by embarking on land reform program.  The 
land reform was meant to redress historical settler-colonial land dispossession and the related 
racial and foreign domination, as well as the class-based agrarian inequalities which the 
colonial state promoted (Moyo, 2009). Unfortunately, there were constitutional provisions of 
the Lancaster House agreement that were a constraint (Chaumba et al., 2003) to conducting 
land reform in a wholesale way.  
 
Even though the land reform was not carried out in the way that was initially desired for the 
envisaged benefits noted above, the government invoked the ‘willing seller/ willing buyer 
basis’ that was enshrined in the Lancaster House Agreement and the constitution. The 
limitations with this approach meant that any resettlement was going to be slow and expensive 
since compensation was supposed to be paid in foreign currency (Moyo 2000). Also the 
approach did not produce much result as few settler farmers were willing sellers. The ‘willing 
seller’ principle ensured that whites only sold the land that had been abandoned during the War 
of Liberation, or else was of poor quality, thereby denying beneficiaries of the land reform the 
opportunity to establish a successful economic sector (Alexander, 1994: 343–344; Cliffe, 2000: 
37; Munslow, 1985).  
 
In pursuit of land reform, soon after independence, a target of 18,000 households was set. This 
was increased to 54,000 in 1982 and then to 162 000 households two years later (Moyo, 1995). 
Although the resettlement programme never achieved these more ambitious levels, it had some 
significant impact (Palmer and Birch, 1992). By 1989, the government had resettled some 
52,000 households and had purchased 2.7 million hectares (around 16%, of commercial 
farmland). By 1996, a total of 71,000 families had been resettled (Moyo, 2000). The reasons 
for the stall in land redistribution in the mid-1980s were complex. Pressures to retain the 
Lancaster House principle of voluntarism came from the predominantly white Commercial 
Farmers Union (CFU), the civil service and foreign donors, including the British government 
and the World Bank (Alexander, 1994). By 1997, about 800 black commercial farmers holding 
about 10 % of the large scale commercial farmlands had emerged, against 4 000 whites holding 
about 10 million hectares (Moyo, 2001). The GoZ had expected to redistribute 50% of the 
white controlled land, but 5 million hectares of this remained to be transferred (ibid). 
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Be that as it may, the government saw the resettlement programme as necessary to ‘neutralize 
a looming crisis of expectation on the part of a land hungry population’ (Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development, 1981: 124). Resettlement was seen as a political imperative that 
would create stability and also promote economic growth.  As a result, the agricultural policy 
that was developed focused more on increasing smallholder participation in markets and 
diversifying the range and value of agrarian market (Moyo, 2000). Furthermore, the land 
reform was envisaged to promote national self-sufficiency, enhancing food security and 
general agricultural development. The agricultural policy also sought to boost labour intensive, 
small farmer production in order to optimize land productivity and returns on capital invested 
(Moyo, 1995). This strategy ensured positive macro-economic benefits including 'growth with 
equity', political reconciliation in a racially polarized society, and inclusivity for the 
marginalised in the economy of the country. 
 
1.5 Wedded To Monopoly-Finance Capital 
Zimbabwe introduced economic structural adjustment program (ESAP) between 1990 and 
1995 (Sachikonye, 2003: 8). This was against the background of a decline in the country’s 
Gross Domestic Product from 6.98 percent in 1990 to 0.15 percent in 1995. It is against such a 
background of poor economic performance that the government was compelled to seek Wold 
Bank and International Monetary Fund support towards economic revitalisation (Makoni, 
2000). The key components of the ESAP were: a) trade liberalisation; b) fiscal and monetary 
policy reforms; c) public enterprise reforms; d) budget deficit reduction; and e) the de-
regulation of investment, labour and prices. It was projected that the combination of these 
reforms would, over a five year period, lead to increased and sustainable levels of growth 
(Sachikonye, 2003: 10). Hardly a year after adoption of ESAP, import cover had literary fallen 
in 1991 (Kadenge, 1992). A general economic crisis was therefore looming and since the 
government had no alternative policy, it accepted market reforms that made the country to 
receive loans from IMF and the World Bank (Ibid).  
 
The conventional wisdom of the World Bank at that time was that the agricultural sector was 
one of the victims of state-directed economic regimes riddled with an urban bias. The World 
Bank argued that indirect taxation depressed farming incomes resulting in poor performance 
for the agricultural sector. These ‘distortions’ influenced by the state were to be ameliorated 
by letting market forces determine product and input prices and the terms of trade between 
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agriculture and the rest of the economy (World Bank, 1989). According to the Bank (1989), 
these measures would restore agricultural export and growth while improving rural incomes 
and livelihoods.  In the same breadth, cut backs in public expenditure outlays on agricultural 
input subsidies, marketing boards, and research and extension services were prescribed and 
justified on the premise that state expenditure needed to be substantially lowered and that the 
benefits were either being captured by large scale commercial farmers or being squandered by 
state officials (World Bank, 1989). 
 
The new neoliberal wave eclipsed questions of race and class due to the demise of socialism as 
an ideology (Moyo, 2000a). The turning of a blind eye to unequal relations between black and 
white did not make the problem go away. It had to be addressed. In Zimbabwe, this policy 
advice was packaged as Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP). It did not pay 
attention to the challenges which small scale farmers faced such as land and financial markets 
that were skewed to benefit the minority, distorted water rights, and lack of access to essential 
infrastructure for more effective land use (Moyo, 2000b). ESAP did not invest in developing 
infrastructure as a way of increasing agricultural productivity and rural development. Its policy 
influences included incentives from currency depreciation, agricultural market liberalization, 
agricultural export market promotion subsidies, and trade liberalization benefits on lowered 
tariffs for imports of inputs and equipment, and labour deregulation (Moyo, 2000b).  
 
In fact, the policy direction recommended minimal state involvement. In the context of land 
issues, the ESAP policy advice of the World Bank propounded that land reform should be 
community driven with communities developing local land reform plans and to identify the 
demand for and potential supply and price of land.  This approach however was based on an 
underlying assumption that the communities had equal standing with the landholders to 
negotiate for the land. This arrangement could have worked if there were strong social 
movements with necessary back up. As a result, this policy advice did not yield substantial 
results but left the status quo unchanged where the landless masses were becoming restless due 
to the other effects of ESAP. As a result of the shift in policies, there was heightened land 
commodification from various newly formed indigenous black farmers' interest groups grew 
who were being affected by the pressure of the liberalization policies. Organizations such as 
the Smallholder Ostrich Corporation, the Zimbabwe Ostrich Producers' Association, and the 
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Indigenous Commercial Farmers' Union promoted new export land uses, which meant that the 
demand for land would increase (Moyo, 2000b).   
 
As the adverse effects of liberalisation policy began to emerge, the country was hit by a 
devastating drought in 1992 (Sachikonye, 1992; Stoneman, 1992). This adversely affected food 
supplies in the country, notably between 1990 and 1994, with the general price index increasing 
by 168%; for food it increased by 225% (Sachikonye, 1992). This had a greater impact on the 
poor, as food represented a higher proportion of their expenditure (Gibbons, 1996: 380). This 
view is corroborated by Abalu et al (1999) when they observed that the household food security 
was compromised by the removal of subsidies for fertilisers and seeds and of rural credit and 
the erosion of agricultural marketing services, especially in remote areas. The World Bank 
itself acknowledged the failure of ESAP when they noted that: 
Trade liberalisation and the rationalisation of tariff, tax and export incentive regimes 
need to be sequenced carefully. The failure in Zimbabwe to properly synchronise these 
measures and to establish the conditions for rapid expansion of exports early on, placed 
many domestic firms at a disadvantage and delayed the supply response. 
 
Sachikonye (2003) corroborates the self-admission of the World Bank when he observed that: 
For a program launched with such a huge political fanfare, the outcome of the ESAP 
was most unimpressive. First, growth was almost stagnant at less than an average rate 
of one per cent between 1990 and 1995. In particular, the volume of manufacturing 
output sank below the pre-adjustment period (ZCTU, 1996)… the combination of high 
interest rates, devaluation and low domestic demand hurt certain sub-sectors, especially 
the textile, clothing and metal sub-sectors. Exports plummeted. The value of exports in 
US Dollars, which had grown at an annual average of nine percent between 1985 and 
1990, declined to an estimated three per cent average between 1990 and 1993. Statistics 
on the production volume in the first eight months of 1995 showed that half of the 
manufacturing sub-sectors has witnessed their volume fall to, or below, the levels 
recorded in 1980 (FMB, December 1995).  
 
The above citation summarises the socio economic situation of ESAP. It is this situation which 
caused a lot of discontentment among the various classes and population groups. Some of the 
frustrations were expressed through food demonstrations and the labour movement became 
more prominent in mobilising its constituency against the government.  
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One of the groups that were adversely affected was the war veterans. The majority of the war 
veterans belonged to the poor class who bore the brunt of ESAP. In the late 1990s, sporadic 
land invasions started to happen as a result of the aforementioned frustrations and 
discontentment with the status quo. The Svosve people epitomised the invasions when they 
invaded large commercial farms in Mashonaland East and refused to move unless they received 
land (Moyo, 2000). The different pathways that were used to access land have been addressed 
in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
  
In 1992 after the expiration of the Lancaster House agreement on land, the government 
amended the constitution to allow for compulsory acquisition of land through the Land 
Acquisition Act with ‘little compensation and limited rights of appeal to the courts’ (Palmer & 
Birch, 1992: 25). Some 1,471 farms were identified for acquisition on the basis of land under-
use (including derelict land), multiple farm ownership, farmer absenteeism, contiguity to 
communal areas and oversized farms in terms of their agro-ecological potential (Moyo, 2005).  
There were several cases of multiple farm ownership. Moyo (2000) notes that of the 1471 farms 
that were initially identified, these belonged to 1103 owners. One would have expected 1471 
owners for 1471 farms assuming that each farmer owned one farm. Instead, in some instances 
three of the landholders owned a total of fifteen farms, ranging from two to ten farms each, 
while 72 owners held between three and eleven farms each which accounted for approximately 
1.2 million hectares - a massive 30 per cent of the total identified area (Moyo, 2000). This 
unequal distribution of resources meant that a white minority, large-scale farmers, controlled 
Zimbabwe's economy which was mainly agrarian. Such imbalances agitated some black people 
who had fought the war of liberation with the rural poor who constituted more than 60% of the 
rural population feeling the pinch of the liberalization policies. Moyo (2000, 2001, and 2005) 
argues that the land reform was catalysed by growth of poverty, unemployment and income 
disparities.  
 
This was coupled with evidence of underutilized substantial parts of land and natural resources 
despite the continued significant growth in commercial agricultural production and tourism 
(Tekere, 2001). This narrative dislodges the neo patrimonial views (Kinsey, 2004; Zamchiya, 
2011) which asserts that the land reform was an electioneering tool to retain support of the 
electorate which was dwindling because of the repercussions of the neo-liberal policies which 
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the government had promulgated in 1991. Having looked at the history of the land question in 
Zimbabwe, the next section will demonstrate the link between social policy and land reform. 
This is important especially for the global south because land reform as a social policy 
instrument is absent in conventional social policy literature. 
 
1.6 Statement of the problem  
Social policy has been defined as ‘collective interventions directly affecting transformation in 
social welfare, social institutions and social relations’ (Mkandawire, 2007; UNRISD, 2006). 
This definition is corroborated by Adesina (2007a: 1) when he also defines social policy as ‘the 
collective public efforts at affecting and protecting the social well-being of the people within a 
given territory’. Both of the aforementioned definitions presuppose the idea of a minimum 
permissible standard of living for every human being in a given context.  Titmuss (1974:31) 
quotes Hagenbuch's definition of social policy where he noted that 'the mainspring of social 
policy may be said to be the desire to ensure every member of the community certain minimum 
standards and certain opportunities (Hagenbuch, 1958:205). This ‘minimum standard’ is 
ensured through ‘elements of social policy’ (UNRISD, 2006) such as direct government 
provision of social welfare through, for example, broad-based education and health services, 
subsidies and benefits, social security and pensions, labour market interventions, land reform 
[italics for emphasis], progressive taxation and other redistributive policies. At the core of 
social policy is the need to guarantee that every citizen in a certain ‘territory’ lives a life of 
dignity regardless of status, ethnicity, age, etc.  
 
Adesina (2009) reinforced the case for land reform when he noted that the land reform program 
that had happened in Zimbabwe needed to be viewed also from a social policy perspective. 
Researches that have been done by the Moyo (2005, 2007, 2009, 2011), Scoones (2010), 
Mutopo (2011), Murisa (2010), Chiweshe (2014) have proven that the FTLRP achieved social 
policy outcomes. This body of literature does not necessarily make a deliberate effort of 
looking at the outcomes of FTLRP from a social policy perspective. It can be argued that even 
though the land reform program might not have been conducted with a full consciousness that 
it was addressing social policy outcomes, but a thorough interrogation of the aforementioned 
literature demonstrates that the five social policy functions namely production, protection, 
redistribution, reproduction and social cohesion have been realised to varying extents. The land 
reform provided the space for the beneficiaries to enhance their productive capacity, which 
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subsequently will protect them from the vagaries of the market (Moyo, 2009). The FTLRP also 
was redistributive in nature, though there have been debates on who benefited, there has been 
convincing empirical research that the land reform benefited all classes of society (Moyo, 2009; 
Scoones, 2010). Mutopo (2011; 2012) has been vocal in identifying the reproductive outcomes 
of the FTLRP. There has been also research on the extent to which social cohesion or nation 
building has been achieved in the resettled areas (Chiweshe, 2014). This research therefore 
intends to provide a self-conscious analysis of the FTLRP from the social policy perspective 
to understand the extent to which the five tasks of social policy have been achieved. 
 
One of the reasons for the unavailability of self-conscious social policy take on the land reform 
has been the dominance of the literature on social policy by scholars from the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, resulting in the literature having 
an OECD bias (Mkandawire 2007). Understandably, these scholars have written on the 
experiences and debates of social policy from their contexts. They have also endeavoured to 
write on social policy in developing countries albeit wearing their lenses hence unable to put 
premium on social policy instruments relevant to the developing world like the land reform.  
As a result, some of the social policy tools mentioned above, which are not dominant in the 
OECD contexts have not been given due consideration on how they have contributed to the 
well-being of the people. The UNRISD (2006)’s unpacking of social policy elements included 
land reform and yet there is little to no self-conscious literature that makes the connection 
between land reform and social policy, except for Gough (2004) and Chung (2014). While the 
former scholar made cursory reference to land reform as a social policy tool, Chung (2014) 
devoted a segment of his chapter to the land reform in South Korea as a specific case of social 
policy. Despite all the available disparate literature on social policy and land reform, there has 
not been literature that appreciates land reform as a social policy instrument save for the 
researches by Gough (2004); Huch-ju Kwon & Ilcheong Yi (2008); Nitya Rao (2014); Mark 
Alan Hughes & Peter M. Vandoren (1990) and Yi et al (2014).1 This gap has been caused by 
focus on social safety nets or social assistance instead of the transformative role that social 
policy should have (Mkandawire, 2011).  Mkandawire (2005:1) laments this shortcoming when 
he notes: 
Social policy has always played redistributive, protective and transformative or 
developmental roles. Although these different roles always work in tandem and 
synergistically, the weight given to each of these elements of social policies has 
varied widely across countries and, within countries, over time. In the context of 
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development, there can be no doubt that the transformative role of social policy 
needs to receive greater attention than it is usually accorded in the developed 
countries and much more than it does in the current focus on ‘safety nets’. 
 
Ben Fine (2009: 2) echoes the above observations when he notes that social policy has been 
flawed by ‘over-generalising across ideal types which are insufficiently sensitive both in 
method and empirically to the differences in context and content of different social policies 
within and between both countries and programmes’. It is this ‘thinness’ (Mackintosh and 
Tibandebage, 2005: 144) of the literature on social policy on the one hand and of land reform 
on the other, which this research intends to address by focusing on contextually relevant social 
policy elements like land reform in Zimbabwe. 
 
Furthermore, some of the available literature consists of attempts to find ad hoc solutions to 
the social consequences of both economic decline and economic policy (Mkandawire, 2001). 
Subsequently, social policy is reduced to social assistance or social safety nets, (Holzman and 
Kozel, 2007) resulting in literature focusing more on ex post interventions not ex ante social 
policy tools (Adesina 2011). This ‘mono tasking’ (Mkandawire, 2005: 6) of social policy has 
reduced it to social protection as promulgated by scholars like Koehler (2011), and Sabates-
Wheeler and Devereaux (2004). The proposed study intends to use the transformative social 
policy conceptual framework in appreciating the multiple tasks or functions of social policy, 
not only as a mechanism to be used on the vulnerable in society (Adesina, 2011) but as a conduit 
for development in its holistic sense. 
 
As has been noted earlier, there has been a lot of literature that has been generated on land 
reform. Unfortunately, most of this literature has been produced using neopatrimonial 
narratives which reduce African politics and the state to endemic ‘corruption’, ‘patronage’, and 
‘tribalism’ (see de Grassi, 2008; Olukoshi, 2011; Mustapha, 2002; Mkandawire, 2012), while 
overstating the virtues of neoliberal good governance (Richardson, 2005; Campbell, 2008; 
Bond, 2008). In this narrative, empirical researchers on land reform in Zimbabwe who found 
contrary evidence to the dominant narrative were labelled as partisan to the ruling party 
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) (Cliffe et al., 2011; see also 
Hungwe, 2011; Chiweshe, 2012). Moyo (2012) argued that such literature suffer from 
‘conceptual malaise’ and empirical deficiencies (Moyo et al., 2012:18). Most literature on the 
FTLRP in Zimbabwe took a Manichean perspective where it gave attention to political party 
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struggles that were ensuing during the land reform without focusing much on the social 
struggles of the time. The available literature (Scarnecchia et al., 2008; Marongwe, 2011; 
Zamchiya, 2011; Dekker and Kinsey, 2011; Cliffe et al., 2011) also took a rights and 
governance approach building on this Manichean perspective to vilify land reform in 
Zimbabwe. There have been attempts however of producing empirical literature and these 
attempts have been primarily led by the African Institute for Agrarian Studies (AIAS) led by 
Moyo (2001, 2005, 2011, 2012). Scoones et al (2010); Matondi (2012); Hanlon et al (2013) 
have also demonstrated many of the positive outcomes of the land reform process.  
 
1.7 Scope Of The Research  
The research is premised on the understanding that social policy is indispensable for enhancing 
the quality of life of citizens in a given territory. Recent literature interrogating the outcomes 
of the land reform in Zimbabwe has ‘unwittingly’ shown that the FTLRP seem to demonstrate 
meeting the multiple functions of social policy namely production, protection, redistribution, 
reproduction and social cohesion. This research therefore brings a unique perspective of 
viewing land reform as a social policy tool that can facilitate the enhancement of welfare and 
wellbeing of the citizens. Land reform rarely features in the social policy literature, while 
consideration of the welfare impact of land reform within the land and agrarian reform literature 
is largely framed by the ‘livelihood’ discourse. This thesis therefore seeks to bridge that gap 
by using a transformative social policy conceptual framework to assess the social policy 
outcomes from the Fast Track Land Reform Program that was conducted in Zimbabwe between 
2000 and 2005.  
 
1.8 Research Questions 
The overall questions which the research sought to answer were the following: 
1. To what extent did the FTLRP contribute to the welfare and wellbeing of its 
beneficiaries? 
2. To what extent were the transformative social policy functions (production, protection, 
redistribution, reproduction and social cohesion) realised through the FTLRP? 
3. What are the gender and other social relations that exist in the aftermath of the FTLRP? 
4. What are the education outcomes of the FTLRP? 
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1.9 Research Objectives  
1.9.1 Primary research objective 
The primary objective of this study is to examine the FTLRP from a social policy perspective. 
The research is concerned with the extent to which the five principal tasks or functions of social 
policy, identified in the Transformative Social Policy conceptual framework (production, 
protection, redistribution, reproduction and social cohesion/nation-building) have been met 
through the FTLRP. 
1.9.2 Secondary research objectives 
1. To explore the socio-economic factors which characterise the new land owners, the 
agrarian structure and related struggles in relation to control of land, natural resources, 
production, assets, control of labour and as well as access to markets. 
2. To identify the new social and agrarian relations that now exist in the resettled areas 
3. To examine the character of land and agrarian change since 2000 within its historical 
context 
4. To examine the education outcomes of the FTLRP on the lives of children who 
interfaced with it. 
1.10 Limitations To And Scope Of The Study  
The research looked at the FTLRP that took place between 2000 and 2005. The study only 
focused on Kwekwe District in Zimbabwe where 210 farms were distributed (Utete Land 
Commission, 2003: 69). The study focused on both A1 and A2 resettlement schemes. The A1 
resettlement scheme is where the beneficiaries got 6 hectares of arable farming land and 30 
hectares–50 hectares of common grazing lands (Mutopo, 2012). The A2 scheme is made up of 
medium commercial farms of between 20-250 or more hectares, which have replaced large-
scale commercial farming that existed before fast track land reform (Mutopo, 2012). To 
appreciate the extent of the benefit from the land reform by the beneficiary households, the 
fieldwork was for eight months. The eight months gave me conceptual understanding on how 
the households cope with the different agricultural seasons.  
 
1.11 Importance Of The Study 
This research is important because it seeks to bridge the gap between land reform and social 
policy literatures. Except for Mark Alan Hughes & Peter M. Vandoren (1990); Huch-ju Kwon 
 16 
& Ilcheong Yi (2008); Gough (2004); Nitya Rao (2014) and Chung (2014), there has not been 
self-conscious literature that provides insights on land reform as a social policy instrument. As 
a result, the land reform debate especially in Zimbabwe has been impoverished because it has 
not contextualised land reform as a social policy instrument with subsequent social policy 
outcomes. This research therefore provides a rare analysis of land reform as a conduit for 
engendering transformative social policy outcomes.  
 
Another important dimension which this research brings is its scope. This research, through an 
ethnographic approach, provides micro level exploration of the social policy outcomes of the 
land reform. This perspective allows for the identification of both intrinsic and extrinsic value 
addition of the land reform to its beneficiaries. Most of the available literature on land reform 
does not use a social policy perspective in articulating this aspect. This means that the research 
recognises that despite the processes that were undertaken in the land reform program, there 
has to be an appreciation of the value addition from the rare perspective of the beneficiaries so 
that an empirical evaluation can be made of the outcomes, success and failures of the FTLRP. 
 
1.12 Organisation Of The Thesis 
After this first introductory chapter, the thesis is organised into the following chapters: 
Chapter Two presents the theoretical underpinnings of this research. Chapter 2 presents an 
analysis of the polemical literature that has been produced on the FTLRP. The land reform 
process generated a lot of academic curiosity amongst various scholars. Inevitably, this created 
ideological polarity as the scholars analysed both the process and outcomes of land reform 
using their ideological lenses. I provide a critical analysis on the following analytical 
frameworks: the neopatrimonial approach; the human rights approach; the livelihoods 
approach and the political economy approach. While each scholar produced nuanced 
arguments anchored on their ideological grounding, I however made sure that the key strands 
of debates and submissions which the scholars made are the ones I used in providing a critique 
of the analytical framework which the scholars chose. 
 
In chapter 3, I unpacked the conceptual framework that I used in writing this thesis. I used the 
transformative social policy framework to analyse the FTLRP as a social policy tool. The 
framework was designed by scholars such as Adesina (2007), Mkandawire (2011) and the 
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United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (2011) to correct the social policy 
mono tasking (Mkandawire, 2005: 6) conceptual malaise as propagated mainly by OECD 
scholars. These OECD scholars reduced social policy to social assistance or social safety nets, 
(Holzman and Kozel, 2007) resulting in literature focusing more on ex post interventions not 
ex ante (Adesina, 2011). This mono tasking of social policy has reduced it to social protection 
as enunciated by scholars like Koehler (2011), and Sabates-Wheeler and Devereaux (2004). 
The transformative social policy conceptual framework therefore helps in conceptualising 
social policy in its broader tasks of production; protection; redistribution; reproduction and 
social cohesion. 
 
In the chapter, I also provide a nexus between social policy and development. The reason for 
this is the realisation that social policy outcomes are measured using social development 
indicators. I demonstrate that social policy instruments are conduits for the achievement of 
social development in any society. I identify five areas of mutuality between development and 
social policy. First, there is a common interest in investing in human capabilities. Secondly, 
both social policy and development emphasise the inseparability of economic and social 
policies. Thirdly, both development and social policy put significance emphasis on social 
justice, which can be achieved amongst other means, through redistribution.  Social capital is 
considered as a process and an outcome of development and social policy in view of Midgley’s 
(2005) argument that communities with higher social cohesion have a high degree of social 
capital and economic well-being. Both social policy and development recognise the 
involvement of the state in achieving desired outcomes. I argue that social policy should ideally 
be considered as an element of development process and planning—along with economic 
policy. It is more than development because outside of deliberate development efforts, social 
policy like economic policy still subsists. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses methodological issues of the thesis. In this chapter, I first tackle issues of 
research philosophy, giving attention to the paradigm wars that exist between interpretivists 
and positivists. I then give attention to the mixed methods approach, which is the research 
design for this thesis. I note that whilst the thesis uses the mixed methods approach, it has an 
inclination towards the qualitative mixed methods research design. The methods used for data 
collection include in-depth interviews with land beneficiaries, key informant interviews, focus 
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group discussions and systematic observation. I outline the pros and cons of using these tools 
in data collection. For quantitative data, I rely on the baseline studies that were conducted by 
AIAS in 2008-2009 and 2013-2014. The baselines covered six districts, including Kwekwe 
District. The baseline surveys primarily provide data on the production and redistribution 
functions of social policy. In the chapter, I chronicle the challenges that I experienced in data 
collection, especially in view of the fact that land reform is a highly polarised subject in 
Zimbabwe. I outline the ethical considerations I observed inter alia, confidentiality on the 
collected data, obtaining informed consent from the respondents, voluntary participation of the 
interviewees, and not exposing the research participants to any form of risk through the 
research.  
 
In Chapter 5, I set the context for discussing the findings of the research. I argue that from the 
interactions and interviews with the farmers, I realised that there was a general assumption in 
literature that the period between the time when beneficiaries got land (2000-2001 mostly), the 
circumstances were similar therefore the outcomes of the FTLRP should be evident. I note that 
from my interacting with the land beneficiaries, there are three phases in which the land 
beneficiaries put their time after getting the land. The three phases are 2000-2006; 2007-2008 
and 2009 to current. The chapter shows that in all the three phases, there were different 
dynamics with different implications for the situation that is prevailing on the farms right now. 
The first phase was characterised by farmers occupying the land and most of them 
enthusiastically working on the land. The production trends show that whilst productivity 
drastically dropped between 2001 and 2002, there was a gradual increase in productivity up to 
2006. This was despite the 2002 drought which affected farmers’ yields. The second phase of 
2007 to 2008 was observed by the farmers as the one when they were taken back to the starting 
point. This phase was characterised by drought and hyperinflation. Due to the latter, the Grain 
Marketing Board could not pay farmers for the agricultural produce which they had sold to the 
marketing board in good faith. This meant that most farmers did not have capital to use for the 
season that followed, hence they had to start afresh. The third phase is linked to the second one. 
To salvage the hyper-inflationary environment, the government introduced a multicurrency 
system, with the US Dollar being the main currency. This compounded the situation for the 
farmers as they did not have means to get much needed capital to invest in the proceeding 
agricultural season. Hence, phase three is about farmers trying their own efforts without much 
help from the state.  I argue therefore that understanding social policy outcomes of the FTLRP 
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has to be done in the context of these three phases in order to fully appreciate what is happening 
currently.   
 
In Chapter 6, I interrogate the redistributive social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. In the 
chapter, I demonstrate that one of the major outcomes of the FTLRP has been the changed 
agrarian structure from a bi-modal to a tri-modal structure. The new agrarian structure has 
about 150 000 households settled under the A1 scheme and 30 000 under the A2 scheme with 
some transnational agro estates still operational around the country. The new agrarian structure 
has created a broad base for the peasantry in its variegated categories. I posit that the process 
had its own shortcomings since it was mostly a revolution from below. As a result women did 
not get access to land on equal footing as men. This was mainly pronounced in A2 resettlement 
scheme where in Sherwood Farm, no women received A2 plots. There is general consensus 
among scholars that between 13-22% of the land beneficiaries are women. The majority of the 
women then accessed land through their husbands, which reinforces the patriarchal nature of 
the society. I further argue that the land beneficiaries brought their cultural values in the way 
they relate to land. As a result, the allocated plots have been subdivided by the households to 
make provision for tsewu for the women and the main field for the household. I however 
observe that this increases the burden of labour on women as they are supposed to work on 
their tsewu at the same time contribute to the household plot. 
 
In the chapter, I also provide detailed accounts of how the land beneficiaries accessed the land 
in Kwekwe District. Some of the beneficiaries got the land during informal farm occupations, 
which were mainly orchestrated by the war veterans as similar to other districts studied by 
scholars such as Scoones et al (2010), Murisa (2007, 2010), Sadomba (2011) and Mkodzongi 
(2013). The majority of the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District got the land through formal 
allocation by the government. Concerning the profiles of land beneficiaries, the data I collected 
and that of AIAS refutes the narrative that only the elite benefited from the FTLRP. Civil 
servants, former farm workers, senior politicians, war veterans and ordinary citizens all 
benefited from the FTLRP, albeit to different extents. The beneficiaries also had varied 
educational levels ranging from no formal education to tertiary qualifications such as degrees. 
The average age of the land beneficiaries is 55 years. About farm residency trends, I observe 
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that most beneficiaries in A1 type of farming, especially the villagised type, reside on the farms 
they were allocated.  
 
I premised Chapter 7 on the understanding that production is a centrepiece in the realisation of 
social policy outcomes. Hence, enhancement of the productive potential of members of society 
is a key variable in ensuring that social policy outcomes become a reality for the people. This 
chapter therefore answers the production question of what land beneficiaries are doing with the 
land they got, looking at both agricultural and non-agricultural activities.  I argue that in 
appreciating the productive outcomes of the FTLRP, it is imperative to realise that it was not 
every land beneficiary’s aspiration to consider agriculture as a business, which subsequently 
would contribute to national development. Some of the farmers I spoke to noted that their 
motivation for participating in the land reform exercise was to be able to get a musha for their 
children.  It seemed though that the government was well aware of this as can be explained by 
coming up with A1 farms meant for family production, compared to A2 and LSCF designed 
for commercial production.  
Overall, production trends showed a slump between 2001 and 2002. This was caused by a 
severe drought as well as the shocks of the land reform exercise. Thereafter, there was a gradual 
rise in production patterns for sorghum, tobacco and maize. In 2008, production of these crops 
fell to unprecedented levels. From 2009, despite the challenges which farmers faced, there was 
a gradual rise again in production, although the levels of productivity are still lower than those 
of years before 2000. 
 I observe also that export and cash crops are mostly produced by A2 farmers. Tobacco 
production has however been on the rise across all the settlement models because of the support 
of private companies through contract farming arrangements. Even in districts such as Kwekwe 
which had no history of tobacco farming, farmers are slowly adopting this export crop. I note 
that, land utilization is still constrained by access to inputs and capital, while recurrent droughts 
pose challenges to grain production, which is sensitive to the rainfall patterns. Diversified 
markets now exist for a wide range of commodities produced by rural households beyond the 
state marketing system. 
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In the chapter, I also cover the issue of agricultural financing, attending to the question of how 
the land beneficiaries are coping with this aspect. I observe that after the collapse of the 
agricultural system in 2008, the government has not been able to provide adequate support to 
the farmers. As such, issues of means of production such as inputs, access to tools, labour and 
access to information about agriculture pose challenges to farmers. As a coping mechanism, 
farmers have come up with ways of mitigating the impact by sharing productive tools and 
information. Further, I interrogate the availability and accessibility of quality extension 
services in Kwekwe District. I observe that indeed extension services are available and also 
accessible though their quality is low due to inadequate resourcing. I end the chapter by looking 
at non-farming activities which take place on the resettled farms. In the context of Kwekwe 
District, gold panning is a pronounced activity so I attend to the nuances around this issue.  
 
I argue that the FTLRP created new agrarian labour structure which has resulted in the semi-
proletarianisation of labour. Most farm workers do not have farm tenancy as was the case under 
white farmers. This has led to a situation where they roam from one farm job to another while 
negotiating a wage for each task being based at the compounds where farm workers used to 
stay. Under this arrangement, they are able to engage in gold panning and other productive 
non-agricultural activities. 
 
In Chapter 8, I borrow from Alva and Gunner Myrdal when they posit that social policy should 
be prophylactic. In view of this, I demonstrate that land reform is an ex ante social protection 
instrument.  I show that even in droughts and periods of economic crises, the severity of 
vulnerability is reduced for land beneficiaries.  The most immediate vulnerability that was 
reduced as a result of the FTLRP is destitution. This is because land beneficiaries have the 
opportunity to build for themselves reliable shelter. Some of the land beneficiaries have made 
the resettlement areas their home where they do not have to pay any accommodation costs. 
Further, the land beneficiaries have significant potential for food security. This is because the 
land beneficiaries can use the land to produce food for their families, grow gardens, and 
establish other income streams such as selling firewood, selling grass for thatching houses, 
gold panning and mould bricks. All these options help the land beneficiaries in diversifying 
their livelihoods.  
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I also observe that livestock is a form of insurance against the vagaries of the market and other 
exogenous factors which may affect the farmers. While livestock is a form of accumulation on 
the one hand, it is also a form of insurance when farmers are in dire straits. The farmers can 
sell their cattle, goats or chickens to get the money they may need for other things. They can 
also engage in batter trade in exchange for the products they need. Lastly, they can use the 
livestock for food. 
 
Overall, I note that there are different levels of precarity amongst the farmers. These levels are 
characterised according to the tri-modal agrarian structure as posited by Moyo (2011). As a 
result, the farmers are affected differently by such things as droughts and economic crises. 
Farmers who fall into the first category of poor peasants are the hardest hit by droughts and 
economic crises. This is because they do not have diversified livelihoods that are sustainable. 
More often, they end up selling their labour to those with diversified livelihoods. Land 
beneficiaries who receive remittances from their children and are on pensions have lower levels 
of precarity compared to the land beneficiaries who do not have any reliable streams of income.  
 
Despite the challenges which farmers in resettlement areas face, their levels of precarity are 
lower than their communal areas counterparts. The means of verification for this were the 
statistics of those receiving food aid in a particular year were more in communal areas 
compared to the resettlement areas. Further, the AIAS survey showed that land beneficiaries in 
the resettlement areas indicated that they ate three meals in day whilst in communal areas the 
average number of meals per day was two. These observations show that land reform 
prophylactically reduces the levels of household vulnerability for the land beneficiaries in a lot 
of ways. 
 
Chapter 9 explores the social cohesion outcomes of the FTLRP. I used Jenson (1998)’s 
conceptualisation of social cohesion which denotes that there is vertical and horizontal 
cohesion. I acknowledge that several scholars have attended to the function of social cohesion 
outcomes of the FTLRP albeit using primarily the horizontal cohesion lenses. In the chapter, I 
show that the FTLRP brought people of different backgrounds, religious beliefs and value 
systems together. Be that as it may, they were faced with similar challenges which made them 
to collaborate as they tried to solve these challenges. In the process of doing that, there were 
trust issues amongst the beneficiaries in some instances suspecting each other of witchcraft. 
Despite these suspicions, land beneficiaries collaborated, in some instances, successfully whilst 
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in other instances without much success. I observe that the collaboration of the farmers 
transcends the tri-modal agrarian structure’s categorisation of the farmers. A1 farmers work 
with A2 farmers in solving common challenges such as water and building of schools. The 
building of Bonstead Secondary School is one example of a project where the farmers are 
working together to make sure that the school is established. This project is on the road to 
succeeding since most of the materials needed have been provided by the farmers. The success 
of this project is because, for the A1farmers who are not able to provide financial contributions, 
they avail themselves for labour. An example of a project that was not so successful was the 
Umlala Water Project. The failure of the project was because when financial contributions were 
needed, most farmers in A1 resettlement scheme were not able to raise the required amounts, 
to the frustration of A2 farmers who could meet their part of the bargain.  
 
The other major areas of cooperation for the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District is on sharing 
productive tools and participation in farmer groups. As a result, there has been some solidarity 
amongst the farmers as they help each other to solve common problems. I observe that one 
institution in horizontal cohesion that has played an instrumental role in bringing people 
together is the church. Through it, members have come up with mutual aid societies (mikando) 
where they support each other in addressing challenges they face.  
 
Chapter 10 does not necessarily address one of the transformative social policy functions as 
other findings chapters. Instead, the chapter explores educations outcomes of the FTLRP since 
it had pronounced outcomes. The reason for focusing particularly on education is that human 
capital development is a centrepiece in increasing productivity in any context. As such, in 
exploring the outcomes of the FTLRP, it is imperative to appreciate the extent of human capital 
investment that subsequently leads to increased productivity which would culminate in 
economic development. Beyond contributing to economic development through labour and 
skills, education is an entry point to increasing one’s (capability set) opportunities and options 
to realise one’s full potential.  
 
I argue that the major education outcome of the FTLRP was increased accessibility of both 
primary and secondary education in the resettled areas. Secondary education significantly 
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increased (31 percent) in Kwekwe District mainly due to the absence of secondary schools in 
the farming communities prior to the land reform program. Consequently, the demand for 
education in resettled areas inevitably compromised quality of the education provided. Some 
of the factors which compromised the quality of output from the satellite schools include inter 
alia, distances which the children have to walk to and from school, poor welfare of the teachers 
thereby affecting their motivation in school, and inadequate infrastructure. 
 
Finally, Chapter 11 is a summary of the thesis and provides an in-depth discussion of the major 
findings from the study. It ties up various conceptual strands with empirical data and provides 
a way forward for research around social policy tools that are relevant for the global south. 
 
1.13 Conclusion  
This introductory chapter sets the foundation of the thesis by framing the central questions 
analysed in this study. The thesis comes from an appreciation that there has been a lot of 
attention given to the process and outcomes of the FTLRP. Some of the scholars who have 
written on this subject have grappled with some of the social policy outcomes without however 
a conscious focus on these as social policy outcomes.  
 
I noted in this chapter that the major contribution of this thesis to the body of knowledge is its 
exploration of the extent to which the FTLRP achieved social policy outcomes. This is 
important because for a long time land reform has not been generally considered as a social 
policy tool in the main stream social policy literature. The reason for this is that social policy 
literature has been dominated by OECD scholars who naturally focused more on social policy 
tools that are more relevant to their contexts. Consequently, social policy tools from the global 
south, such as land reform, have not featured in any significant way in mainstream social policy 
literature.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The FTLRP invoked a lot of ideological grandstanding on interpreting how the land reform 
transpired. This chapter provides an analysis of the various literature on land reform as well as 
the polemical analytical frameworks which were used by scholars to write on the process and 
outcomes of the land reform. The research outputs of the scholars have been influenced mainly 
by the analytical frameworks they chose to employ in assessing both the FTLRP processes as 
well as outcomes (Scoones, 2009). The choice of framing was driven mainly by ideological 
commitment of the scholars, instead of simply analytical considerations. In view of this, I 
decided in this chapter to explore the literature with a special focus on the approaches which 
the various scholars used. My review of the literature as well as analysis of the various 
approaches which scholars used, focusing mainly on the crucial strands of the scholars’ 
arguments. It is worth noting that there are a lot of overlaps amongst the analytical frameworks 
that were employed by the scholars. The following analytical frameworks will be examined: 
the neo-patrimonial approach, the human rights approach, the neo-liberal approach, the 
livelihoods approach, and the political economy approach. 
 
2.2 Right of conquest justification for redistribution 
One of the myths which provides premise of some of the approaches used by scholars 
mentioned below stems from the perspective that the land rights held by the white minority 
over the land they expropriated should have enjoyed social and political legitimacy. This notion 
is advanced by Floyd (1959) when he notes that 'the historic fact that Southern Rhodesia was 
finally occupied and subdued by force of arms, and that the Europeans are thereby the heirs to 
land by right of conquest, is also advanced as justification for land apportionment'. He further 
argues that when Cecil John Rhodes won a military victory in 1889 in what is now Zimbabwe, 
and gave large tracts of land to victorious soldiers – evicting the occupants. Floyd argues that 
it is a natural principle of war that the defeated people become subjects to the victors with their 
land and any other possessions liked by the victors becoming properties of the latter.  This 
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argument has been challenged by several scholars who posit that acquisition of property by 
conquest is not part of international law unless in limited circumstances of a just war.2  
 
This line of thinking legitimises the skewed agrarian structure where the white minority 
dominated agricultural production and excluded local black farmers from the production of 
certain products such as tobacco, wheat and flowers. Hanlon et al (2012) posit that the 
liberation war was fought to regain control over alienated land making the land symbolic, 
having economic and social value. This notion is corroborated by Sacco (2008: 346) when he 
argues that access to land is a means of achieving economic, social and cultural rights especially 
in a country such as Zimbabwe where land remains the premier factor of production. Access 
to arable and fertile land becomes a determinant factor in fighting poverty. The nationalist 
scholars argue that the liberation war in Zimbabwe was fought in part to reclaim the land, so 
simply taking it back is an important goal (Hanlon et al, 2012). One can then use Floyd’s 
conquest argument, albeit in reverse, to argue that when the whites were defeated in the war of 
liberation, which subsequently compelled them to resort to the negotiating table, the liberation 
war victory similarly legitimized repossession of land since the victors of the war were the 
majority blacks. In international law, this would pass the test of a just war since the land had 
been expropriated violently previously.  
 
Sacco (2008: 347) takes this argument further by noting that the preconception that the land 
belonged to white commercial farmers and everyone else received land as largesse of the state 
or political entity is flawed. This is because if indigenous communities were seen as holding 
rights to restitution and compensation after colonialism, for the deprivation of property, this 
would have allowed a rational basis to question the moral and legal rights of white farmers to 
farms settled during the farm occupations under the fast track land reform program (Sacco, 
2008:349).  
 
Sacco further argues that under international law, each government inherits the obligations 
undertaken by its predecessors on the basis that the obligations are undertaken on behalf of the 
state. The government of Zimbabwe is the descendent in title of the southern Rhodesian, 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland governments and therefore would be liable for any wrong done by the 
previous government. A claim against the government of Zimbabwe for the unlawful acts of 
its predecessor in title is the easiest claim to make considering the obvious link between the 
government of Zimbabwe and acts perpetuated by the state under precious, if illegitimate, 
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regimes. A strong argument can be made that the government of Zimbabwe owed 
compensation and restitution to the people dispossessed by colonialism. 
 
2.3 The fast track land reform process 
The land Reform and Resettlement Program Phase 1 was done from 1980s up to 1996. This 
phase included the first ten years when the Lancaster House Agreement was in effect.3 Soon 
after the lapsing of the Lancaster House provisions, the government of Zimbabwe embarked 
on neo liberal policies. Mbaya (2001) argues that the post-colonial Zimbabwe government was 
under a lot of external pressure on how it executed the land reform program. As a result, Phase 
1 of the land reform program was in tandem with global trajectories while securing the interests 
of local white and black capital. 
 
The failure of ESAP exacerbated the frustrations and discontentment which already existed 
amongst the war veterans, the peasantry and urban workers who had lost their jobs. The 
situation was aggravated by government’s reduced role in regulating the provision of public 
goods such as education and health, an outcome of the structural adjustment package. It is the 
argument of scholars such as Moyo and Yeros that the discontent over the ‘snail pace’ (Kinsey, 
2004) with which government was resolving the land issue led civil servants, the rural folks 
and war veterans to invade white owned commercial farms (Moyo and Yeros, 2007a). The 
discontentment of the peasantry has come to be epitomised by the Svosve people in the Svosve 
communal lands near Marondera.4 These displayed vigorous discontentment of the state’s 
collaboration with white farmers. Their major issue was that the government had not done 
enough to fulfil the promises they had made of redressing colonial wrongs of land expropriation 
(Magaisa, 2010). 
 
2.3.1 Organisation of the FTLRP 
The organisation of the fast track land reform program has been a subject of polemical debates 
amongst scholars. In this section I will explore the various debates that have been posited by 
the different scholars. The process and organisation of the FTLRP pits two sides with 
diametrically opposed views. On the one hand, there are scholars who argue that the FTLRP 
was a stage managed project by ZANU PF in an effort to gain traction with the electorate after 
the opposition forces started gaining power proven by their victory in the February 2000 
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constitutional referendum vote. This argument is advanced by such scholars as Hammar et al 
(2003), Raftopoulos (2004), Rutherford (2007), Moore (2005), Zamchiya (2011) to mention a 
few.  
 
On the other hand, there are scholars such as Moyo (2005, 2011), Scoones (2010, 2015), 
Helliker (2006), Sadomba (2011), Murisa (2007), Chambati (2011), Chiweshe (2012), 
Mkodzongi (2013) who argue that the FTLRP was a bottom up initiative that cannot be 
considered as a monolithic neopatrimonial project. In support of this argument, Moyo (2001:3) 
posits that the historicity of the land movement during the post-independence period: 
…[were] an ongoing social phenomenon in both urban and rural areas of Zimbabwe, 
before and after the country’s independence… the 2000-2001 occupations mark a 
climax of a longer, less public and dispersed struggle over land shortages and land 
demand in the post-independence period. 
 
This argument about a longue duree movement has been criticised by another school of thought 
(Sachikonye, 1994; Alexander, 2003; Hammar and Raftopoulous, 2003; Raftopoulous 2003) 
for not providing an explanation the sudden eruption that was experienced in 2000 revolving 
around significant violence in the rural areas, the precipitating economic meltdown and the 
imminent elections. These events are often labelled as insinuating circumstances for the state, 
ZANU PF and President Mugabe to actively intervene in the land occupations and to use the 
land issue as a scapegoat for the continued control of power. These scholars’ argument falls 
short in that it disconnects the 2000 ruptures from the previous periods and yet there is an 
intricate symbiosis which makes the year 2000 the climax year (Sadomba, 2008: 147). 
 
This notion is attested by Hanlon et al, (2012) then they note that the war veterans became 
increasingly restless and began to take action. There were more than 1,000 occupations of white 
commercial farms between March and April 2000. Sadomba (2011: 80) argues that war 
veterans were an embodiment of this anti-colonial demand (Kriger, 1995), although a scattered 
peasant movement had dominated land struggles until 1996 as postulated by Moyo (2001). The 
war veterans as a social category were constituted by a movement of former military youth and 
so called former refugees, whose nucleus were fighters of the Zimbabwe’s liberation war. 
 
He further argues that the state had actively suppressed the war veterans’ movement in the 
1980s. In 1997 however, the state conceded to provide for their welfare and financial demands. 
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In trying to meet its promises, the government gave war veterans $Z50 000 each as financial 
compensation and further monthly payments of Z$2,000 – from unbudgeted funds. Also, as part 
of the conditions of a truce between the state and the war veterans, President Robert Mugabe 
promised to redistribute land. This promise was not honoured. The war veterans then started a 
movement which became militant, challenging settler capital, the state, ZANU PF elite and the 
presidency from 1998. This caused sharp class conflicts in the polarisation of land politics and 
state/society relations. Chaumba et al (2003) notes that after the people had settled in 2001 
state agricultural extension service arrived to allocate plots formally, using technical criteria of 
the colonial period and the base commanders had been joined by village committees, with 
chairman, secretaries and women and youth league members. 
 
Moore (2005), Hammar et al (2003), Raftoupoulos (2004) and others argued that it was the 
ZANU-PF directing its cronies to invade land to shore up its declining electoral prospects as 
the 2000 elections drew near. Scoones et al (2010) have argued that in the Masvingo areas the 
land invasion was complex in motivation, drivers, and duration—with a combination of 
grassroots driven and state-directed land invasions. Ruling party politicians initially 
condemned the invasions. Thus John Nkomo (then Minster of Home Affairs) argued: 
If we allowed this kind of behaviour it will spread like a veld fire. The law will take its 
course if irregular settlers refuse to move back to their villages. Policy cannot be 
compromised [quoted in Sithole et al 2003:4] 
Helliker et al (2008) argues that measures taken against the squatters generally failed and 
squatters would even return to their site of eviction. As well, squatters were often encouraged, 
supported and protected by local party leaders (Zishiri, 1998:13). At times national ZANU-PF 
figures expressed qualified support of squatters, arguing though that the peasantry was 
expressing its long standing grievance against racially based land distribution and not a 
dissatisfaction with the pace of the land reform set by the government. Clearly, squatting in the 
late 1990s was ‘a macro challenge at national level’ (Zishiri, 1998: v) 
 
Moyo (2001:321) argues in his theory of social movement that there is a conspicuous ‘unbroken 
chain of rural action by semi-proletariat’ with the FTLRP as the climax of constant and 
consistent struggled over land (Moyo, 2001: 314). Interestingly, Richardson (2005) agrees with 
this notion when he notes that ‘war veterans saw the commercial farms as a just prize for having 
supported Mugabe during the independence movement 20 years earlier, and they continued to 
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clamor for the commercial farmland prior to the 2000 parliamentary election’ [emphasis 
added]. Whilst Richardson is a prominent critic of the process of the FTLRP as having been 
stage managed by the state for patronage purposes. In the citation noted, Richardson seem to 
be acknowledging that the FTLRP was not a top down initiative, but started at the grassroots 
where war veterans ‘continued to clamor’ for the land, an argument which Moyo has made 
through the use of the ‘unbroken chain’ imagery. 
 
I concur with Scoones et al (2010) that the FTLRP cannot be simplified using a single narrative. 
The process was complex with different dynamics depending on the area. In Masvingo 
Province, Scoones et al note that the process was driven by the war veterans and the state later 
come in to regulate and standardise the processes. This approach was also noted by Mkodzongi 
in Mhondoro Ngezi area which is in Mashonaland West Province. Scoones et al’s (2010) 
observations are in harmony with Sadomba (2008:159) who argues that 
The organisation of land occupations from 1998 to 2001 reflects complex relationships 
of forces within the liberation movement in the post-independence period. Lower 
classes of peasants, farm workers, the urban unemployed and poor war veterans who 
participated in the liberation struggle in various ways only to be abandoned after 
independence by the ruling clique meant that there was a simmering volcano waiting 
for eruption at any moment… 
Helliker et al (2008:18) corroborate this argument when they note that:   
…there were clear signs of volunteerism and spontaneity in the pattern of physical 
movements between the communal lands and occupied farms, involving a rich diversity 
of individuals, motivations and interests that cannot be reduced to some ill-defined 
state-cum-party poltical manipulation.  
 
This line of argument is supported by Moyo who posits that the origins and processes of the 
FTLRP cannot be explained away as being driven merely by a monolithic neopatrimonial 
agenda as it was complex. 
 
The detailed chronicle of the whole process in different contexts has been documented by 
several scholars (see inter alia Sachikonye, 2002; Hammar et al., 2003 Moyo and Yeros, 
2007a; Murisa, 2010; Scoones et al, 2010; Sadomba 2011; Chiweshe, 2012; Moyo and 
Chambati, 2013 Hanlon et al., 2012; Zamchiya, 2013; Mkodzongi, 2013). 
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In the quest for empirical evidence on the FTLRP outputs, the African Institute for Agrarian Studies 
conducted a baseline study in 2005-2006 covering 6 districts which were purposively sampled. 
The study indicated that 14.5 percent of the beneficiaries had obtained the land through invasions. 
9.7 percent of the land invaders then formalised their occupations. The table below illustrates that 
the majority of the land redistribution process was conducted in a formal process on the 4 8745 
farms that were gazetted by the government when they were establishing control of the process.  
Table 2.1: Mode of land access for beneficiaries6  
Mode of land access  A1 A2 Total 
No. % No. % No. % 
Formally allocated 1285 83.0 336 81.2 1621 82.6 
Occupations  158 10.1 33 8.0 191 9.7 
Both formal & occupation 69 4.5 25 6.0 94 4.8 
Purchasing  37 2.4 20 4.8 57 2.9 
Total  1549 100.0 414 100.0 1963 100.0 
Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey (2009) 
Only 1000 farms were occupied before formalised land allocation by the government. These 
observations of the AIAS Baseline dispel the general narrative peddled by neopatrimonial 
scholars who argued that the land redistribution program was chaotic and characterised by 
anarchy (Hammar et al., 2003; Hellum and Derman, 2004). These scholars further note that the 
Fast Track Land Reform Programme was a highly centralized and discretion-based political 
process, not human rights based (Ibid). In support of this narrative, Ikdahl et al (2005) noted 
that ‘the FTLRP was legitimized ex post facto through constitutional changes’. They further 
argued that the state largely adopted a state-centric rights approach. 
 
On the contrary, formalised land allocations were spread over time, place and between the two 
land allocation schemes (A1 and A2) (Chaumba et al., 2003, Murisa, 2007 and Hanlon et al., 
2012). In the year 2000, there was a lot of activity on land allocations. This is when the land 
invasions were taking place. After the formalisation of the program by Vice President Joseph 
Msika on the 15th of July 2000, the subsequent processes became formal and those who had 
invaded sought to regularise their occupations. 
 
The land redistribution exercise that was led by Government picked momentum towards the 
end of 2000 when the 3 000 farms were gazette. In the same breadth, in May 2001, the Rural 
Land Occupiers Act Chapter 20:26 was promulgated which protected people who had occupied 
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land on or before the 1st of March 2001. The same Act deemed illegal any occupations that 
were to happen after the passing of this law with the state committing to evicting them. This 
however did not stop land occupations as they continued albeit at a low scale. 
 
2.4 Diction of ideological framing 
The naming of the FTLRP has been a subject of attention from various scholars coming from 
diverse ideological persuasions. Some scholars have called it ‘jambanja’ (Chaumba et al, 2003) 
literally meaning violence or angry argument. They further note that jambanja was used subtly 
in different contexts to refer to people who conducted the farm occupations and also places 
where the farm occupations had taken place. While this term was used in some quarters to 
describe the land reform, it gave insight into one’s perception of the land reform by the terms 
which they used to call it. Scholars who considered the process to be of jambanja chose the 
neopatrimonial analytical framework, thereby calling the white farmers ‘victims’ who were 
dispossessed of ‘their land’ using unorthodox means. This narrative is closely linked to the one 
which calls this process ‘land grabbing’.  
 
The naming of the process also suggests that the redistribution, overall, took an acrimonious 
approach. This however is not a true depiction of the process as the AIAS Baseline has shown 
that in most of the areas, the processes were without violence. This diction rides of the teleology 
and sensationalism that the media and some quarters of civil society adopted in portraying the 
process of the FTLRP. It further implies that there is a party that is forcefully taking from an 
unwilling party who then becomes the ‘victim’. Scholars belonging to this narrative have 
blamed the FTLRP for promoting environmental destruction and land degradation. The newly 
resettled farmers have been accused of cutting down trees and overexploiting wildlife and other 
natural resources rather than farming (Masekesa, 2012). Off-farm livelihood activities such as 
gold panning, hunting and harvesting of non-timber forest products, which have increased in 
the aftermath of land reform, have been ‘criminalised’ as evidence of environmental banditry 
brought about by the land reform (Saxon, 2011; Bell, 2012). 
 
2. 5 Approaches To FTLRP Outcomes Debates 
The proceeding section reviews approaches that have been used by scholars in interrogating 
the outcomes of the FTLRP. While some of the approaches have overlaps, I have identified the 
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dominant strands that are posited by the scholars who use each approach. Kirk Helliker (2011) 
acknowledged this when he summarised the debates around this issue as: 
Polarized between a minority position that argues that the radical restructuring of 
agrarian capital has served as a progressive tendency that has opened up opportunities 
for black small-scale farmers, and a majority position that insists that land redistribution 
has dramatically undercut agricultural production, thereby severely compromising food 
security for most Zimbabweans. This latter position “brings to the fore violent state 
action in instigating land occupations and in thwarting political opposition to ‘fast 
track’ (Helliker, 2011). 
The proceeding section of the thesis seeks to unpack the major approaches to the debates by 
providing a ‘face to face’ engagement with the literature from the polarised perspectives. 
Moore (2004) has characterised this schism among left leaning academic commenters as 
between ‘patriotic agrarianists’ and critical cosmopolitans’, and all sides of the debate have 
aired their views, often coming to much more accommodating positions along the way. 
 
2.5.1 The neopatrimonial approach 
Mkandawire (2015) describes neopatrimonialism as a narrative that has been used to describe 
‘different styles of exercising authority, idiosyncratic mannerisms of certain individual leaders, 
and social practices within states’. Bach (2012:221) posits that: 
Neopatrimonialism provided the ‘common denominator’ for a range of practices that 
are highly characteristic of politics in Africa, namely despotism, clannish behaviour, 
so-called ‘tribalism,’ regionalism, patronage, ‘cronyism,’ ‘prebendalism,’ corruption, 
predation, factionalism, etc. All of these practices had . . . been frequently treated as a 
disparate collection of phenomena in the scholarly literature.” 
 
The neo-patrimonial repertoire reduces the state to be an institution that is rife with endemic 
corruption, patronage and tribalism (see de Grassi, 2008; Olukoshi, 2011; Mustapha, 2002; 
Mkandawire, 2012).  These scholars agree with Christopher Clapham’s concise definition of 
neopatrimonialism as “a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial 
type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-
legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organizations with powers which are 
formally defined, but exercise those powers . . . as a form of private property.” The scholars 
that use this approach fit niftily into the narrative on African crises’ economic collapse, political 
instability, socio-economic inequalities, corruption, crime and war, and depictions of failed, 
vampire, or collapsed African states as depicted by Bayart (1999). Chege (1997) calls the neo-
patrimonial approach to be ‘brazen name calling’  and laments that this narrative by noting that 
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there is unbridled use of anecdotes, pejorative vocabulary and vivid vignettes of all too frequent 
cases of egregious abuse of state resources and power (Mkandawire, 2015). 
 
There are several scholars who used this approach in their appreciation of the processes and 
outcomes of the FTLRP. These scholars account for the land reform process as one that ignored 
bureaucratic and technical practice of most of the post-independence period for a period of 
disorderly and violent state sanctioned appropriation of land.7 This has been held directly 
responsible for the country’s transition from ‘breadbasket to basket case’ and for ‘plunging the 
country head first into a morass of lawlessness and, ultimately starvation’. The neo-patrimonial 
approach contends that the land reform was a ZANU PF machinated response to the outcomes 
of a constitutional referendum that had been done by the state in 2000 (Sachikonye, 2002; 
Hammar, 2003). In this referendum, the majority of the electorate did not vote in favour of 
ZANU PF’s standpoint. The loss of the constitutional referendum in February 2000 was ‘the 
straw that started to [break] the ZANU PF camel’s back’ and was the direct catalyst for the 
third chimurenga (Moore 2001:255). In fear of losing the impending elections of 2002, ZANU-
PF elites initiated a process of taking over land from white commercial farmers by force as a 
desperate way of salvaging political support in the wake of a growing opposition (Moore 2012; 
Alexander and McGregor, 2013). Consequently, the state had to engage in patronage politics 
and exclusionary sovereignty over development and violence (Bracking, 2005; Raftopolous, 
2009; 2013a; Zamchiya, 2013). Richardson (2005) lucidly puts it: 
The vast differences in wealth between whites and blacks became a political 
opportunity for President Mugabe to focus upon in the run-up to the 2000 parliamentary 
election. War veterans, who had vaulted Mugabe to power in 1980, now became more 
strident; they felt that promises of land after the war had been repeatedly broken… 
Moore argues that the ruling party’s election jingles for the year 2000 and beyond – ‘anti-Blair 
vote’ and ‘the land is the economy’ – all captured the moments of the social crisis, as these 
moments facilitated an effort by ZANU PF to ‘rebuild a fading hegemonic project’ (Moore 
2003: 8) and to coagulate its external and internal sovereignty through land reform. Kinsey 
(2004: 5) corroborates the foregoing argument when he notes that the FTLRP was compelled 
by ‘Robert Mugabe’s political megalomania, to his cynical manipulation of the land issue as 
an election tool’. Andreason (2003: 385, 395-396) argues that Zimbabwe was a ‘complete 
democratic breakdown in the late 1990s in Zimbabwe and hence a decreased likelihood of 
obtaining an inclusive policy environment 
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The foregoing argument which posits that the state ‘stage-managed’ and manipulated the 
peasantry in order to rescue political power that was slipping from their hands has several 
shortcomings. The argument ignores empirical facts and reproduces a ‘history from above’ 
while the ZANU PF narrative about ‘sons and daughters of the soil’ reclaiming their land is a 
‘history from below’ (Sadomba, 2008: 159). Sachikonye (2003:234) erroneously claims that 
the occupations differed from the ones in the late 1990s in that the latter were ‘spontaneous, 
and thus not orchestrated or directed by state institutions’. 
 
Moyo (2011) dislodges the argument by inter alia Moore, Sachikonye, Raftopolous, 
Andreason, Zamchiya and Hammar on the purpose of the FTLRP. Overall, these scholars argue 
that the FTLRP was instrumentalised by ZANU PF to get political support after they realised 
through the February 2000 constitutional referendum that they were losing traction with the 
electorate. Moyo on the contrary argues that the origins and greater goal of the land reform was 
to ensure the efficient use of scarce and abundant national resources, while promoting food 
security and household self-reliance. At the same time, the land reform was aimed at achieving 
economic growth by reducing the size of land holdings per individual and allocating it to 
diverse beneficiaries that included the landless, former refugees, war veterans, the general poor 
and former commercial farm workers (Moyo, 2011).  
 
The other argument by scholars in the neopatrimonial camp is that the FTLRP benefited 
primarily the elite (see Willems, 2005). Richardson corroborates this argument by positing that 
‘President Mugabe set in motion the seizure of nearly all the 4,500 commercial farms, 
beginning in early 2000. Most ended up in the hands of Mugabe’s party supporters and 
government officials, who knew little about farming’. 
 
As the AIAS (2009) noted, what is in dispute is the character and the extent of the elites’ 
benefit. The literature that labels the land reform as elitist homogenizes a complex group of 
people without interrogating its disaggregation. As a result, inadequate attention has been paid 
to the class struggles within this group. The elitism narrative assumes that a beneficiary who is 
an employee of the state, a war veteran and a member of the security forces of the country all 
belong to ZANU PF. Further, these land beneficiaries have been assumed in the literature to 
have received the land through corrupt means. The narrative further downplays the fact that 
 36 
most of the beneficiaries of the land reform were rural based peasants, small capitalists, 
bureaucrats and traditional authorities (see Chapter 6 on redistribution outcomes). Urbanites 
and farm workers were also involved in the land occupation movement (AIAS, 2009). 
  
The preceding arguments are however not to submit that the neopatrimonial approach got it all 
wrong. There are some of their arguments which are of merit. The scholars in this camp speak 
to corruption in the allocation of the land. Moyo, a critic of the neopatrimonial approach does 
not disavow the existence of corruption (Moyo, 2011). Further, while there are sound 
arguments given for the FTLRP, it can be said that ZANU PF leveraged the momentum that 
existed for their benefit in view of the elections that were pending.  
 
2.5.2 The human rights approach  
Scholars who use the human rights approach cite several human rights violations that took 
place during the FTLRP and this section will seek to address these aspects.  These violations 
include; the illegality of the land reform itself, especially land invasions and the failure by the 
government to evict land occupiers in violation of court orders (this is also referred in some 
texts as violations of the rule of law); the abuse of farm workers and failure to include them in 
resettlement schemes; and the violation of proprietary rights- predominantly white commercial 
farmers. This line of argument further notes that land reform destroyed the Zimbabwean 
economy and caused food crises. The narrative goes further to address the issue of 
environmental degradation caused by the FTLRP. Scholars such as Richardson (2004; 2005), 
Marongwe (2002; 2003 & 2008) and Zamchiya (2011) provide the details of the human rights 
violations that occurred and the corruption by the political elite in obtaining the most fertile, 
strategically positioned pieces of land. The last perspective that this section will consider will 
be what Sacco (2008) called the right to development as enshrined in the Copenhagen 
Declaration on Social Development. 
 
2.5.2.1 Property rights 
Richardson (2005) argues that the nature of property rights in a country has a direct bearing 
towards economic growth. He further notes that damaging property rights is likely to cause a 
sudden collapse. This is his diagnosis for the economic down turn in Zimbabwe from 2000 
 37 
onwards. Richardson argues that by the year 2000, 80 percent of the white owned commercial 
farms had changed hands since independence. There were less than 5 percent of white farmers 
who could trace their ancestry back to the original British colonists who arrived in the 1890s. 
Using this argument, Richardson suggests that the land legitimately belonged to the white 
farmers since they had bought it. The white farmers therefore were entitled to the land as their 
property regardless of the history around the same land. The colonial government provided 
secure property titles for the land. This gave the white farmers incentives to efficiently manage 
the land and allowed a banking sector to loan funds for machinery, irrigation pipes, seeds and 
tools. The narrative further uses a human rights approach to analyse this process and condemns 
the state as the major duty bearer with a social contract to protect its citizenry and their property 
rights (Johnson, 2009). 
 
Richardson makes a parallelism with the communal areas where the blacks were pushed to 
when land apportionment was taking place. He argues that areas without well-defined property 
rights suffered severe erosion, as communal farming methods took their toll through slash-and-
burn agriculture. On the contrary, small- and large-scale farms with property titles (owned by 
both whites and blacks) suffer no such environmental degradation. It is worth remembering 
that not only were the lands where the Africans were made to stay arid, they were forced to 
stay crowded as has been noted in the Introduction Chapter of this thesis. Inevitably, this caused 
environmental degradation. Degeorges and Reilly (2007) corroborate this point by noting that 
since the early 1980s, the black population had increased by 60% to about 12 million 
compounding the problem of land compression, degradation and hence land hunger. This 
assertion debunks Richardson’s point where he argues that where there is no security of tenure 
like is the case in communal areas, the people do not take good care of the land. 
 
The argument about who owned the land that was redistributed by the FTLRP is not simplistic 
as has been portrayed by Richardson. Sacco (2008) counters Richardson’s argument by noting 
that: 
I consider an approach to the rights of the communities dispossessed during colonialism 
and suggest that a rights based approach to the land question in Zimbabwe should 
include attention to the question of how to deal with colonial violations of the right to 
property… the rights of commercial farmers who have had their farms expropriated 
have received international attention. However, no attention has been given to the rights 
of persons and communities that lost land, property and labour during colonial rule and 
the racist settler regime. In many instances the very same persons who were disposed 
by the colonial government still live in the arid communal areas into which they were 
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evicted more than fifty years ago. An interesting argument can be made that the victims 
of colonial expropriation are entitled to restitution and compensation 
This argument has precedence in international law. Some of the examples that could be given 
include the Mau Mau restitution in Kenya.8 It thus can be said that ownership to the land was 
not as straight forward as Richardson suggested hence the argument about property rights 
needed to be traced back to colonialism for it to hold water. Sacco (2008: 349) concludes his 
argument by noting that if indigenous communities are seen as holding rights to restitution and 
compensation for the deprivation of property during colonialism, this allows a rational basis to 
question the moral and legal rights of white farmers to farms settled during farm occupations 
under the fast track programme. 
 
2.5.2.2 Violence  
Zimbabwe experienced an increase in social and political violence between 1999 and 2003. 
Most of this violence was related to the elections and ZANU PF and MDC clashes. Inevitably, 
partisan political differences over the FTLRP meant that electoral and inter-party violence also 
affected the land reform (Sacco, 2008: 350). The situation was further compounded by the 
inherent violence of some of the war veteran-led invasions. There was also another element of 
violence caused by the commercial white farmers who were trying to defend their farms from 
invasions. Such resistance escalated the acrimony. It is worth noting that the white commercial 
farmers that experienced violence were those who themselves had a history of being violent 
with their employees or communities around (This aspect has been covered in greater detail in 
the redistribution chapter of this thesis).  
 
Sacco further argues that the land reform often gets conflated with numerous instances of 
violation of human rights committed throughout the period, such as election violence and ruling 
party violence, attack on the independence of the judiciary. It is instructive to note that human 
rights violations that took place between 1999 and 2006 were supposed to have been dealt with 
by the government. There were supposed to be prosecutions of those accused of the crimes 
committed. A misnomer however is the conflation of all the human rights violations that 
occurred between 1999 and 2003 with the FTLRP. This narrative then fails to appreciate the 
merits of the FTLRP  
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2.5.3 Right to development  
Beyond focusing on the rights that were violated, there has been an effort to focus on the rights 
that were fulfilled through the land reform. The shortcoming of focusing on the rights that were 
violated presupposes that there are some groups of people with superior rights that dare not be 
violated, and another group whose rights do not matter. The mainstream literature which gives 
attention to the violated rights focuses more on the rights of the white commercial farmers. It 
is important to look at the rights of the beneficiaries of the FTLRP and appreciate the human 
rights fulfilment that happened, if any. 
 
As shall be noted in proceeding chapters, it can be argued that land reform is a means of 
achieving economic, social and cultural rights. In a country that is agro based, access to arable 
and fertile land is a determinant of poverty and individual development. Land reform allows 
access to the resources that facilitate production of sufficient food for communities and 
individuals to feed themselves. It thus can be said that provision for land is a panacea to food 
security in the long run. This argument dislodges the argument by scholars noting that the land 
reform violated food security of the country. Looking at the FTLRP using the lenses of the 
beneficiaries makes one realise that there are a lot of rights that will be fulfilled for a whole lot 
more persons than was the situation before the land reform. 
 
Another aspect to consider on the fulfilment of rights through the FTLRP is the issue of non-
discrimination. One of the fundamental principles of human rights is non-discrimination. The 
agrarian structure that was in existence before land reform perpetuated discriminatory patterns, 
a principle that is contrary to human rights principles. The FTLRP therefore can be lauded 
attempting to address the skewed agrarian structure that was premised on discrimination.  
 
2.6 The ‘Two Lefts’ 
The other analytical paradigm used by scholars is a nationalist, populist perspective (Scoones, 
2009) that underscores that ‘the people’ took back their land through a bottom-up process 
(Hanlon et al. 2012). The process of obtaining land was therefore spearheaded by a popular 
rural movement (Moyo and Yeros, 2005) which some scholars call ‘third Chimurenga’, a 
culmination of the liberation struggle (Moyo and Yeros, 2007a).  As a result, the state and 
ZANU PF had to respond to the will of the people by backing their quest for land through 
provision of a necessary legal and technocratic framework for the redistribution of the land 
(Moyo and Chambati, 2013). This approach blends the radical political economy approach 
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(Scoones, 2009) as well as the Marxist analytical framework. The other analytical framework 
which will be looked at is the livelihoods framework. 
 
Moyo and Yeros (2007b) observed that there are two left camps that have written on the fast 
track land reform in Zimbabwe. The scholars in the first left camp include Moyo et al. 2009; 
Hanlon et al. 2012; Chambati, 2011; Murisa 2011; Mutopo, 2011; Sadomba, 2011; 
Chiweshe, 2012, Matondi, 2012. The second left is composed of such scholars as Chaumba, 
2003; Scoones et al. 2010, Scoones, 2012 and Mkozongi, 2013. The two lefts’ reading of the 
evidence from their research was incongruent to the Neopatrimonial School. The two left 
camps’ studies show that the outcomes of the FTLRP are complex and beneficiaries should 
not be homogenised as one group, like for example the elite, or the farming workers. These 
scholars have conducted extensive research in different areas of Zimbabwe.  
 
2.6.1 The livelihoods approach 
Chambers and Conway (1992) define a livelihood as comprising ‘capabilities, assets (including 
both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living’. A livelihood 
is then deemed to be sustainable ‘when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks 
and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, both now and in the future, while not 
undermining the natural resource base’ (Ibid). The foregoing definition of a livelihood provides 
a descriptive analysis which portrays a multifaceted web of activities and interactions that 
highlights the diversity of ways with which people make a living. The definition further 
suggests that livelihoods cuts across several disciplines in a bid to provide an essential counter 
to the monovalent approaches that have dominated development enquiry and practice 
(Scoones, 2009). A livelihoods approach places primary focus on the people, their assets and 
capabilities. In its enquiry, it pays attention to how the people use the resources they have, the 
scope of opportunities available to them and impediments they face in quest for elimination of 
poverty from their lives (Baumann, 2002).  The livelihoods approach uses a Sustainable 
Livelihoods Framework that was developed by Scoones (1998:4). The Framework (see Figure 
2) provides an interrogation of the policy environment of a given context, articulating the 
history, politics, macro-economic conditions, climate, demographics and social differentiation. 
Having articulated the contextual issues, the framework outlines livelihood resources which 
the people have such as natural, financial and human capital. A centre piece for accessing 
livelihoods resources are institutions and forms of organisations that act as conduits.  The 
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framework identifies three livelihood strategies which people use to cushion themselves against 
vulnerability in the context of farming. These strategies are livelihoods diversification, 
agricultural intensification and or extensification and migration. The expected livelihood 
outcomes are reduction of poverty, increased number of working days, wellbeing and 
capabilities.  
Figure 2.1 Sustainable rural livelihoods: a framework for analysis  
 
Source: (Scoones, 1998:4)  
As can be deciphered from the framework in Figure 2.1, sustainable livelihoods approach offers 
a structured way of thinking about the connections among vulnerability, poverty and 
environmental or natural resource management. The framework provides for an opportunity to 
reflect on the context, considering how different people follow a range and combination of 
livelihood strategies in view of the vulnerabilities that may characterise a given context. The 
framework further explores the interlinkages of various forms of capital, namely natural 
capital, human capital, financial capital, social capital and physical capital assets (see Giddens, 
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1979; North, 1990; Mehta et al, 1999), whilst interrogating how people leverage these to 
prevent vulnerability. The framework draws inspiration from diverse work on vulnerability and 
assets (Swift, 1989); well-being, capabilities and entitlements (Sen, 1981; Drèze and Sen, 1989; 
Leach et al, 1997.). The framework has however been criticised for taking a pentagon approach 
where it only identifies five forms of capital. There has been a push to have a hexagon approach 
for the inclusion of information capital. Odero (2003) argues that: 
Information capital is a core livelihood asset. As an important factor that affects 
people’s livelihoods, including information capital as a core asset in the sustainable 
livelihoods framework promises to improve our understanding of livelihoods, 
particularly the livelihoods of the poor. 
The framework is continually being improved by several scholars so that it can encapsulate 
some of the missing elements such as political capital as well. Despite the criticism, the benefits 
of using the livelihoods framework are widely acknowledged, including for example, their 
stress on the importance of people-centred change, a holistic approach, and people’s access to 
different assets, poor people’s vulnerability, partnerships, sustainability, change and the multi-
faceted nature of livelihoods (Dorward et al., 2003; Neely et al., 2004; Hajer, 1995). No doubt 
this approach has enriched the coverage and comprehension of the outcomes of the FTLRP. 
Since its conception, the livelihoods approach has sought to bring disparate perspectives 
together, allowing conversations across disciplinary and professional divides and providing an 
institutional bridging function linking people, professions and practices in new ways (Gieryn, 
1999). Furthermore, it is argued by Scoones and Wolmer (2003: 5) that the livelihoods 
perspective offers an important lens for looking at complex rural development questions. They 
further argue that a sustainable livelihoods approach encourages deeper and critical reflection 
which stems from looking at the consequence of development efforts from a local-level 
perspective, making the links from the micro-level, situated particularities of poor people’s 
livelihoods to wider-level institutional and policy framings at district, provincial, national and 
even international levels.  
 
In looking at the outcomes of the FTLRP, the camp that uses the livelihoods approach as 
encapsulated in Figure 2.1 includes scholars such as inter alia Scoones et al (2010), Scoones 
(2015), Mkodzongi (2013), Mutopo (2011), Mushongah (2012). These scholars have sought to 
interpret the outcomes of the FTLRP using the framework given above. Scoones et al (2010) 
demonstrated that households in Masvingo Province, where the research was focused on, had 
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invested significantly in their land by doing such things as clearing the land for it to be arable, 
drilling boreholes, obtaining farming equipment and draught power. The scholars approximate 
that, on the average, each household spent more than US$ 2,000 in these investments. The 
scholars further posit that production levels have been on the rise over the years though there 
are disparities from scheme to scheme and between households. Scoones et al (2010) and 
Scoones (2015) provide insights on investments that the land beneficiaries have done for 
increased production, the types of crops that are produced, livelihood portfolios and changes 
in the marketing of products.   
 
Using the Dorward et al’s (2009) categorisations of livelihoods status, the scholars using the 
livelihoods approach identify several livelihood pathways and patterns of accumulation from 
below (cf. Neocosmos, 1993; Cousins, 2010). This pattern is where there is a new group of 
petty commodity producers who regularly sell, continuously invest, and who are new farm 
based entrepreneurs. The literature goes further to show market linkages (both legal and illegal) 
that exist for the land beneficiaries. This aspect of marketing of the petty commodities is a 
thread that can be traced in the works of Mutopo, Mkodzongi, Chiweshe, Murisa and Scoones. 
Some of the market linkages that are outlined in the literature include cross border trading, 
bartering, extraction and selling of the natural resources on the allocated land, trying to avoid 
state control on production and pricing. 
 
Overall, the scholars endeavour to demonstrate the increased levels of household resilience for 
the land beneficiaries using several livelihood diversification initiatives. The resilience is being 
achieved through leveraging the capitals that are available to the land beneficiaries. There is 
therefore substantial literature that has been produced focusing on social capital, physical 
capital, human capital, financial capital (albeit the most lacking) and natural capital (See 
Scoones et al, 2010; Scoones, 2015; Mkodzongi, 2013; Mutopo, 2011; Mushongah, 2012; 
Murisa, 2007; Chiweshe, 2012; Richardson, 2004). 
 
Whilst the livelihoods thinking has enriched our insights on the outcomes of the FTLRP, the 
approach has several problem which need to be borne in mind when appreciating the literature 
that has been produced. The first challenge with this approach is its conceptual grounding. This 
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‘malleable concept’ (Scoones, 2009) is ahistorical and belongs to no discipline in particular. 
Scoones (2009) endeavoured to trace its origins but could hardly find any substantial 
information to prove its existence and centrality to the development discourse. Only in the 
1990s was the concept defined and those who advanced it sought to pitch it as the development 
discourse of choice. This lack of history affects this approach as it struggles to find its place 
without losing its assumed identity.  
 
There are four fundamental shortcomings of the livelihoods approach that are glaring in the 
literature that has been produced on the outcomes of the FTLRP by scholars like Scoones et 
al.(2010), Mkodzongi (2014), Scoones et al. (2014), and so forth. The first gap relates to the 
lack of interrogation of economic globalisation and monopoly finance as it relates to the 
outcomes of the FTLRP. While there is encapsulation of economic thinking in the sustainable 
livelihoods thinking, it does not do justice to this component. The quest of livelihoods thinking 
to being locally embedded, while providing place-based analysis and soliciting the views and 
participation of the poor made this discourse to be lacking in political nuances when dealing 
with global scale questions (Clarke and Carney, 2008). Whilst the sustainable livelihoods 
framework provides for analysis of the policy environment, the literature that has been 
produced on the FTLRP does little, if anything on engaging with debates about how global 
processes impinge on livelihood concerns at local level. As a result, the livelihoods literature 
on land reform has not engaged with the implications of monopoly finances’ decisions of 
alienating Zimbabwe and how these affected the outcomes of the FTLRP. Consequently, the 
livelihoods scholarship on the FTLRP borders on naive localism and idealistic liberal analyses 
that ignore the structural forces of class and capital. 
 
Bernstein et al. (1992: 24) notes that at the centre of a livelihoods approach are relations of 
class, caste, gender, ethnicity, religion and cultural identity. He further notes that understanding 
agrarian structures requires asking the basic questions: who owns what, who does what, who 
gets what and what do they do with it? The livelihoods literature neglects these important 
questions including the class formation, patterns of work and divisions of labour, the 
distribution of income and the dynamics of consumption and accumulation (Bernstein, 1992; 
Moyo, 2009). In concluding this aspect, O’Laughlin (2004: 387) corroborates the foregoing 
when she argues that: 
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Class, not as an institutional context variable, but as a relational concept, is absent 
from the discourse of livelihoods. Accordingly, political space is very limited – 
focusing mainly on ‘empowering’ the poor, without being clear about how this 
process takes place or who might be ‘disempowered’ for it to occur. 
 
Moreover, the livelihoods approach is silent about a ‘cocktail of economic and political 
sanctions’ (Chirimambowa, 2012) which Zimbabwe was subjected to. Mamdani (2008) and 
Chirimambowa (2012) provide a detailed account of how the sanctions from the United States 
of America through the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery (ZIDERA) Act and 
those imposed by the EU affected the country including the agricultural sector.  After ZIDERA 
in 2001, the Act noted that: 
The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director to each 
international financial institution to oppose and vote against– (1) any extension by the 
respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the Government of Zimbabwe; 
or (2) any cancellation or reduction of indebtedness owed by the Government of 
Zimbabwe to the United States or any international financial institution. 
 
A year later, the IMF declared Zimbabwe ‘ineligible to use the general resources of the IMF’ 
and subsequently removed it from the list of countries that could borrow from its Poverty and 
Growth Facility (Mamdani, 2008). In 2002, the IMF issued a formal declaration of non-co-
operation with Zimbabwe and suspended all technical assistance. As a result of this, the total 
foreign payments arrears increased from $109 million at the end of 1999 to $2.5 billion at the 
end of 2006 (Mamdani, 2008; Chirimambowa, 2012). Foreign direct investment shrunk from 
$444.3 million in 1998 to $50 million in 2006. Donor support, even to sectors vital to popular 
welfare, such as health and education, was at an all-time low. Danish support for the health 
sector, $29.7 million in 2000, was suspended. Swedish support for education was also 
suspended. Agriculture could not enjoy the subsidies which are essential for sustainability. 
Consequently, a proper credit facility could not be put in place for the land beneficiaries 
(Mamdani, 2008).  
 
It must be noted that the strategic underpinnings of the sanctions were to put political and 
economic pressure on selected individuals (and entities) holding political decision-making 
power in the governments (Sitt et al., 2010:46). As Tostensen and Bull (2002: 374) argued, the 
fundamental flaw in conventional sanctions theory is its assumption that hardships inflicted on 
the civilian population of a targeted state will lead to grassroots political pressure on that state's 
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leaders to change their behaviour. Furthermore, the scholars argue that the weapon of economic 
sanctions is incapable of discriminating between combatants and civilians. In the case of 
Zimbabwe, the sanctions had collateral damage in various aspects of the economy including 
the agriculture as Mamdani (2008) noted.  Unfortunately the livelihoods approach does not pay 
any attention to this even though it had direct repercussions for the outcomes of the land reform. 
 
The other gap in livelihoods approaches literature has been the lack of focus on dealing with 
long-term changes in the agrarian situation of FTLRP beneficiaries and the country as a whole.  
Livelihoods literature does not answer the question of direction and projected future of the 
agrarian structure that now exists. Since its major concern is the current state of affairs, it 
neglects some long run slow agrarian changes that may occur due to such factors as 
demographics (Tiffen et al., 1994) and the ‘intergenerationality’ of the existing agrarian 
structure which was established by the FTLRP. The literature using this approach is silent on 
aspects like climate change (Adger et al., 2003) and how it has affected the outcomes of the 
FTLRP since this does not have dynamic change which can be captured in a snapshot view as 
the livelihoods approaches usually do. Failure by the livelihoods approach to pay attention to 
these slow variables which affect agrarian relations and outcomes compromises the approach 
in articulating slow transformations of people. Some of these slow transformational areas 
which may be missed include gradual intensification of production, improving or deteriorating 
environmental conditions, long term investments in strengthening land beneficiaries’ capacity 
or migrations due to pull or push factors outside the scope of a livelihoods framework. As a 
result, the livelihoods approach does not provide insight and ideas for the generations to come 
in view of the prevailing status quo (Chambers and Conway, 1992: 26). 
 
 
Furthermore, the livelihoods approach puts premium on diversification. Scoones et al 
(2010:166) corroborates this view when he notes that ‘diversity is the watchword, and 
livelihoods approaches have challenged fundamentally single-sector approaches to solving 
complex rural development problems...’ Razavi (2006) however has reservations in broadly 
using this concept when she notes that  
‘Diversification captures several different economic processes and its blanket use to 
describe all forms of non-farm employment is misleading. It is particularly important, 
from the point of view of thinking about poverty, to distinguish between diversification 
as a survival strategy (which it very often is) and diversification that feeds into a process 
of accumulation’.  
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Most literature from the livelihoods perspective however focus on the former. There is a gap 
in interrogating accumulation that is going on among the beneficiaries of the FTLRP while 
cognisant of the different power dynamics at play both amongst the different classes and the 
broader state politics.  
 
 
The fourth failing of the livelihoods approach literature is its inability to capture the nuances 
around markets. The approach does not put emphasis on markets and their roles in livelihood 
development and poverty reduction amongst the beneficiaries of the FTLRP. Dorward et al. 
(2003) argues that if the roles of markets and market relationships are not properly addressed 
in livelihoods analysis and action, it can lead to failure in identifying and act on livelihood 
opportunities and constraints arising from critical market processes and institutional issues that 
are important for pro-poor market development. It must be noted that the livelihoods of poor 
people are directly dependent on their involvement in a range of markets as private agents or 
as employees (and are indirectly dependent on the wider economy for the demand and supply 
of goods and services) (Ibid).  
 
2.6.2 The political economy approach 
Ricardo (1817) suggested  that the political  economy analytical framework is concerned 
mainly with the  relations  and  distribution of resources  among three  classes,  namely 'the  
proprietor  of the land,  the owner of the stock or capital necessary for its  cultivation,  and the  
labourers  by  whose  industry  it is  cultivated'. This is the approach that has been used by 
Moyo et al. and the AIAS in demonstrating the outcomes of the FTLRP.  The approach focused 
mainly on power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution and 
consumption of the outcomes of the fast track land reform. Scholars using this approach further 
interrogated the emerging production and trade dynamics that are developing in the farming 
communities. They link these to the law, customs and government processes. To understanding 
outcomes of the land reform, the political economy approach paid particular attention to the 
new agrarian structure in the resettled areas by focusing on the character of redistribution of 
the land that occurred and accumulation that is happening among the land beneficiaries. The 
studies conducted demonstrated the ramifications in change of the agrarian structure from a 
bimodal to a tri-modal arrangement after the FTLRP.9 
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To demonstrate the case of transformation, the political economy literature by the 
aforementioned scholars focused both on the beneficiaries of the land reform and the prevailing 
circumstances in the communal areas where most of the beneficiaries came from. This 
approach to understanding the outcomes of the land reform provides a unique opportunity to 
compare between those who remained in the communal areas to the ones who benefited from 
the land reform. Lastly, the political economy approach located the outcomes of the FTLRP in 
the global political economy. The studies conducted demonstrated the linkages that exist 
between the production of the new farmer at a local level to national and global politics like 
economic alienation of Zimbabwe after the commencement of the FTLRP, the global recession, 
and dynamics in national politics under the government of national unity. The linkages of these 
issues to what happens on the farm provides enriching insights on understanding why the 
outcomes of the FTLRP resulted in the way they did. 
 
 
This analytical framework also focuses on the extent to which small scale farmers who got the 
land have been able to ensure productivity in order to secure their social reproduction while 
establishing a ‘broad based and inclusive local, regional and national economic development, 
that benefits the majority of the population’, as well as ecologically sustainable methods of 
farming (IPC for Food Sovereignty, 2006; cited in Borras, 2008: 144). The assessment of 
redistributive outcomes of land reform is also done at a scale beyond the individual farm or 
land reform project, and seen in the context of a new agrarian order that embodies social justice, 
socio-economic transformation, and ecological sustainability (Scoones, 2009). 
 
The major criticism of this approach however has been that it turned a blind eye to the 
unorthodox way the land reform took place in some areas where human rights were violated. 
Further, the writings using this approach have not gone into detail in highlighting any possible 
corruption that might have taken place in the process of land redistribution.  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
The FTLRP generated a lot of academic curiosity amongst various scholars. Inevitably, this 
created ideological polarity as the scholars analysed both the process and outcomes of land 
reform using their ideological lenses. This chapter has endeavoured to critique the various 
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approaches which scholars used. The following approaches were interrogated in this chapter: 
the neopatrimonial approach, the human rights approach, the livelihoods approach, and the 
political economy approach. It is important to note that these analytical frameworks were 
chosen by the scholars on the basis of their ideological standpoints. It is instructive to note that 
each of the scholars produced nuanced arguments anchored on their ideological grounding. I 
however made sure that the key strands of debates and submissions which the scholars made 
are the ones I located in their respective ideological framing implemented through the 
analytical framework which the scholars chose. The next chapter then builds on this analysis 
by unpacking the transformative social policy framework which was used in this research. The 
chapter also demonstrates the symbiotic link between social policy and development as a way 
of setting the framework for interpreting the social policy outcomes of the FTLRP.  
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: TRANSFORMATIVE SOCIAL 
POLICY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide details about the conceptual framework that I 
use in this thesis. The chapter is divided in three sections. The first section builds on the 
previous chapter by providing a nexus between land reform and social policy. As has been 
demonstrated in the preceding chapter, there have been several approaches that have been used 
to write on both the process and the outcomes of the FTLRP. This chapter therefore adds to 
that literature by providing a perspective that has not been used before of viewing land reform 
as a social policy tool. The second section of the chapter provides an analysis of the 
transformative social policy framework which is my analytical tool of both existing data and 
the data that I collected from Kwekwe District. The last section of the chapter explores the 
nexus between social policy and development.  The exploration of the nexus between social 
policy and development has been necessitated by the fact that social policy outcomes are 
measured through social development indicators. It therefore becomes imperative to interrogate 
this relationship. 
 
3.2 Returning to the wider social policy vision 
As has been noted earlier, at the core of social policy is an aspiration to ensure quality of life 
for citizens in a ‘given territory’ (Adesina, 2007a, 2007b). This notion had been noted by 
Marshal (1950) in his Citizenship and Social Class where he argued that ‘citizenship is 
essentially a matter of ensuring that everyone is treated as a full and equal member of society. 
And the way to ensure this sense of membership is through according people an increasing 
number of social rights’ (Marshal, 1950). Marshal divided citizenship rights into three 
categories namely civil rights, political rights, and social rights which included public 
education, health care, unemployment insurance and old age pension’ (Kymlicka and Norman, 
1994). Esping- Andersen (1990: 21) took Marshal’s argument further by noting that ‘if social 
rights are given the legal and practical status of property rights, if they are inviolable, and if 
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they are granted on the basis of citizenship rather than performance, they will entail a 
decommodification of the status of individuals vis a vis the market’ (ibid).  
 
 
The foregoing arguments have been key in social policy debate with Titmuss (1974:31) adding 
that social policy is supposed to be ‘beneficent, redistributive and concerned with economic as 
well as non-economic objectives’. This implies that for social policy outcomes to be achieved, 
there has to be a symbiosis between social policy and economic policy. Chang (2001) refers to 
Polanyi (1946) in backing this notion when the latter notes that the ‘economic is inseparably 
linked to the social’. Arguments contrary to this view had been prompted mostly by neoliberals 
who believed that ‘economic growth is a precursor to social development’ (Udegbe, 2007). 
These scholars’ argument was that economic growth subsequently leads to social development. 
This neoliberal thinking inevitably prompted a lot of debate among scholars over time. The 
neoliberal persuasion is however contrary to documented experiences where significant growth 
did not really translate to reduction in poverty, inequality and unemployment. This ‘residualist 
welfare’ approach, though it has persisted in some quarters, has been challenged by scholars 
(Titmuss, 1974; Myrdal, 1984; Sen, 1999; Adesina, 2011b; Mkandawire, 2002b; UNRISD, 
2006; Fine, 2009) who argue that social policies are intricately linked to economic policies and 
there should be emphasis on human development, as a conduit for economic development. In 
conclusion, as Mkandawire (2004:20) notes: 
 
Studies on the linkages between social policy outcomes and economic growth show 
that at both microeconomic and macroeconomic levels, social development outcomes 
have beneficial effects on economic growth. 
 
While there is not much contention on social development indicators, there is, however, 
considerable contention on the classification of social policy systems. Scholars like Titmus 
(1958,1974), Korpi (1980), Korpi and Palme (1998), Esping-Andersen (1990), and Bonoli 
(1997) have taken pains to come up with various welfare state classifications that summarize 
how some countries’ social policy systems are structured.  
 
 
Some countries established their social policy architecture on the basis of the various schools 
of thought, with United Kingdom heavily influenced by the Fabian Society established in 
1884.10 The society developed a social policy paradigm, which tapped into, the evidence 
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emerging from the research conducted by Booth and Rowntree (Alcock, 2012:23). The 
research indicated that poverty was widespread and serious in Britain at the end of the 
nineteenth century despite the existence of Poor Laws.  This research finding challenged 
conservative political assumption that economic markets could meet the welfare needs of all 
(ibid). The Fabians used the findings of the research to convince those of contrary persuasion, 
who believed in the commodification of welfare services, that policy intervention through the 
state was needed to provide the support and protection which markets could not. Scholars that 
followed like John Maynard Keynes were informed by the thinking that was already prevailing. 
Keynes, who was a liberal, played a key role in helping Europe recover from the Second World 
War of 1939–45 – in contrast to the failures after the First – and in establishing the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the welfare state (Townsend 2004). In 1936, his General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money was published which made a clear distinction between macro 
and micro economic theories (Townsend 2004). Keynes’ macroeconomics was linked to his 
insistence on planning and social development. One of Keynes’ major contributions to social 
policy was his view of the state ‘as [the] ultimate protector of the public good and has a duty 
to supplement and regulate market forces’ (Alcock 2012:24). Later, Beveridge came up with 
his report, which sought to address the ‘five giants on the road to reconstruction’ (Beveridge 
1942) while giving the state a central role in driving the processes.  
 
In his report, Beveridge proposed a system of national insurance for Britain to deal with the 
infamous ‘giants’ namely want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness’ (ibid). The primary 
emphasis of Beveridge was on addressing want which later dominated the social policy 
discourse of Europe. On the basis of Beveridge’s recommendations to address the five ills of 
the British society, the Labour Government introduced key legislations namely the 1946 
National Insurance Act, which implemented the Beveridge scheme for social security; the 
National Health Service Act 1946; and the 1948 National Assistance Act, which abolished the 
Poor Law while making provision for welfare services (Bonoli 2007). The laws became an 
example of a welfare state using inter alia ‘flat rates’ of contribution and subsistence. The 
insurance scheme classified the population into six classes namely (Beveridge 1942):  
 
Employees, that is, persons whose normal occupation is employment under contract of 
service; others gainfully occupied, including employers, traders and independent 
workers of all kinds; housewives, that is married women of working age; others of 
working age not gainfully occupied; below working age and retired above working age.  
The category of below working age were covered by children’s allowances.  
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The Beveridge Report of 1942 created the bedrock of a welfare state because it built on the 
macro economic analyses that had been done by Keynes in 1936 which envisaged the state 
playing a key regulating role.  
 
Under Otto von Bismarck, Germany in 1883 introduced sickness insurance, Accident Insurance 
in 1884 and later came up with an old-age and disability social insurance program in 1889. By 
giving substantial advantages to workers, he was able to buy their allegiance since this was the 
group that potentially was a threat to the politics of the day (Alber, 1986; Baldwin, 1990). The 
Bismarckian social policies were based on social insurance while providing earnings-related 
benefits for employees. Entitlement to the social insurance was conditional upon a satisfactory 
contribution record. The financing thereof was mainly based on employer/employee 
contributions (Bonoli, 1997).  In essence the Bismarckian policy did not have a concern on 
poverty, but for the section of the population which was in the labour market and crucial for 
the country’s economic development. The policy became a powerful instrument to enhance the 
position of the workers in the Germany market economy (ibid). The foregoing developments 
informed the social policies architectures of several countries. There were efforts to establish 
contextually relevant architectures as can be exemplified by countries like Sweden (Esping-
Andersen, 1990: 52) which combined different ways of achieving the objective of wellbeing 
for all in its territory. 
 
One of the oversights however which social policy has had historically has been the 
reproductive and nurturing roles of women and their centrality to understanding the wellbeing 
of individuals, households, communities and indeed nations (Folbre, 1994; Bonoli, 1997; Elson 
and Catagay, 2000; Mkandawire, 2005; Adesina, 2007a). As such around the 1980s up to the 
1990s, there was a lamentation that social policy was oblivious of women’s reproductive roles 
in the society. This outcry is succinctly captured by Adesina (2007:45) when he notes: 
 
The gendered dimensions of labour market participation and sustained employment 
record – and therefore retirement annuity or provident fund contributions – distinctly 
disadvantage women whose labour market participation is often interrupted by 
marriage, childrearing, or who bear the burden of the unpaid care economy. 
 
Adesina (2007b:45) further reinforces the foregoing notion when he asserts that rethinking of 
social policy ‘requires a strongly pro-natal approach, but it also requires social provisioning 
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that treats women as people in their own right rather than in their procreation and nurturing 
roles’. In light of the gender consciousness that social policy has tried to have in recent history, 
Bonoli (1997) notes that some countries responded to the call for gendered social policy by 
putting significant steps in place to improve the position of women within their social insurance 
systems. Most notably these measures included the use of contribution credits for years spent 
rearing a child, the availability of maternity leave, and (free) childcare facilities. 
 
In the context of Africa, social policy was structured in an exclusive way because of the 
peculiarities, which the continent went through in the 1800s and 1900s. After removing the 
shackles of colonialism, which had lasted for more than a century, most African states came 
up with a nationalist ideology for their people. This ideology focused on the ‘eradication of the 
“unholy trinity of ignorance, poverty, and disease” (Mkandawire, 2005: 13), by adopting 
development strategies on the tripod of people, hard work and use of intelligence, public 
education (Garba, 2007: 63). Garba (2007:54) also gives another example of Zambia, which 
had an economy that heavily depended on mining. At independence, the country did not have 
a single indigenous mining engineer (ibid).  
 
In the nationalist discourse, social spending on education was meant to address the legacy of 
colonialism, which deprived the indigenous people of an education (ibid). Further, investment 
in education was meant to address the human resources needs that existed after colonialism. In 
several countries – from Malawi to Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal – the schooling 
strategies involved bringing young people of different ethnic or regional backgrounds together 
in secondary schools, and even more so at the university level (Garba, 2007:56). The intended 
result of this effort was to enhance nation building and social cohesion. The nationalists 
envisaged to create nations that had mechanisms to enhance the social and economic capacities 
of its people while establishing cohesive polities. 
 
3.3 Transformative Social Policy Conceptual Framework 
Transformative social policy conceptual framework is a systematic way of thinking and 
considering social policy so that it will not miss all its functions. This systematic way of 
thinking was hatched by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development in its 
research on Social Policy in a Development Context. The conceptualisation of social policy 
using the transformative social policy way of thinking shifted attention to the neglected 
dimensions of social policy, especially in the context of development or catch‐up. As has been 
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noted, social policy had lost its developmental orientation as had been suggested by the 
Myrdals (Myrdal & Myrdal, 1934; Myrdal, 1960). It is grounded on the ‘imperative of 
reconstituting the state in its policy making capacity, and its ability to run the state, administer 
society, and define the parameters of economic activities’ (Adesina, 2007c).  The starting point 
would be the recognition that successful efforts at building socially inclusive developmental 
agenda have always depended on visionary agenda setting ‘… the visionary agenda setting can 
only come along when the state plays its role’ (ibid). 
 
In view of the foregoing, the transformative social policy conceptual framework has been able 
to provide a structured way of looking at social policy without neglecting the other functions 
of social policy which seem to have been forgotten due to the OECD bias. The conceptual 
framework can be summarised diagrammatically as below (Adesina, 2011):  
Figure 3.1: Transformative social policy conceptual framework 
 
Source: Adesina (2011) 
The diagram above identifies the five social policy tasks namely production, protection, 
reproduction, redistribution and social cohesion. Moving from the monotasking of social policy 
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as has been characterised by most literature that is Eurocentric, social policy is supposed to 
address the five functions noted above. It is worth noting that the extent of coverage of the five 
functions may differ from one tool to the other. Some social policy interventions however do 
not cover all the five functions.  
 
One key ingredient that would ensure the actualisation of social policies is leadership 
commitment. It can be argued that having benign laws and constitutions that guarantee social 
rights as posited by T.H. Marshall (1950) is not good enough if there is no visionary leadership 
to make the policies a reality. Adesina (2007:44) argues that: 
… Leadership matters; so does policy. Constructing social consensus around a 
developmental project is fundamental: it calls for visionary leadership that is locally 
grounded in Africa’s realities; it calls for putting at the heart of our collective social 
contract social justice, equity, and the vicarious indignity that we should experience 
when others in our societies contend with poverty and destitution [emphasis added].  
 
This notion is attested by Yi and Mkandawire (2014) in their exploration of the lessons that 
could be learnt from South Korea’s development success. The book shows a conspicuous 
strand of the role of leadership in spearheading the development process. Through quality 
leadership, such ingredients as inter alia impeccable legislation; genuine platforms for citizen’s 
participation; a vibrant civil society, not NGO society (Adesina 2007); easy access to 
information; free media (Koehler 2011); gender equality and competent institutions to deliver 
on the public goods will be provided.  It is worth noting that many of these enablers are 
themselves subject to the vagaries of politics and public resource management (human and 
material). 
 
3.4 Development and Social Policy: A Nexus 
Having unpacked the nexus between social policy and land reform, I will now look at the 
linkages between social policy and development. This is important because social policy 
outcomes are measured using social development indicators. Examples of such indicators 
include inter alia information about health, education, employment and general quality of life 
in a given context.  
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3.4.1 Conceptualising Development 
The term ‘development’ has become a ‘modern shibboleth, an unavoidable password’ (Rist, 
2007) which is elusive to define, since it depends on where and by whom it is used (Mafeje, 
2003; Mkandawire, 2011). There is a tendency to take for granted the meaning of this 
buzzword. In this section, I will give a snapshot analysis of the evolution of the idea of 
development. Thereafter, I will compare and contrast the concept of development and its 
outcomes to social policy.  
 
The concept of development emerged after World War 2 (Sen, 1997). Development thinking 
became prominent in the middle of the 20th century with a speech delivered by the then US 
President Harry Truman in 1947 about foreign aid, in what got to be known as the “Truman 
Doctrine”. Taking from Truman’s perspective, development was conceptualised as a linear 
process that was geared towards increasing prosperity of the perceived ‘underdeveloped’ 
people (Nustad, 2004) in the areas of infrastructure, agriculture and industrialization. The 
western societies were then viewed as the developed world who were supposed to be role 
models to the ‘’bottom billion’’ who had missed the development boat. 
 
Inevitably, the conceptualisation of development as a way of emancipating some ‘left behind’ 
societies of the world in the south created a condition of underdevelopment which was the arch 
enemy that had to be fought. The idea therefore was that underdeveloped countries in the south 
would catch up if they would become nation-states and get capital, technology democracy, 
education and the rule of law (Hart, 2000; Nustad, 2004). In the words of Hirschman (1968), 
African countries were characterised as “late, late-comers” to development. Some of the 
writings on Africa resonated with this view giving Africa the synonym of what Frantz Fanon 
(1965) termed the “Wretched of the Earth”.  
 
Previously, Africans had been the dominant denizens of the world populated by the “Bottom 
Billion” were the sole inhabitants of the Third World who have “missed the boat” (Collier, 
2007). It is against this background that African nationalists like Julius Nyerere in the post-
1980s wanted to address the lagging behind of the continent when he made the statement that 
“We must run while others walk”. Western scholars attributed this backwardness to intra-
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country deficits which needed to be addressed as a precondition for western governments and 
institutions to provide assistance. As a result, the concept of development became a vehicle 
that was driven by the agency of elites as “experts and scientists were given the responsibility 
for guiding the development of peoples seen as lacking it” (Collier, 2007). 
 
The development discourse had two strands: the Truman version which involved geopolitical 
considerations and humanitarianism. The second strand, also named the ‘’Bandung 
Conference’’, conceptualised development in terms of catching up, emancipation and the ‘right 
to development’’ (Mkandawire, 2009). The Bandung Conference development narrative 
argued for a judicious mix of tradition and modernity. Rather than an imitation of the West, 
they drew inspiration from a diversity of experiences. For instance, Nyerere sought to draw 
inspirations from ‘traditional’ modes of association and organizing production and was inspired 
by the Chinese example. Kiswahili was chosen as the national language rather than English. 
 
Another school was led by Rostow, through his Stages of Growth model, which suggested that 
development should occur in five stages, was a key reference point for the modernization 
theory.  ‘Traditional  societies’ framed as hierarchic,  fatalistic,  heavily  dependent  on 
agriculture, and by their low use of technology would reach the “Age of High Mass 
Consumption” after  passing  three  sequential  stages  of  development (Ibid).  The  third  stage,  
“Take-off”  was considered vital because it would occur when  society  is  driven  more  by  
economic  processes  than  tradition.  For modernization theorists, historic conditions and unfair 
international economic structures were only of minor importance (Nuscheler, 2004:78; Fischer 
et al., 2004: 35). Through this modernisation discourse, efforts were therefore made to make 
the third world a resemblance of the western countries. This was viewed as the ultimate goal 
of development. This narrative was within the ambit of modernization theory which contended 
that the poor countries could become  democratic  nation-states governed  by  the  rule  of  law,  
accumulate  capital  and focus  on  economic  performance,  acquire technology  to  enable  
industrial  production,  and  increase  the  level  of  education (Niznik, 2011).  
 
In this corpus, the Bretton Woods Institutions gave themselves the mandate to provide 
financing and policy advice to the countries that were trying to catch up. For these institutions, 
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development  was,  from  the  outset, defined  as  the  promotion  of  economic  growth. This 
view did not change despite the changes in the approach and functions of the Bank’s growth 
model over time (Woods, 2006: 43).  The Bank's  ethical  and  economic arguments for 
development have been varying and “what is so remarkable is the rapidity with which the 
Bank's new political rationalities shift and often contradict one another, yet circulate and 
become legitimate” (Goldman, 2005: 266). Developing countries have been dragged into the 
confusion where they became experimentation grounds for the feasibility of these policies.  
Moyo (2009) in consonance to the foregoing notes that the post-war  development  assistance  
can  be  broken  down  into  seven  decades  and  associated  with different development 
paradigms: the birth of the Bretton Woods system in the 1940s; the era of the Marshall  Plan  
and  modernization  theory  in  the  1950s;  the  heydays  of  industrialization  and dependency 
theory in the 1960s; the shift towards aid as an answer to poverty in the 1970s; the “lost decade” 
of stabilization and structural adjustment  in the 1980s; the emphasis on good governance and  
democracy  in  the  1990s;  and  the  decade  of  the  Millennium  Development  Goals  (Moyo 
2009: 10). Garba (2007:54) provided a more nuanced analysis of the policy advice by providing 
the approach which was adopted at each stage. In the first advice, governments in sub Saharan 
Africa were encouraged to borrow in order to fund national development plans that failed to 
bring about economic growth, structural transformation or equity, but left most heavily 
externally indebted. In the second diagnostic, the development advisers blamed the state as a 
means of starting the process of deepening and widening the influence of the neoclassical 
doctrine in development finance and advice. It was not enough to get prices right [second 
advice], policies had to be right [third advice] and reform had to extend to the state [fourth 
advice] (Garba, 2007: 54) 
 
Boas and McNeill (2004: 4) contend that development is a question of planned socio-economic 
change, and consequently a political question. This perspective is corroborated by Gardner and 
Lewis (1992) who argue that development and anthropological representations of development 
processes are embedded in power relations. To these scholars, development is “an enormously 
powerful set of ideas which has guided thought and action across the world” for the best half 
of the 20th century. They concur with Boas and McNeill in that: 
It  “involves  deliberately planned” political, economic and social change, and 
continues to affect the lives of millions of people around the world, regardless of what 
critiques think or say of it… [development is] a  series  of  events  and  actions,  as  well  
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as  a particular  discourse  and  ideological  construct”  that  are  “inherently  
problematic”,  and  in certain  regards,  “actively  destructive  and  disempowering”  
(Gardner  &  Lewis  1996:25).  Far from  being  simple,  homogenous,  wholly  
monolithic,  static  and  encompassing,  as  is  often thought,  development  decision-
making,  policy  and  practice  actually  comprise a  variety  of countervailing  
perspectives  and  practices,  as  well  as  a  multiplicity  of  voices”  (Gardner  and 
Lewis  1996:78).  
Nyamnjoh (2010) seems to conclude on the definition of development by noting that the 
development discourse is heterogeneous, contested and constantly changing. In consonance to 
Nyamnjoh, Mafeje (2003) posits that development can be given empirical relevance by looking 
at it as: the expanding and adaptive capacity of society to satisfy the changing and increasing 
needs of its members, be they material or cultural. I believe, these can be investigated through 
the use of both quantitative and qualitative indices. For Sen, development, as expounded in his 
Development as Freedom work (Sen 1999), has to be about individual’s freedom to choose. 
 
3.4.2 Social development indicators and social policy outcomes  
Having defined development broadly, this section now explores social development in 
particular and its linkages with social policy. The purpose of this section is to show the 
cleavages that exist between social development and social policy, which will later in the thesis 
be linked to the context of land reform. Midgley's (1993) identifies social development as one 
of the different "types'' of development amongst economic, political, self-development, human, 
community and grassroots development. Social development can be defined as ‘a process of 
planned social change designed to promote the well-being of the population as a whole in 
conjunction with a dynamic process of economic development’ (Midgley, 1995: 25).  
 
In consonance to Midgely’s definition, Burkey (1993) conceptualise social development as a 
progression of change starting from individual development of confidence, cooperativeness, 
awareness and skills. These two definitions dovetail with the social policy definitions that I 
have given earlier where the latter is about the collective public efforts that are meant to affect 
and protect social well-being of people within a given territory. If we therefore mirror the 
definitions of social development and social policy, some key synergies can be identified on 
have human welfare and enhancement of human capabilities as the centre piece. Prioritising 
the individual in the right to development is conceptually important because it emphasises that 
development is not simply the economic or social growth of a society but the growth of 
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individuals within that society. (Sacco, 2008: 358). The following section unpacks the areas of 
mutuality between social development and social policy. 
 
3.4.2.1 Investing in human capabilities 
Scholars agree that the concept of development is problematic. Sen (1989) argues that instead 
of focusing on the points of disagreements and contentions, which is the process of 
development, focus should be placed to the intended results rather than means. In providing 
the nexus with social policy, I decided to focus on this element. Rist (2007) notes that the 
concept of development conveys an idea that ‘tomorrow things will be better…’ Mkandawire 
cites Arthur Lewis, who was of the view that development meant the widening of the ‘range of 
human choices’ (Lewis, 1955). This is the view that then received greater prominence and 
expression by Amartya Sen. Taking from Lewis, Sen argues that development is premised on 
the understanding that ‘human beings are the agents, beneficiaries and adjudicators of progress, 
but they also happen to be directly or indirectly the primary means of all production’ (Sen, 
1989). He further noted that  
the  enhancement of living conditions must clearly be  an  essential- if  not  the  
essential-object  of  the  entire  economic  exercise  and that  enhancement is  an 
integral part  of the concept of development [emphasis added]. 
This approach by Sen builds on that of Aristotle in arguing that development is about providing 
conditions which facilitate people’s ability to lead flourishing lives. He further argues that these 
conditions include access to quality primary goods which subsequently enable human beings 
to be given free choice of what they want to be or do. This conceptualisation of development 
as freedom places premium on human being’s capabilities to live lives that they choose to 
live.11 Midgley (2001) concurs with the foregoing when he notes that ‘the goal of social 
development in the context of modern welfare is to produce a social well-being that makes 
people capable of acting and making their own decisions in the broadest sense’ [emphasis 
added]. What can be noted in both social policy and social development is an aspiration to 
widen the range of human choices through enhancing their capabilities so that they can live 
lives they have reason to value.  
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3.4.2.2 Inseparability of social and economic policies  
Another area of converge between social policy and development is the symbiosis of 
relationship that exists with economic policy. While neoliberals take a residualist approach in 
dealing with social policy when they argue that economic growth should precede social 
development, Polanyi argued that economic policy is inseparably linked to the social. Midgely 
weighs in on this argument by positing that social development endeavours to promote human 
well-being in collaboration with a dynamic, ongoing process of economic development. He 
further argues that social development considers economic and social processes as inextricably 
important components of the development process. As such, social development cannot take 
place without economic development, and economic development is meaningless if it fails to 
bring about significant improvements in the well-being of the population as a whole (Midgely, 
2005). 
 
Research has shown that increase in GNP per capita does not have a direct relationship with 
enriching human lives. Countries with high GNP per capita can nevertheless have astonishingly 
low achievements in the quality of life, with the bulk of the population being subject to 
premature mortality, escapable morbidity, overwhelming illiteracy and so on. Midgely (2001) 
refers to such as scenario as ‘distorted development’. Birdsall and Londono (1997) observed 
that sustainable growth that avoided addressing inequality was only achievable when there was 
a redistributive component in a country. As such, addressing poverty and vulnerability which 
are at the core of social policy and development only happen when there is symbiosis between 
economic and social policy (see Polanyi, 1946; UNRISD, 2006; Adesina, 2007; Garba, 2007; 
Mkandawire, 2007; Tharamangalam, 2010; Yan Shik et al, 2012). 
 
3.4.2.3 Interest on social justice 
Sacco (2008: 361) argues that the right to development can only be fulfilled if all human rights 
are realised in a comprehensive manner based on principles of equity and social justice. 
Looking at the transformative social policy framework above, the quest for equality is one of 
the desired outcomes as well as the normative premise. One key way of reaching equality is 
through equity, which is one of the ingredients that have been identified correctly by Sacco 
(2008) as a prerequisite for realisation of development. This quest for equality can be 
deciphered in social policy as well since it strives to guarantee every member of the society 
certain minimum standards and certain opportunities (Hagenbuch, 1958:205). 
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Social policy’s purpose is to make sure that people within a given territory live lives of dignity 
with their wellbeing protected regardless of status, ethnicity, gender, age and any other 
potential area of discrimination. Adesina (2007) affirms the aspect of social justice and quest 
for equality. The minimum standard of living for each person is guaranteed through social 
policy elements such as direct government provision of social welfare through, for example, 
broad-based education and health services, subsidies and benefits, social security and pensions, 
labour market interventions, land reform [italics for emphasis], progressive taxation and other 
redistributive policies. Using Sen’s terminology, social policy tools can be said to be conduits 
through which human functionings are realised. 
 
From the foregoing, one can decipher that at the core of both social policy and development, is 
a desire for social justice and equality. The ultimate goal of both social policy and development 
are individuals and societies that are liberated from any inhibitions such as poverty, but with 
choices and freedoms to live lives they have reason to value. Social policy tools facilitate social 
development and enhance economic development. Social policy answers the ‘how to’ question 
of development. I can also argue that there may not be development, that is, deliberate and 
intentional social change, without social policy. 
3.4.2.4 Role of the state 
It is important to note that the drivers of both social policy and development should be the state. 
The state has a responsibility to mobilise human, natural and economic resources to achieve 
social change as ideally should be set out in national policies which includes social policy 
(European Report on Development, 2010).  In consonance with the foregoing, Midgely (2001) 
argues that developmental welfare requires a strong role for the state, not only in social welfare 
but in promoting economic development as well.  It is instructive to note that while the state 
may set out the parameters of social policy, it is not always the one that would deliver on the 
broad range of social policy measures. Esping-Andersen’s typology and the earlier one by 
Richard Titmuss show that self-provisioning and occupational welfare (linked to employment) 
are important aspects of how social policy is delivered. Esping-Andersen’s Anglo-Saxon 
‘liberal’ welfare regime limits state’s role to addressing indigency (something that goes back 
to the Poor Law). 
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While this is the ideal case, there is substantial literature against the involvement of the state. 
This discourse focused on approaches such as the New Public Management to promote market 
principles in the governance of the public sector or the direct privatization of public-sector 
entities (Dostal, 2010). Other neoliberal policies have included the downscaling of state 
intervention in the economy, financial market deregulation, efforts to attract rising levels of 
foreign direct investment, and multilateral trade liberalization under the World Trade 
Organization. In addition, policy-making was supposed to be based on the contracting out of 
formerly public services to the private sector, decentralization of decision-making, and good 
governance (UNRISD, 2010: 257-58).  
 
Alternative development theorists however have argued that the state must provide leadership 
in the transition to an industry- and information-based economy, that markets require for their 
survival conditions that cannot be provided by the marketplace itself, and that the answer to 
the structural needs of the economic transition is the formation of developmental states with 
expanded state agency and activity (UNRISD, 2010: 257-58)). It should however be noted that 
in Scandinavian countries which have exemplary social policies and are considered developed, 
the state played an instrumental role. The active involvement of the state brings with it 
leadership, political will, financing and integration into the legislative and policy regime of the 
country. Koehler (2011), showed that political change in several countries  such as India in 
2005,  Pakistan in 2008 and Bangladesh in 2009  and  the  end  of  civil  conflict  in  Nepal-
2006 all created  political  pressure,  political  will,  as  well  as policy space for social policy 
innovations. Tharamangalam (2010) provides evidence for this narrative using the case studies 
of Kerala and Cuba. The effective role of the state has been documented in various case studies 
by several scholars (see also Kwon, 2005; Wu, 2007; Dostal, 2010; Adesina, 2010). 
 
3.4.2.5 Investing in social capital formation 
One of the functions of social policy is engendering social cohesion. The concept of social 
cohesion, as shall be noted in Chapter 9, is used to refer to social networks and institutionalised 
social relationships that promote community integration (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1995). 
Apart from social cohesion being a desirable end in itself, research has shown that communities 
with higher social cohesion have a high degree of social capital and economic well-being 
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(Putnam et al, 1993). Midgely (2001) observed that communities with a high degree of social 
cohesion are more prosperous than those with a low degree of social cohesion.  
 
Consequently, communities with high rates of disorganisation, despondence and crime have 
low social capital as well as low levels of economic development. This assertion by Midgely 
suggests that social cohesion is a necessary ingredient to economic and social development. 
Putnam (1995: 2) echoes this assertion when he argues that the productive activity of social 
capital is visible in its ability to facilitate coordination and cooperation for common benefit. 
This is because communities will be able to harness their social capital in undertaking programs 
that would have an impact on the living standards of the people in that particular community. 
Midgley and Livermore (1998) substantiate this argument by positing that social cohesion 
requires investments in initiatives that mobilise local people around a variety of local social 
and economic projects. In the context of social cohesion outcomes of the FTLRP, Chapter 10 
enunciates the dynamics at play in Kwekwe District- the case study of this thesis. 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
The chapter has demonstrated that land reform is a social policy tool which has not received 
academic attention in that regard, except recently by Yi and Mkandawire (2014). The second 
section of this chapter has unpacked the identified five social policy functions namely 
production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and social cohesion. The last section of the 
chapter provided a nexus between social policy and development. The purpose of the section 
was necessitated by the fact that social policy outcomes are measured using social development 
indicators. In this section, I demonstrated that social policy instruments are conduits for the 
achievement of social development in any society. I identified five areas of mutuality between 
development and social policy. First, there is a common interest in investing in human 
capabilities. Secondly, both social policy and development emphasise the inseparability of 
economic and social policies. Thirdly, both development and social policy put emphasis on 
social justice, which can be achieved amongst other means, through redistribution.  Social 
capital is considered both as a process and an outcome of development and social policy in 
view of Midgley’s argument that communities with higher social cohesion have a high degree 
of social capital and economic well-being. Both social policy and development recognise the 
involvement of the state in achieving desired outcomes. The next chapter will discuss the 
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processes of field research and data collection. Prior, however, the chapter will look at the 
ontological and epistemological issues that are relevant to this research.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Introduction  
There are a lot of ontological, epistemological and methodological contestations in the process 
of knowledge production (Gialdino, 2009). Wright Mills argues in his 1959 work, The 
Sociological Imagination, that the contestations are a result of the complex nature of science.  
The arguments on knowledge production reflect the different ways of observing, studying and 
measuring the world or what constitute reality (Neuman, 1994). Ontology is one of the root 
issues as a point of departure in research. Blaikie (2000) has defined it as: 
‘claims and assumptions  that are made about the nature of social reality, claims about 
what exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with 
each other. In short, ontological assumptions are concerned with what we believe 
constitutes social reality’ (Blaikie, 2000: 8). 
When we have defined what constitutes social reality, the next issue to grapple with would be 
on how we get to know it. Epistemology therefore is a broad set of approaches to the study of 
knowledge and a form of proof to justify a claim about the social world (Longino, 1990). It 
considers the appropriate foundation for the study of society and its manifestations, and 
provides the underlying philosophical basis for the arguments supporting the validity of a 
research strategy (Chiweshe, 2011). Galliers (1990) noted that epistemology, being what is 
known to be true, is different from doxology, which is what is believed to be true. He further 
argues that the purpose of science therefore is to transform the things that are believed 
(doxology), into the things that are known—from doxa to episteme.  The transformation from 
doxa to episteme uses primarily two research philosophies, namely positivism and 
interpretivism. On the one hand, scholars such as Bacon, Descartes, Mill, Durkheim, Russell 
and Popper have been prominent in using the positivist approach while on the other hand 
scholars such as Kant, Freud, Polanyi and Kuhn have been characterized by using the 
interpretivist approach (Hirschheim, 1985).  
 
4.2 Positivism 
Positivism can be defined as a body  of  techniques  for  investigating  phenomena  and  
acquiring  new knowledge of the natural world, as well as the correction and integration of 
previous knowledge, based  on  observable,  empirical,  measurable  evidence  and  subject  to  
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laws  of  reasoning (Kalebe-Nyamongo, 2012). Crotty (1998) argues that positivism is based 
on the assumption that the only authentic knowledge is scientific knowledge, and that  such  
knowledge  can  come  only  from  positive  affirmation  of  theories  through  strict scientific 
and quantitative methods.   This notion is corroborated by Levin (1988) when he noted that 
positivists believe reality is constant and can be observed and described from an objective 
viewpoint, without meddling with the phenomena being studied. In view of this notion, it can 
be argued therefore experimental research would not be positivist since experiments involve 
‘meddling with the phenomenon being studied.’ Scholars from the positivist orientation argue 
that the researched subject should be isolated and that observations should be replicable. Thus, 
a positivist researcher employs a deductive process to  gather  facts  and  produce  
generalizations  about  cause  and  effect  relationships  between variables through objective, 
observable, and quantifiable data. These cause and effect relationships, once  identified,  can  
be  used  to  predict  general  patterns  of  human  activity  or  outcomes (Marsh and Stoker, 
2002; Deacon et al, 1999; Neuman, 1994; Kalebe-Nyamongo, 2012).  
 
Key positivist tenets are measurement and objectivity, with a focus on quantitative data. The 
general positivist approach to research usually starts with theories, conceptual frameworks, and 
models and structures the research through framing of hypotheses that are then tested (Schell, 
1992:7). The approach places premium on observable external realities over internal reality. Its 
main shortcoming has been this inflexible concern with  abstract  laws,  formulas  and  statistics  
that  pay  relatively low attention to the  importance  of  contextual  factors such as social and 
cultural forces that might also  affect human activity. As a result, the approach, particularly in 
the natural sciences context, has been criticized for failing to distinguish between people and 
social institutions from the world of nature as well as assuming that the respondents’ 
understanding of their questionnaires is the same as theirs; and also the assumption that it is 
possible to control’ variables in experimental research involving human beings to achieve 
unambiguous results (Denzin, 1970; Cicourel, 1964; Blumer, 1956; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). 
In appreciation of this, researchers conduct pilot test of survey instruments and use them in 
conjuncture with methods such as FGD primarily because it is understood that the researcher’s 
frame of reference is not the same as that of the research subjects. The following section will 
look at interpretivism and its nuances in the context of research designing. 
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4.3 Interpretivism  
Lindlof (1995) argues that, ‘unlike quantitative researchers who perform tests of prediction and 
control, qualitative inquirers strive to understand their objects of interest’ (Lindlof 1995:9). His 
view is corroborated by Mommsen when he notes that interpretivists pay attention to human 
cultural values, symbols, and social processes, although viewed from a subjective perspective 
of the researcher (Mommsen, 1992). This approach contends that reality can only be 
understood through interpretation of people’s customs and cultures. The interpretive 
epistemological assumption is that through methods such as interviews, document analysis and 
observation, we can understand people’s beliefs, preferences and the meanings they attach to 
social phenomena (Kalebe-Nyamongo, 2012). Therefore, interpretive researchers cannot 
divorce themselves from their own socio-cultural realities and adopt a value-free position, nor 
can they operate in an apolitical environment.   
 
Researchers need to reflect on their own views and feelings and identify how these might 
impact on their study. In other words, an objective analysis of events  or  social  phenomena  is  
impossible  (Deacon  et  al,  1999;  Neuman,  1994;  Marsh  and  Stoker, 2002).  Interpretivists 
admit that there may be several interpretations of reality, however, these interpretations are in 
themselves a part of the scientific knowledge. It is  through  the  researcher‘s  insight  that  
qualitative  research  achieves  its  ultimate  goal-understanding (Ashley & Orenstein, 2005). 
Qualitative research begins from an ontological foundation that defines reality as some  type  
of  projection  of  imagination,  the  point  of  view  of  at  least  one  actor  and ultimately  a  
social  construction,  which  can  be  explored  through  a  science  of  meanings, 
phenomenological  insight  and  subjective  processes (Kalebe-Nyamongo, 2012). Joniak 
(2007) argues that qualitative research embraces an ontology that negates the existence of (or 
at least the efficacy of arguing for the existence of) an external reality. Searle (1995) regards 
external reality as one that exists outside and independent of our interpretations (Searle, 
1995:154).  
 
Williamson (2002) argues that an important component of interpretivism is that people are 
continuously involved in interpreting their dynamic world. Interpretivists believe that the  
social  world  is  constructed  by  people  and  is,  therefore,  different  from  the  world  of 
nature. This implies that evidence about social action cannot be isolated from the context in 
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which it occurs, nor from the meanings that social actors assign to them (Joniak, 2007). 
Therefore, people act on their beliefs and preferences, and their actions can be explained by 
these beliefs and preferences (Jennings, 1983; Neuman, 1994; Bevir et al, 2003; Joniak, 2007). 
As such, researchers’ interpretation, translation and representation of data obtained from 
research subjects cannot be considered objective, as it is also socially constructed. This thesis 
is alive to that fact and therefore cannot have its findings generalizable to other contexts. 
 
In view of the foregoing epistemological debates, Gramsci weighed in firstly by condemning 
the positivists for adopting “the conception of the objective reality of the external world in its 
most trivial and uncritical sense” (Gramsci, 1971: 444 quoted in Femia, 2009: 38). For 
Gramsci, there is some acceptable sense of “objective reality”, albeit one which recognizes the 
contribution of human thought to the way that reality is structured and accessed (ibid: 38). 
Nevertheless, Gramsci disapproved of conventional positivist approaches by saying that: 
Bare 'facts' acquire meaning only when organized in the frame of a theory, which cannot 
itself be derived from the facts to be explained. Knowledge is not like a photographic 
plate that reproduces the picture it receives, for our images of reality are filtered through 
culturally determined presuppositions. (ibid: 38) 
The citation by Gramsci is not necessarily a vote for interpretivism, instead, it is more about 
how we apprehend external reality which has an autonomous existence from the knowing 
subject. Femia (2009) completes his study of Gramsci's ontology by noting that Gramsci “was 
a truly dialectical thinker who asserted the interdependence of mind and objective reality, and 
not the absolute priority of either” (ibid: 41) [emphasis added]. Consistence with Gramsci’s 
persuasion, I structured my research to use the mixed method approach. 
 
It is worth noting that the dichotomy between positivism and interpretivism as has been 
discussed above falls down when one enters the terrain of mixed methods research.  Post-
positivists for instance accept that the world we observe is independent of the knower without 
assuming that we can objectively observe the world or phenomenon. The following section 
now looks at the emic and etic approaches in research which were used significantly in 
articulating the findings of this thesis. 
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4.4 Emic and etic approaches in research 
Emic and etic approaches to research are key strategies that enrich research when dealing with 
the issues of culture especially. Pike (1967: 37) posits that ‘the etic viewpoint studies behaviour 
as from outside of a particular system, and as an essential initial approach to an alien system. 
The emic viewpoint results from studying behaviour as from inside the system’.  Pike (1967: 
41) argues that ‘the emic and etic data do not constitute a rigid dichotomy of data, but often 
present the same data from two points of view’. Pike elaborates the symbiosis of the two 
approaches by noting that: 
Through the etic ‘lens’ the analyst views the data in tacit reference to a perspective 
oriented to all comparable events (whether sounds, ceremonies, activities), of all 
peoples, of all parts of the earth; through the other lens, the emic one, he views the same 
events in that particular culture, as it and it alone is structured. The result is a kind of 
‘tri-dimensional understanding’ of human behaviour instead of a ‘flat’ etic one. (Pike, 
1967, p. 41) 
 
In the emic approach, ‘culture’ is an integral part of human behaviour, and is inalienable to an 
individual (see, Gergen, 1985).  As such, the behaviour of humans cannot be detached from 
their cultural context. This same behaviour therefore cannot be established through exploration 
of causes which can be studied by means of methods of natural sciences, but rather, by 
interrogating reasons which are within the control of the person in question. The reasons must 
also be comprehended using the eyes of individuals under investigation. The emic approach 
emphasizes human self-determination and self-reflection (Berry, 1989). Emic approach 
provides views of a person who is familiar with a system or culture under study, and who has 
the know-how of functioning within it. Pike (1967: 41) posits the value of using the emic 
approach in research as: firstly, it permits an appreciation of the way in which a language or 
culture is constructed, ‘not as a series of miscellaneous parts, but as a working whole’; 
secondly, it assists one to understand individuals in their daily lives, including their attitudes, 
motives, interests and personality; and thirdly, the approach ‘provides the only basis upon 
which a predictive science of behaviour can be expected to make some of its greatest progress, 
since even statistical predictive studies will in many instances prove invalid’(Ibid). 
 
There are four reasons which Pike gives for why the etic approach is valuable in research. 
Firstly, it provides a wide viewpoint and training about various events around the world, so 
that similarities and differences can be acknowledged; secondly, methods of recording 
differing phenomena can be attained; third, an etic approach is the only point of entry, since 
there is ‘no other way to begin an analysis than by starting with a rough, tentative (and 
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inaccurate) etic description of it’ (p. 40); and, fourth, an etic comparison of selected cultures 
may allow a researcher to meet practical demands, such as financial limitations or time 
pressures. 
 
It is these foregoing compelling reasons as posited by Pike (1967) and Berry (1989) on the 
value of using emic and etic approaches to research that I decided to have them guide my data 
collection. I then developed the research design to be cognisant of the emic and etic approaches 
in the process of data collection. 
 
4.5 Background information on research site- Kwekwe District 
The research was conducted in Kwekwe District. The District is one of the eight districts 
centrally located in the Midlands province. The capital of the district is located approximately 
220 kilometres, by road, southwest of Harare, the country’s capital city. The district covers a 
geographical area of 8 625 square kilometres. Most of the district falls within agro ecology 
region 3 (78.8 percent) and a small segment of 21.2 percent is in region 4 (Moyo et al, 2009: 
24). The area is generally dry with an average rainfall of 550mm which falls intermittently 
during the summer season (Zimbabwe Meteorological Department, 2000). The area has mostly 
vertifoils and parafersiallitic soils (Mararike, 2001). Such soils rapidly lose fertility when 
cleared of autochthonous vegetation. Subsequently, year after year cultivation worsens soil 
infertility, and thus crop yields easily deteriorate (ibid). The major rivers in the district include 
the Kwekwe River, Munyati River and Mbembezani River. 
 
With a warm temperate climate, the district has an annual average temperature of 19oC.  
Kwekwe district has both rural and urban areas. Rural areas include Silobela, Chiundura, 
Zhombe and urban areas include Mbizo, Fitchlea and Chicago to mention a few.  The area is 
generally suitable for large scale cattle farming and the growing of some drought tolerant crops 
such as millet, rapoko and sorghum. Mujeyi (2010) notes that Kwekwe district is characterised 
by land use patterns such as extensive livestock production, cash crops and marginal production 
of drought tolerant food crops.  The main economic activities found in this district are 
subsistence crop cultivation and intensive crop cultivation on smallholdings in irrigation 
schemes (ibid).  
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In view of the above facts, the area is generally suitable for large-scale cattle farming and the 
growing of some drought resistant crops such as sorghum, millet and rapoko (Maposa et al 
2011). Maize, which is the staple food for Zimbabwe, does not grow well in the dry Region 3, 
unless there is the practice of irrigation agriculture. This explains why the former white farmers 
specialized in cattle ranching and wild life management in Kwekwe District. As a result, some 
of the resettled farmers take advantage of the fact that Kwekwe district is located within a 
mineral-rich belt known as the Great Dyke by participating in gold panning partly driven by 
the practical need to survive (Mhope, 2010).  Common minerals extracted include gold, chrome 
and iron ore from mines such as Globe and Phoenix. Major industries operating in the Kwekwe 
district include ZIMASCO (production of ferrochrome), ZISCO (steel making), Sable 
Chemicals (fertiliser production) and Munyati Power Station (electricity generation). 
Moreover, because Kwekwe District is located on the great Dyke, the area is predominantly a 
mining area and is prominent for informal mining affectionately known as ‘chikorokoza’. This 
presented opportunities of exploring how such mining activities had shaped the lives of newly 
resettled households. 
 
Kwekwe district had approximately 291 large and small-scale commercial farms (Magauzi et 
al, 2011). In a baseline survey conducted by AIAS, Kwekwe District had 1925 households that 
were settled on 42 farms (AIAS, 2009:25). Most of these households were settled under the A1 
scheme. These identified beneficiaries participated in the initial baseline survey that was 
conducted by AIAS thereby making entry easier into the district.  
Map 1: Map of Kwekwe District 
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The district is easily accessible by road and is relatively close to Zimbabwe’s capital city, 
Harare (approximately 212 km), which made data gathering process relatively easy to manage. 
Moreover, despite its close proximity to Harare, the area has had very limited academic 
attention except for the AIAS Surveys in 2009 and in 2014. Besides these surveys, there has 
not been another academic study conducted in the District exploring the outcomes of the 
FTLRP. 
 
4.6 Kwekwe Demographics 
Kwekwe district has a varied population with more people living in the urban areas and a higher 
female population. As of 2012 national census, the district was reported to have a population 
of 174 727 people (86 698 males and 88 029 females). Kwekwe urban areas had 100 900 people 
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(48 265 males and 52 635 females) whereas Kwekwe rural areas had 73 827 people where 
49.6% were males and 50.4% were females (ZIMSTAT, 2012). There is also diversity amongst 
newly resettled land beneficiaries. AIAS Survey (2014) established that marital status of newly 
resettled land beneficiaries in the Kwekwe district is much diversified from single, divorced 
and widowed to monogamously and polygamous married, with the majority of land 
beneficiaries being monogamously married. 
 
4.7 Research design  
According to Mouton (2001), research design is a blue print of how one intends conducting a 
research. This definition is corroborated by Terell (2012: 258) who describes research design 
as a road map that determines the most appropriate route to take when carrying out a study. 
Research designs guide the methods and decisions that researchers make during their studies 
and set the logic which they use to interpret their findings (Flick, 2002: 220). In coming up 
with my research design, the earlier noted philosophical research standpoints were instructive. 
For quality results, I decided to use both emic and etic approaches (Lett, 1990: 130) in the 
research but with a greater bias towards the former.  As such, I employed the mixed methods 
approach for this research.  
 
4.7.1 Mixed methods approach 
Mixed research is a synthesis that includes ideas from qualitative and quantitative research 
(Johnson et al, 2007). John Creswell (2003) corroborates this definition by noting that ‘mixed 
methods research is a research design (or methodology) in which the researcher collects, 
analyses, and mixes (integrates or connects) both quantitative and qualitative data in a single 
study or a multiphase program of inquiry’. Tashakkori (2010) consolidates the various 
definitions or this third paradigm of research by noting that: 
Mixed methods research is the type of research in which a researcher or team of 
researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches 
(e.g., use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference 
techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and 
corroboration. 
 
The foregoing definitions have been summarised diagrammatically by Johnson et al (2007) in 
Figure 4.1 below. The diagram demonstrates the qualitative-quantitative continuum, with 
several overlapping groups of mixed methods researchers or types of mixed methods research. 
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Moving from the centre of the figure outward either the left or the right, with the exclusion of 
the area near poles, is where mixed methods research, generally falls. The centre of the figure 
represents the strongest or “pure” form of mixed methods approach in research.  
 
Figure 4.1: Locating the mixed methods approach in research paradigms 
 
Source: Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) 
A researcher therefore might have one primary home (out of the three major homes: qualitative 
research, mixed research, and quantitative research). Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) posit 
that it is sensible for a researcher to borrow from other research paradigms if the research can 
benefit from such. Hence, what comes from it could be a research design that could be 
considered to be qualitative dominant mixed methods research. This type of research would be 
ideal for qualitative or mixed methods researchers who consider it important to include 
quantitative data and approaches into their otherwise qualitative research. The other type of 
mixed methods research as can be deciphered from the diagram is the quantitative dominant 
mixed methods research. This approach is ideal for quantitative or mixed methods researchers 
who find it important to include qualitative data and approaches in their otherwise quantitative 
research projects (Ibid).  
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It is in appreciation of the foregoing that I decided to use the mixed methods approach in my 
data collection. Overall, the research design is qualitative dominant mixed methods research. 
This is so because my fieldwork collected primarily qualitative data. The reason for this was 
that I had access to two baseline studies that had been conducted by the African Institute for 
Agrarian Studies in 2005-2006 as well as in 2013-2014.  The baselines provided detailed 
quantitative information about the state of land beneficiaries in six districts namely Kwekwe, 
Zvimba, Chiredzi, Goromonzi, Mangwe and Chipinge. The two baseline studies collected 
primarily quantitative data on the new agrarian structure, characteristics of the land 
beneficiaries, redistribution patterns, production and land use patterns of the land beneficiaries, 
social institutions that are being formed in the farming communities, and the agrarian change 
that has been happening over the years. My research had access to these datasets. The AIAS 
data provides the quantitative element to my thesis while my own data provides the qualitative 
component. 
 
Armed with the AIAS data which was mainly quantitative, I structured my fieldwork in such a 
way that I had to avoid duplication of efforts by collecting the same data as had been collected 
by AIAS. I therefore designed my research tools to address the gaps that I had observed in the 
AIAS data sets. Since the AIAS data was collected using a political economy approach, it 
neglected some elements that are important when looking at social policy outcomes. Some of 
the missing elements from the AIAS data include providing inadequate or in some instances, 
no attention to inter alia the dynamics around social services in the resettlement areas; giving 
attention to social protection, in the event of vulnerability caused both by market failures as 
well as external shocks such as droughts and the non-economic value of land for the 
beneficiaries. To be able to identify these gaps, I had to spend three months (January to March 
2015) at AIAS. During this time, I acquainted myself with the data they had collected in the 
two baseline surveys as well as literature that they had which was not readily available in 
libraries and on the internet.  
 
4.7.2 The ethnographic study of Kwekwe District 
After the three months at AIAS, I spent six months (April to September 2015) in Kwekwe 
District. During this time, I was collecting emic data on the experiences of the land 
beneficiaries as well as addressing some gaps in the AIAS data through ethnography. I 
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collected a large corpus of data through semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, 
informal conversations and systematic observations.  
 
Ethnography has been defined as an approach developed in the social sciences for 
understanding how a culture works by observing it from the inside (Ybema, 2009). This is 
corroborated by Hammersley and Atkinson (2007), Lofland (1995), and Prasad (2005) when 
they note that ethnographic fieldwork typically involves the development of close connections 
between the ethnographer and the subjects and situations being studied (Van Maanen, 1988: 2, 
49–50). Through systematic, intensive, detailed observations and in-depth interviews, the 
social organization of behaviour and interaction is examined, including the nature of social 
rules, interactional expectations, and cultural values (Andrew, 1983). Using the transformative 
social policy framework, I went into the field to undertake the ethnographic work seeking 
clarity on the five functions of social policy. This however does not mean that I was inflexible 
to both observe and identify some pertinent data, in fact, some of the findings that I have in the 
thesis, such as the chapter on education, were a product of this open mind. This is in view of 
the fact that education is a critical aspect of social policy, with implications for production task 
of social policy (as a human resource investment), and relative ex-ante protection from 
vulnerability. 
 
One special emphasis of ethnography is the dual perspective of the participant observer, to look 
at everything from the viewpoint of the insider, while remaining conscious of being an outsider 
with an analytical perspective (Agar, 1980). Spradley and McCurby (1972) define the 
perspective of ethnography as “instead of asking ‘What do I see these people doing?’ [The 
ethnographer] must ask ‘What do these people see themselves doing?’  This approach made 
me appreciate the quality of life for the families in the resettled areas from their own viewpoint. 
The method allowed me to ‘illuminate the often taken-for-granted everyday life’ (Bloch, 1997) 
of the households, in appreciating the impact of the FTLRP. Details around how fieldwork 
happened, the logistics, challenges, entry and exit of the field sites are all covered in the 
administration of the study section below.  
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4.7.3 Study sample 
A sample can be defined as a representative selected for a study whose characteristics 
exemplifies the larger group  from  which  it  was  selected  (Patton,  2002: 408;  Denzin  and  
Lincoln, 2005: 370). The foregoing definition is taken further by McMillan and Schumacher 
(2010:138) who define purposive sampling as ‘an approach whereby participants are selected 
because of the rich information they hold that is required to answer the research questions’. In 
consonance, Cohen et al (2007:115) posit that, in purposive sampling, researchers handpick 
the cases to be included in the study on the basis of their typicality or possession of particular 
characteristics being sought.   
 
The choice of Kwekwe District as the study area was done through purposive sampling based 
on six districts where AIAS had done baselines to investigate the outcomes of the FTLRP in 
both 2009 and 2013. The AIAS studies covered six districts namely Mangwe, Chiredzi, 
Zvimba, Goromonzi, Chipinge and Kwekwe. The latter was chosen also because of the 
convenience it provided in collecting data. Further, the district is close to my rural home 
therefore understanding of the way of life of the people would not have been a challenge for 
me. In Kwekwe District, two research sites (Sherwood Block and Umlala Farm) were 
purposively sampled with the assistance of a District Agricultural Extension Officer. The 
officer helped me to identify the two sites which had a contrast in terms of infrastructure as 
well as a history of how the people had been resettled. Umlala Farm had land beneficiaries 
resettled officially by the government. This was a farm which war veterans had initially not 
invaded since the white farmer had a reputation of hospitability. Because of the approach that 
was used, land beneficiaries were randomly selected resulting in having a mix of war veterans, 
former farm workers, civil servants such as teachers and individuals from the communal areas. 
This farm has 44 A1 farms. I held 20 semi-structured interviews with land beneficiaries 
purposively sampled to capture the various categories of beneficiaries cited earlier.  
 
With the help of the Agricultural Extension Officers, I visited the farmers at their homes as 
they were doing their daily chores.  The Agricultural Extension Officers are part of the 
Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX) in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development. One of their responsibilities is to visit 
farmers and provide on-site training whilst also monitoring productivity. In some of my visits 
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to the farmers for interviews, I joined the Agritex Officers as they were doing their job. I had 
shared my semi-structured interview guides with them. In some of the cases when we could 
not establish rapport to conduct the interviews comfortably, the officers would ask the 
questions on my behalf as I listened and recorded where possible. In both Umlala Farm and 
Sherwood Block, I managed to use the trust which farmers had developed with the extension 
officers to get the interviews done. With constant interaction, I then managed to build my own 
relations so that the respondents became confident to express themselves in my presence.  
 
When we visited potential interviewees, in most instances, we joined in the work they were 
doing. It is interesting to note however that most of the uncensored responses to our questions 
were those when we spoke whilst we were working together on whatever the farmer was doing. 
In some of the occasions, the farmers had to stop what they were doing to sit down with us. In 
those instances, the interviews morphed into formal processes, with an impression of one party 
wanting to get information from the other party, not necessarily like colleagues having a 
conversation. Such interviews did not yield detailed accounts of the outcomes of the FTLRP.  
 
Sherwood Block is an area which had four commercial farms before the land redistribution 
namely Devilwood Farm, Bonstead, Lindela and Dickel Farm. The first three belonged to one 
family with three brothers, each owning a farm. The three brothers are popularly known as the 
Burger brothers. On these four farms, there were 171 households that were settled there in 
several ways—from farm occupations to allocation by the chief and also government’s formal 
process.  
 
Most beneficiaries of A2 farms in this area were soldiers who were in Democratic Republic of 
Congo when the land reform started. Of the 171 beneficiaries, I managed to hold 25 semi 
structured interviews. Details of how these happened are noted later in the section of research 
techniques.  I purposively sampled the households in view of the agrarian structure that existed. 
The farm was a total contrast to Umlala Farm for two main reasons. First, it was one of the 
farms with a unique arrangement where the white farmers remained on the farms albeit with 
reduced land sizes. Each white farmer was categorized under the A2 farms and had their land 
size reduced to 450ha. I discuss elsewhere in this thesis (see Chapter 7 on production) on the 
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nature of the relationship between the land beneficiaries and these white farmers. The second 
uniqueness of Sherwood Block is that the greater part of the land is fully equipped with 
irrigation equipment as well as canals for irrigation.  
 
Since the relationship with white farmers was not severed, the latter still maintain their 
equipment and water pump so that all A2 farms can irrigate their farms. In choosing the 25 
respondents, I made sure that I interviewed two representatives of the white farmers, the former 
soldiers, as well as former farm workers who were now in the village type of resettlement of 
Bonstead Farm, which is now called Bonstead Village. 
Table 4.1: Summary of the systematic random samples 
Farm name  Farm size (ha) Number of resettled 
households 
Number of 
households 
interviewed 
Umlala Farm 2500 44 20 
Sherwood Block 6000 171 25 
Total  8500 215 45 
 
4.8 Research techniques  
The research relies mainly on primary and secondary data. The key methods that were 
employed during the fieldwork were observations and in-depth interviews. 
 
4.8.1 In-depth interviews  
Gay et al (2011:386) posit that ‘an interview is a purposeful interaction in which one person 
obtains information from another’.  The interviews provide information that is inaccessible 
through observation (Wiersma and Jurs, 2009). In-depth interviews help researchers to obtain 
important data that they may not acquire from observation alone (Silverman, 2004:181). In-
depth interviews were conducted with 45 farming households who were beneficiaries of the 
FTLRP. As has been noted in the section on sampling, the interviewees were purposively 
sampled to make sure that all the various categories of beneficiaries participated. The categories 
of the beneficiaries whom I interviewed are as below: 
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Table 4.2: Disaggregation of the in-depth interviews with FTLRP beneficiaries 
Category of interviewee  Number  
War veterans  5 
Former farm workers 4 
Civil servants  7 
Beneficiaries from communal areas 8 
Beneficiaries from urban areas serving in private sector 5 
Pensioners  5 
Farm workers  6 
Traditional authorities (chief and two headmen known as sabhuku) 3 
White farmers’ representatives 2 
Source: Own Fieldwork (2015) 
 
As I have noted earlier, a semi structured interview guide structured according to the five 
functions of social policy was used. As such, there were questions on production and productive 
capacity of the beneficiaries. There was a category of questions on redistribution, in terms of 
how the beneficiaries had obtained their land and the configurations of the new landowners. 
The interview guide had also a set of questions on social protection mechanisms available to 
the farmers. Another category of questions was on social reproduction as well as the gender 
relations that are emerging in the resettled communities. Lastly, there was a category of 
questions on social institutions that had been established in the farming communities and the 
extent to which social cohesion was being realised. While the foregoing gave a guide on the 
interviews, I used a rolling and flexible approach to the interviews to make sure that they were 
not mechanical. This approach made the interview process to be fluid and the interviewees in 
most cases would let down their informational guard.  
 
4.8.2 Key informant interviews 
Key informants are people in authority or of certain expertise working within or with a 
community. Such people include local government authorities, teachers and agriculturalists 
(Meis, 2007:4). Due to their personal skills or position in a society, key informants are able to 
proffer details and insights into the vicissitudes of that particular community (Marshall, 
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1998:92). The purpose of these interviews were to bridge any informational gaps or areas that 
needed clarity on the basis of my interaction with the farmers. These key informants included 
ministry of education personnel such as teachers and administrators. Interviews were also 
conducted with ministry of agriculture personnel at district level and also the agricultural 
extension officers of the two sites I was focusing on. I had the opportunity also to talk to the 
local political leadership representatives albeit they wore two hats, as land beneficiaries as well 
as the political leadership of the area. Please see Annexure 1 for the list of the key informants 
interviewed. 
 
The in-depth interviews were relatively more fruitful as the interviews were done without many 
people around. Also, most of the respondents in this category had previously participated in 
research so they did not have any fears. Another dynamic which was at play was that most of 
the key informants were in some position of power so they did not express any discomfort on 
discussing the outcomes of the FTLRP.  Some of the key informant interviewees indicated that 
they had participated in several researches. Their major concern was that the researcher never 
returned to share with them the outcomes of the research, something which they hoped I would 
not do. 
 
4.8.3 Focus group discussions 
Focus groups are part of a category of qualitative research methods useful when wanting to 
obtain some understanding of participants’ views, feelings and attitudes. Focus group 
discussion (FGD) is a useful method for exploratory research (Mahr, 1995:112). It produces 
data and insights that ordinarily would not have come out without group interaction as hearing 
the experiences of others would stimulate memories, ideas, and experiences in the discussants 
(Lindlof and Taylor, 2002:182). Group interactions provide several benefits. Kitzinger (2004) 
exemplifies this by noting that group interactions can inspire a variety of communication 
including anecdotes and jokes, which may be an eye opener to the researcher on what the 
participants know and encourage a wide understanding of issues. The researcher gets exposed 
to subject areas that usually remain untapped using the conventional data collection techniques 
like in-depth interviews. The various forms of communication used during focus group 
discussions may enlighten the researcher to the normative values of the participants that are 
enveloped in the participants’ culture (Kitzinger, 2004).  
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There were two reason for using FGDs in this research. Firstly, FGDs help in understanding 
primarily the solidarity and equality dynamics within the communities. Understanding 
solidarity and equality dynamics is key since these are the normative framings of social policy. 
Secondly, FGDs assist in understanding both horizontal and vertical social cohesion issues in 
line with one of the functions of social policy.  
 
In this study, four focus group discussions were conducted with resettled farmers with an 
average of six participants in each session (see annexure 3 for the details of the FGDs). The 
FGDs were mainly composed of A1 farmers. A2 farmers were mostly based in urban areas. I 
however noticed that the participants were not very free to discuss issues in the FGDs. This 
was primarily because there were two exercises that were taking place at the time of the 
research. The first exercise was a government initiative of identifying underutilised farms for 
repossession and reallocation to people on the waiting list. It took a long time for the 
respondents to appreciate that I was not an undercover government official looking for farmers 
who are underutilising the allocated land. Even though the agricultural extension officers I was 
working with to get entry into the farms explained several times the purpose of the research, 
some of the respondents kept on asking why I was doing the research. When I asked for 
permission to record the conversations, the respondents were categorical in their rejection. I 
had to rely on writing in my journal as the discussions went on. The respondents noted that 
they were not comfortable with being recorded whilst expressing themselves since they were 
not sure of who could end up with the information. Even after my explanations that the 
information I was collecting was going to be confidential and also that there would not be any 
mention of the names, the respondents registered concerns arguing that whilst I could have 
good intentions, should the recordings by any means get into the hands of some people, it could 
turn out bad for them. I therefore respected their sentiments so I did not record the FGDs.  
 
As a result, the focus group discussions then did not achieve as much as I had anticipated. The 
focus group discussion that yielded much was with teachers at Umlala Primary School. The 
teachers spoke freely on their experiences with children from the farming communities. They 
also had no problems with having me write in my journal their views verbatim as the discussion 
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happened. This could have been due to the collegiality which I observed amongst the teacher 
who were all females.  
 
Another reason why the farmers specifically were uneasy with me and the questions I had was 
that the research coincided with a cleansing exercise of members of ZANU PF who were 
aligned to the ousted former vice president Joyce Mujuru. The local ZANU PF structures were 
on the lookout for their members who were alignment with or expressed support for Joyce 
Mujuru. The suspected members were to be ousted from the party and will relinquish any 
position they may hold. There was a fear of losing the land as well. These fears made every 
farmer to be economical with their words so that they would not say the ‘wrong’ thing which 
would get them suspected of sympathising with Joyce Mujuru. Even though my questions were 
not political, the polarised nature of the issue around the land reform invokes a lot of 
sensibilities amongst the respondents.  
 
4.8.4 Observation, interaction and informal questioning 
Observation is often effectively used to explain what is transpiring in a context and why it is 
happening (Silverman, 2004:181). This method of data collection is in coherence with Tedlock 
(2005:468) argument that the most thorough form of gathering sociological data is through 
participatory observation. This approach enables a researcher to record their   observations with 
the aid of an observation checklist (Wiersma & Jurs, 2009:232). In the context of this research, 
I had a journal which I used to systematically record my observations in line with the 
transformative social policy framework. To do this, I participated in the activities of the farmers 
such as harvesting their crops, tending to their livestock as well as watering their gardens. 
Interacting with farmers doing their daily chores helped in breaking the barriers and suspicions 
that initially existed. I also visited schools and other social services institutions that were on 
the two sites. At the end of each day, I would sit to reflect on the conversations that I had 
participated in and record the conversations with my observations and reflections in the field 
journal. As I reflected, the process raised questions that I pursued in the days that followed. 
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4.9 Data analysis 
The analysis of data started with content analysis which was followed by segmentation of the 
findings from observations and interviews according to the transformative social policy 
conceptual framework. In this framework, I categorised the data according to the five functions 
of social policy namely production, redistribution, protection, reproduction and social 
cohesion. What simplified the task is that the research questions were drafted along the five 
social policy functions as well. For the areas where there were linkages, I compiled a list of 
data available for each social policy function. Having done so, I then identified the similarities 
and differences in the data. I realised that some of the data I had categorised as for the 
production social policy function, for example, were also useful for social protection or 
reproduction. I made sure that the linkages of the data were deliberate so that there would be 
coherence in the writing. 
 
Having used ethnography in collecting the qualitative data, I then adopted a realist approach in 
writing this thesis. Carol Bailey (1996) argues that: 
The presentation of respondents’ voices is assumed to be a true reflection of their point 
of view. The researcher dispenses a realistic tale as the disembodied voice of 
authority… the author includes quotations, interpretations by members, summaries of 
informal interviews, and members’ accounts and interpretation of events… (p.106) 
In light of Bailey’s assertion, my findings chapters are primarily written using this approach. 
The use of this approach is supported by Patton (2002:225) who argues that in qualitative 
research, direct quotations and excerpts from interviews can be used as they present the 
participants’ perceptions.  As a result, in my findings chapters, premium was put on direct 
quotations from farmers and technocrats that I interfaced with. 
 
4.10 Administration of the study  
Working with and through AIAS made the fieldwork amenable. This was because Kwekwe 
District was a study site in two baseline surveys by AIAS. During the two surveys, AIAS 
established rapport with the gatekeepers as well as the key informants. AIAS officers linked 
me up with the District Agricultural Extension Office. Having participated in the earlier studies, 
the district officers had an idea about what I wanted since AIAS personnel had explained to 
them, linking my going to the studies they had done earlier. The challenge I had to deal with 
was managing expectation of paying the Agritex officers for assisting me. When they 
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participated in the AIAS baselines, they were paid modest honorariums. They expected me to 
pay them the same way since I had come through AIAS. I had to use the letter which I had 
gotten from the SARCHI Chair to explain that though the research was related to the AIAS 
baseline surveys, it was separate, with funding coming from different sources, hence I could 
not pay similar honorariums. When we got that out of the way, the officers were keen to assist 
with the research.  
 
The District Agricultural Extension Office linked me up with their ward officers who had direct 
interface with the farmers. The Agritex officers at ward level were responsive to my working 
with them since I had been referred to them from the district office. Working with the ward 
officers made it easy to get access to farmers. In the two sites, I worked with the agricultural 
extension officers for those wards, travelling with them as they undertook their responsibilities. 
While my access to farmers and their struggles was easy, it had a down side in that some of the 
farmers thought I was a government representative investigating on their land utilisation which 
will inform the downsizing of the farms, an exercise that was impending at the time of the 
research.  
 
Throughout the six months when I was staying with the farmers in the district, I would go back 
to AIAS offices in Harare at the end of each month. The purpose of this was to have an 
opportunity to reflect on my findings up to that stage and get feedback from the colleagues at 
AIAS. I found this process to be helpful because as I engaged with other doctoral fellows and 
post-doctoral fellows at the institute I got a lot of insights which informed my return to the 
field. In our usual informal engagements over lunch, the discussions assisted me to engage with 
the data I was bringing from the field and provide rigorous interpretation of the data.  
 
One of the major challenges that I encountered was that my research grant was in South African 
Rand and Zimbabwe used United States Dollar as their currency. This meant that my 
purchasing power drastically reduced when I was in Zimbabwe. As a result, the scope that I 
ideally would have wanted to cover in the research was reduced. The situation was further 
compounded by erratic electricity which meant that sometimes I would not be able to transcribe 
my fieldwork notes into the computer expeditiously.  
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As I noted earlier, political polarity was very pronounced during my research. As a result, most 
respondents refused to be recorded on the Dictaphone which I had carried to the field. I resorted 
to writing in my journal which was inconvenient since most of the data collection happened as 
people went about their daily chores. I also noticed that some of the respondents were not 
comfortable to see me write in my journal as they spoke. It made them to be extremely cautious 
on how they responded to my questions so that they would not say anything that could get them 
into trouble with local authorities, should the information leak. In instances when I left the 
notebook, I found that the respondents spoke freely. This meant that most evenings after 
interaction with the farmers, I had to spend some time transcribing my experiences for each 
day into my journal. My experiences were not peculiar as Helliker (2006:8-12) had experienced 
the same, as well as Murisa (2010) in Zvimba and Goromonzi. 
 
To gain access to teachers and schools, I had to get a letter of approval from the head office of 
the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education in Harare. The process of getting this letter 
was strenuous considering the fact that I was staying in Kwekwe which is about 250km away. 
After some delays and a lot of going back and forth, I managed to get the letter despite fears 
that I was not going to be cleared in view of the sensitivities around my topic.  
 
After obtaining the clearance letter from the head office, the provincial office in Gweru needed 
to give me another letter as well. The process of getting this one was easy since I had obtained 
the difficult one from the head office. After obtaining the provincial letter, I needed to get 
another one from Kwekwe District to allow me access into the schools. The process of getting 
the clearance letters took me about two weeks. I had gotten the clearance letters by end of April 
2015 considering that I had started fieldwork in Kwekwe beginning of April. After all the 
bureaucratic processes were done, I then was allowed to access the schools in the two sites. I 
must say that the bureaucratic processes were worth it because interviewing the teachers 
brought insightful etic views on the land reform which I could not get from the farmers or the 
agricultural extension officers. 
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4.11 Ethical considerations 
Patton (2002:273) regards informed consent as a process whereby respondents give their  
consent  to  take part  in  a  research  study  after  getting  candid  information about its 
procedures, risks and benefits. In compliance with this, I informed all my respondents  about  
the  purpose  of  the  study  as  well  as  making  them  cognizant  of  the risks they may face in 
take part in the study. I also made sure that the  participants  were  free  to  make  choices  about  
whether  they  wanted  to participate  or  not  at  any  point  in  the  study. The purpose of this 
was to seek the respondents’ informed consent (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006:333). All the 
respondents gave consent though some did not want to sign the consent forms. Those ones gave 
verbal consent. I was clear to the participants that they were free to withdraw at any point in 
the study. 
 
Confidentiality means that no one has access to the participants’ data or names in the possession 
of the researcher and that no one can match research information with that of a participant 
(Patton, 2002:412; Christians, 2005:145).  In view of this, I made sure that all my respondents 
remained anonymous. In writing the subsequent chapters of this thesis, pseudo names were 
adopted of farmers and technocrats whom I interacted with. 
 
In line with the research principle of not exposing the participants to any physical, social, 
emotional and spiritual harm or potential harm of any nature (Patton, 2002:274), I made sure 
that I did not expose my respondents to any harm by not asking private and sensitive questions. 
 
4.12 Conclusion  
The methodology chapter has provided the mechanisms through which data that informed this 
thesis was collected. In this chapter, I first tackled issues of research philosophy, giving 
attention to the paradigm wars that exist between interpretivists and positivists. I then gave 
attention to the mixed methods approach, which was the research design for this thesis. I noted 
that whilst the thesis uses the mixed methods approach, it has an inclination towards the 
qualitative mixed methods research design. Overall, I used ethnography for the qualitative data 
collection. The methods used for data collection include in-depth interviews with land 
beneficiaries, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and systematic observation. I 
outlined the pros and cons of using these tools in data collection. For quantitative data, I relied 
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on the baseline studies that were conducted by AIAS in 2008-2009 and 2013-2014. The 
baselines covered six districts, including Kwekwe District. The baseline surveys primarily 
provided data on the production and redistribution functions of social policy.  
 
In the chapter, I chronicled the challenges that I experienced in data collection, especially in 
view of the fact that the subject under investigation is highly polarised in Zimbabwe. I outlined 
the ethical considerations I observed inter alia, confidentiality on the collected data, obtaining 
informed consent from the respondents, voluntary participation of the interviewees and not 
exposing the research participants to any form of risk through the research. I also gave 
demographic and ecological details about the case study site-Kwekwe District.  
 
Having detailed the mechanisms that were used in data collection, the next chapter is a product 
of the same fieldwork but setting the context for the results that shall follow. The chapter 
challenges available narratives in literature (especially the literature that was produced after 
2010) on the outcomes of the FTLRP. Based on the sentiments of the farmers that I interfaced 
with during the fieldwork, I argue that what transpired in 2008 changed a lot of things for the 
farmers who had picked up momentum since 2001 when most of them had settled on the land. 
The momentum was disrupted between 2007 and 2008 that the farmers had to start afresh in a 
different setting from 2009 when the multi-currency system was instituted. 
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CHAPTER 5: IN THE YEAR 2008… 
“True, we are experiencing hardships, some self-inflicted, others of exogenous origin, 
[emphasis added] at all levels of our existence but let us take comfort from the fact 
that no winter, no matter how severe, is permanent and no spring ever skips its turn” 
Dr Gideon Gono, Governor Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
Mid-year monetary policy statement 
October 01, 2007 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a product of my interactions with the land beneficiaries during fieldwork. My 
initial mind frame, informed by literature was that it is logical after a period of fifteen years to 
start seeing outcomes of the FTLRP (see Hanlon, 2012; Scoones, 2010, 2015; Richardson, 
2012; Zamchiya, 2012; Matondi, 2011; Mutopo, 2011). My experiences from interfacing with 
the resettled farmers dislodged this narrative. The farmers do not consider the period between 
2001 and 2015 as a wholesale time frame where the conditions were the same. In their 
periodisation, the farmers in Kwekwe District categorised the period between 2000 and 2015 
into three phases. The first phase being 2001-2006. The second phase starting 2007 to 2008. 
The last phase being 2009 to current. Having listened to the farmers, I then went to triangulate 
the experiences of the farmers with what literature says about these three phases. This chapter 
therefore is a critical analysis of why the farmers periodised their time in the farms in the three 
phases. The chapter is important in that it puts context in appreciating the social policy 
outcomes of the FTLRP which shall follow. 
 
5.2 First phase: 2000-2006 
Moyo (2011) posits that the FTLRP was concluded in 2004, though there were isolated 
incidences of land expropriation that continued to take place beyond 2014. The period saw 
some of the farmers settling on their land for productivity. During this period, the farmers 
started gaining momentum and were beginning to appreciate the terrain they were working in, 
especially for the land beneficiaries who had not been in farming before. One of the farmers 
noted that: 
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I got settled in 2001. In 2002, there was a drought but it did not affect me much because 
I had not planted much. I took my time to acquire equipment and knowledge about what 
I could do with the land. 2003 was the year when I used all the capital I had raised. It 
paid off. The harvest was good. I produced enough for consumption and sold five tonnes 
of the maize to GMB. When GMB paid me, I used the proceeds to finance the next 
season. I was really on track… (In-depth Interview, 9/06/2015, Male, A1 Farmer, 
Umlala Farm). 
This quotation serves to show that from the time the land beneficiaries most of the farmers 
delved into working the land. The output immediately showed especially after the 2002 
drought. Another farmer attested to this when he noted that: 
For me, 2006 was my best year. After selling my produce, I had enough money to take 
my family to Victoria Falls for a holiday. After working that hard, I did not regret taking 
my whole family with me. Isn’t that what the white farmers used to do also? (In-depth 
Interview, 16/07/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block). 
Data from the Central Statistical Office confirms this scenario. The 2001 season was the best 
in this first phase. The 2002 drought affected productivity. The drought did not however affect 
food security because the agricultural season before was good. As can be deciphered from the 
graph below, after the devastating drought, there is a steady improvement in agricultural 
productivity at national level. Even though the agricultural performance is in the negative, there 
was a significant improvement from -23.4 in 2002 to -4 in 2006. This improvement happens in 
a space of four years. At micro level, the quantum produce for the farmers I spoke to in Kwekwe 
District was significant.  
Figure 5.1: Phase 1 agricultural performance 
 
Source: Central Statistical Office and RBZ 
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Another farmer used his experience to demonstrate the data shown in Figure 5.1 above when 
he said: 
Except for the drought in 2002, all the agricultural seasons were very good for me. I 
managed to produce enough food for my family and then sell the surplus to GMB. 
When GMB paid, I used the money to buy the inputs I needed for the next season. I 
managed also to increase my herd by buying five more cattle. My plan was that after 
ten years, my plot would have electricity, borehole for irrigation and home use and at 
least a tractor. With the returns I had made in the first few years that was going to be a 
reality. For me the 2007-2008 season changed everything… (In-depth Interview, 
9/06/2015, Male, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm). 
 
  
The sentiments of all the farmers cited show that the whole agricultural system was functional. 
Though there were challenges, overall, the farmers could rely on the government services such 
as subsidized access to inputs like fertilizers and seeds. Through the Grain Marketing Board, 
the farmers had a ready buyer for their produce despite the fact that the buying price was low. 
The functionality of the entire agricultural chain created predictability, something which the 
second phase 2007-2008 interfered with.  
 
5.3 Second phase: 2007-2008 
At the global level, the year 2008 saw a global financial crisis that had its epicentre in the 
United States of America (Stiglitz, 2008). Global economic growth slowed down, from 4.9% 
in 2007 to an estimated 3.7% in 2008. The crisis was caused by the burst of the housing bubble 
in USA. This crisis affected the developed countries mostly and centred on the liquidity crunch 
which adversely affected commodity prices and reduced demand for raw materials (Rudd, 
2009; Shiller, 2008). The UK and other European countries also spent some $2 trillion on 
rescues and bail-out packages (Gangadharan and Yoonus, 2012). The global economic crisis 
did not affect Zimbabwe much because the country is not fully integrated into the global 
financial system. It is however worth noting that this global crisis coincided with the 
Zimbabwean crisis in the same year 2008. There were some factors which compounded the 
situation in Zimbabwe. Some of these factors include sanctions on Zimbabwe, hyperinflation, 
political instability and drought. The following section unpacks these factors. 
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5.4 Sanctions  
While sanctions on Zimbabwe had been put in place more than five years before 2008, they 
contributed significantly to the compounding challenges which the country found itself in. The 
Bush administration enacted the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act in 2001, 
linking financial support with democratic reforms and soon after, the International Monetary 
Fund withdrew support along with the European Union (Chengu, 2009).  Amongst other factors 
such as RBZ policies which caused hyperinflation, the sanctions also contributed adversely to 
most the sectors of the Zimbabwean economy (RBZ, 2008). Of course one may argue that the 
seclusion of Zimbabwe through the sanctions meant that the country was not overly affected 
by the global recession. This however is a half-truth because when the country needed foreign 
direct investments or loans from the World Bank and the IMF to mitigate the abrupt shocks of 
the FTLRP, there was no support available. The graph below shows how financial support 
drastically dropped soon after the year 2000. 
Figure 5.2: Zimbabwe periodic loan inflows 
 
Source: RBZ 2008 Annual Report 
In the build up to 2008, Zimbabwe did not have lines of credit open to it. The IMF stopped 
supporting Zimbabwe by way of balance of payment support in 1999 while the World Bank 
did the same in 2001. The African Development Bank, also stopped balance of payment support 
in 1998, earlier than the international Bretton Woods Institutions. These developments formed 
part of the background that exacerbated the economic situation of the country eventually. 
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Furthermore, the negative perception associated with sanctions on Zimbabwe adversely 
impacted on foreign direct investment to Zimbabwe. Thus, investors shied away from investing 
in Zimbabwe as the country was portrayed as risky. Reflecting this, most multinational 
corporations such as Anglo-American have been strongly discouraged from investing in 
Zimbabwe by their home countries (RBZ, 2008). 
Figure 5.3: Trends on Foreign Direct Investment since independence 
  
Source: RBZ 2008 Annual Report 
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Figure 5.4: GDP trends for Zimbabwe 
 
Source: Biti (2013) 
During this time, Zimbabwean companies struggled to access lines of credit because of the 
perceived country risk (RBZ, 2008). Consequently, Zimbabwean companies had to pay cash 
for imports. Figure 5.4 above demonstrates this point using real time value of the trajectory of 
FDI flows which the country had access to since independence. From 2000, the country 
experienced investor flight and companies which were not on the sanctions list were also 
affected. Having to resort to paying cash for imports, the companies had to come up with 
mechanisms of getting the United States Dollar which was not readily available officially. This 
partly explains why the supermarket shelves were empty of basic commodities. Four hundred 
companies shut down in 2000 alone. By mid-2009, the country was operating at about 10 per 
cent of its industrial capacity (Hanke et al, 2009). Over a period of 12 months up to May 2007, 
the government itself had lost 15,000 employees (as many as 40 per day), who quit in search 
of better remuneration elsewhere, mostly in other countries but also in the informal economy 
within Zimbabwe (The Financial Gazette, 16 May 2007). As people lost their jobs, those who 
did not emmigrate to other countries moved into the informal sector. An independent tabloid 
in Zimbabwe noted that out of a population of about 12 million, 3 to 4 million Zimbabweans 
earned their living through informal sector employment while supporting another 5 million 
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people. The proliferation of the informal sector presented a challenge for government of 
Zimbabwe tax collection policy as it was found inadequate, further handicapping the 
government as it could not finance its own spending using the economic activities of its 
population. The state was only assured of tax from the 1.3 million people who were in formal 
employment (cited in the Zimbabwean 24-30 June 2005:.8). 
 
5.5 Historical inflation 
Inflation continued  on  an  upward  trend,  increasing from  1  593.6%  in  January  2007  to  
close  the  year  at 66 212.3% (RBZ, 2007). In July 2008, all the foregoing factors compounded 
the situation to have inflation that was incredulous. In that month, Zimbabwe recorded a 
historical inflation of 231 million and it was believed to have reached 5 billion by the end of 
2008 (Mankiw, 2014: 484). The policies which the RBZ promulgated, as shall be noted later, 
further exacerbated hyperinflation. This was worsened by the declining mineral prices at global 
level, prohibitive export tariffs, and restrictive exchange control measures that were put in place 
by the Government of Zimbabwe (Elich, 2002). The latter fuelled the foreign currency parallel 
market. By 2008, the private sector had lost confidence in the Zimbabwe-dollar, but it remained 
the official  legal  tender  of  the  country,  and  as  such,  all  domestic  payments  were  to  be  
made  in Zimbabwe  dollars (Ibid).  The difference between  the  official  rate  and  the  parallel 
market  rate  reached  as  high  as  4,000  times  the  official  rate,  indicating  the  extent  to  
which  the official  exchange  rate  was  divorced  from  reality (Ibid).   
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Table 5.1: Foreign currency market rates-annual averages: Zimbabwe dollars to one US 
Dollar 
Year  Annual average: official 
market Zim$/US$ 
Annual average: 
roadside market 
Zim$/US$ 
Roadside market: 
average premium% 
2000                                                                      
44.00  
           
49.00  
                                      
11.40  
2001                                                                      
55.00  
         
215.00  
                                   
290.90  
2002                                                                      
55.00  
1 049.00   1 807.30  
2003                                                                    
698.00  
3 675.00                                    
426.50  
2004                                                             
5 123.00  
6 354.00                                       
24.00  
2005                                                          
25 142.00  
45 868.00                                       
82.40  
2006                                                        
162 699.00  
768 713.00                                    
372.50  
2007                                                   
81 937 500.00  
818 000 000.00                                    
898.30  
Period 
Average 
                                                 
10 266 414.50  
102 353 240.40                                    
897.00  
Source: Robertson Economic Information Services at: http://www.economic.co.zw 
The tragedy of this scenario was that the government and state owned enterprises like the Grain 
Marketing Board were still required to provide public services in Zimbabwe-dollars, priced at 
the official exchange rate.  Many of the state owned enterprises went bankrupt because they 
could not obtain the much needed imports at the official exchange rate. Since the disparity 
between the official rate and the parallel rate was so huge, the private sector refused to pay for 
utilities and taxes which the state owned enterprises were not able to provide. Right there, one 
of the major income streams for the state dried up. It can be said that the government exchange 
rate policy was the major culprit for the collapse of the state owned enterprises. This policy 
discrepancy went unabated resulting in the Zimbabwe dollar becoming worthless. This resulted 
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in goods disappearing from shops; the formal economy grounded to a halt by mid-2008. The 
difference in  using  the  official  versus the  parallel  market rate  could  be  thousands  of  
times. 
 
It is imperative to link this to what was happening in the agriculture sector since some of the 
challenges which the sector is facing can be traced to this point. The Grain Marketing Board 
went bankrupt in 2008 as it lost value due to the exchange rate policy that existed. Inevitably, 
it meant that the parastatal could not pay the farmers for the produce which they had supplied 
in trust. My research showed that some of the farmers in 2015 are still struggling to pick 
themselves up as they could not get their money from GMB to reinvest in the subsequent 
seasons. The GMB is yet to emerge from the abyss it found itself in 2008. The classic case 
study from the research was of a 65 year old farmer who took 33 tonnes of maize to GMB in 
the 2007/2008 season. He explained that: 
In 2006 I had a good harvest. I took 33 tonnes of the maize I had produced to GMB. I 
was expecting them to pay on time as they used to do. After several follow ups with the 
parastatal, I got money in Zimbabwe dollars that could only buy a soft drink. So how 
was I supposed to prepare for the next season? I had put all my confidence in GMB but 
they failed me. I have learnt my lesson, it won’t happen again (In-depth Interview, 
6/08/2015, Male, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm). 
 
This was at a point where the differences between the official rate and the parallel market rate 
were more than a thousand in value. In the case of this farmer, he was not able to get any other 
money to reinvest in the proceeding season. The inputs were also not readily available and if 
they were, the middlemen who were selling them demanded US dollars which the farmers did 
not have. 
 
5.6 Political polarity 
On the political front, a Government of National Unity (GNU) was established after the 
contested elections of 2008. The GNU brought together the Zimbabwe African National Union- 
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), in an inclusive government with the main opposition parties-the 
two "Movement for Democratic Change" (MDC) factions, the MDC-T, led by Morgan 
Tsvangirai, who became the prime minister, and the MDC led by Arthur Mutambara, who 
became the deputy prime minister, with Robert Mugabe remaining as president. The inclusive 
 100 
government formally took power on February 11, 2009 (Noko, 2011). That month, under its 
Short-Term Economic Recovery Program (STERP), the government consented to transactions 
in foreign currency and to the full dollarization of Zimbabwe, though without any formal 
agreements (Ibid).  
 
5.7 Social policy in crisis times? 
5.7.1 The Basic Commodities Supply Side Intervention (BACOSSI) 
During the crisis period building up to 2008, the RBZ played the centre stage both in trying to 
solve the problems and creating some of the problems. When the government established a 
price freeze policy in March 2007 trying to counter inflation, the policy brought with it 
unexpected repercussions. For the retail shops, it did not make business sense to import food 
products using foreign currency then sell on the local market using a depressed official rate 
whose value was miles away from the parallel market value (Ellyn et al, 2013). The next logical 
thing that the retailers did was either to hoard their products with the hope that the market 
distortion would be addressed, then they would sell. Alternatively, the retailers sold their goods 
on the parallel market, though this was illegal. As has been noted, the shops did not have any 
commodities like mealie meal, sugar, salt and so forth. At this point, the country was 
characterised by queues. As shops would sell a single product, people would make long queues 
with the hope of getting the products. The case was similar on petrol stations. Fuel was scarce 
so those filling stations that would have managed to import would witness long queues with 
motorist wanting the scarce commodity. 
 
During these times of food shortages through the RBZ, the government came up with the Basic 
Commodities Supply Side Intervention (BACOSSI). The program started in 2008 with the 
PEOPLE’S Shops concept. From July 2008, Reserve Bank officials were deployed to all the 
provinces to distribute the heavily subsidized commodity baskets which were sold at only 
ZWR$10 as of October 2008. A total of 1,578,365 households, which is 77% of the established 
number of households of 2,049,410, were served under the BACOSSI programme (see table 
5.2). It is noteworthy that the program sought for universal access to the food basket for all 
Zimbabweans. Even though in practice this did not happen considering the polarized 
environment, it is fascinating for a social policy scholar to note that during the crisis time, for 
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all the priorities which the government had, attention was given to providing universal food 
baskets. 
Table 5.2: BACOSSI distribution total reach 
Province  Household after 
previous census 
Households served 
by BACOSSI 
Percentage 
served 
Matebelaland North  164.602 117.514 71 
Matebeleland South 135.074 135.074 100 
Manicaland 369.000 293.669 80 
Midlands 222.163 212.953 96 
Mashonaland East 285.316 208.864 73 
Mashonaland West 230.690 155.391 67 
Mashonaland Central 274.263 186.242 68 
Masvingo 368.302 268.658 73 
Total  2. 049. 410 1.578.365 77 
Source: RBZ 2008 Annual Report 
The RBZ kept on printing money through 2007 and 2008 to buy foreign currency on the 
parallel market. Under this new regime of concentrated economic power, the Reserve Bank 
increased currency in circulation at escalating rates, with the period from January 2005 to 
May 2007 noteworthy for exceeding the peak of the efforts of the German central bank's 
printing presses in January 1921 to May 1923 (Hanke, 2008).  
 
Since the official rate was far lower than the parallel rate, the RBZ would print Zimbabwe 
dollars in the form of bearer cheques. Through this process, the RBZ managed to get US dollars 
that were in the market at cheap prices. The people who sold their US dollars were taking 
advantage of the situation as well because most payments had to be done in Zimbabwe dollars 
since it was the legal tender. These shenanigans around the exchange rate policy made the RBZ 
to have a lot of disposable US dollars to buy food baskets that they distributed under the 
BACOSSI program. The program was flourishing to the extent that it was extended to strategic 
institutions like the army, all the 58 prisons of the country and hospitals. The food rations were 
to assist hospitals feed patients. 
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5.7.2 Farm mechanization program 
The farm mechanization program was launched in March 2007. In 2008 the Government, 
through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, continued to procure tractors, combine harvesters, 
and other farm equipment for distribution to farmers to increase agricultural production (RBZ, 
2008). Under this program, a lot of equipment was distributed to farmers around the country. 
This research however noted that ordinary beneficiaries of the FTLRP did not get the 
equipment. One war veteran who had benefited from the land reform noted: 
I had been identified at national level to receive a tractor. Personnel from the Reserve 
Bank even visited me here in Kwekwe as they were doing their due diligence. They 
noted that the tractor was there and in the near future I should collect it. But after a 
month or so, they went quiet on me. I tried making follow ups to no avail. I even visited 
the Reserve Bank division that was working on this project to understand what was 
happening. That is when I was told that the tractor had been taken by someone senior 
in our political establishment. I was extremely disappointed (In-depth Interview, A1 
Farmer, Umlala Farm, 27/06/2015). 
Another farmer confirmed this point when he noted that: 
If you go to the farms of our superiors, even here in Kwekwe, you will find all the 
equipment that was supposed to have benefited all the farmers. At one farm here in 
Kwekwe, there are three tractors which we know were gotten through the 
mechanisation program. The problem is that these tractors are not accessible to all of 
us. This boss of ours has privatised them. What kind of greed is that? Imagine if at least 
two of the tractors rotated amongst us, which would save us a lot of money we use on 
hiring tractors (In-depth Interview, A1 Farmer, Sherwood Farm, 18/07/15). 
. 
One Agritex Officer confirmed the sentiments of the land beneficiaries when she noted that: 
It will be untrue to say farmers did not benefit from the mechanisation program. Yes 
some farmers benefited from the mechanisation program. They however got small 
equipment such as ploughs, animal drawn harrows and scotch carts. I do not know any 
farmer, both A1 and A2 who is not a heavy weight in the political establishment who 
got such equipment as tractors, combine harvesters or even motor cycles. These were 
taken by the senior leaders in the party (ZANU PF). If you take a tour around their 
farms, you will find all the equipment, some of them laying idle… (Key Informant 
Interview, 20/08/2015, Female, Sherwood Block).  
 
As can be noted from the citations, most of the valuable equipment was primarily taken by the 
government senior civil servants and political leaders of ZANU PF. Corruption emerged within 
and outside ZANU-PF as various classes competed for access to the subsidies and rents. 
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Patronage often included or excluded both political opponents and supporters. These events 
widened the fractures within ZANU-PF and fuelled the violently contested elections of 2008 
(Moyo and Yeros, 2009). Table 5.3 below is an inventory of the equipment that was distributed 
to beneficiaries of the FTLRP: 
Table 5.3: Farm mechanization program equipment distributed 
Equipment  2007 2008 
Tractors 2125 100 
Combine Harvesters 85 20 
Ploughs 1386 - 
Harrows 1263 10 
Vicons 378 - 
Boom sprayers 541 - 
Planters 371 15 
Animal drawn ploughs 50000 400 
Knapsack sprayers 70000 17000 
Animal drawn planters 1000 50 
Animal drawn cultivators 20000 1000 
Animal drawn scotch carts 45000 7000 
Animal drawn harrows 70000 4000 
Generators  - 400 
Spreaders   50 
Motorcycles  - 750 
Grinding Mills - 150 
Chains - 50000 
Source: RBZ 2007 and 2008 Annual Reports 
5.7.3 Interventions on the Cholera Outbreak 
As though the above mentioned predicaments were not enough, the country was bedevilled by 
a cholera outbreak. The epidemic had its tentacles across the whole country. 98 592 people 
were infected and 4 288 died (WHO, 2010). This represents a case fatality rate of 1.7% and for 
Budiriro suburb in the southern part of Harare, the fatality rate was 2.3% as it was one of the 
most affected suburbs, where 206 people died (Chipare, 2010). 
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The primary cause of the epidemic was lack of access to safe water in urban areas. This was a 
result of the collapse in urban water supply, sanitation and garbage collection systems. The 
situation was compounded by dysfunctional drainage system which were overwhelmed by the 
rains that were falling leading to human excrete flooding water sources which were the only 
available water sources for the people. The RBZ intervened to contain the spread of the disease 
through the improvement of the national water supply by ZINWA and the rehabilitation of 
sewer systems. In this regard, the Bank funded cholera programmes through ZINWA by 
providing US$1 million and ZAR5.6 million for the importation of water treatment chemicals 
from South Africa, and also provided Z$375 quadrillion for cholera programmes (RBZ, 2008). 
The Bank also financed the ferrying of ZINWA water treatment chemicals from ZIMPHOS to 
Morton Jaffray.  
 
In addition, the Bank allocated 28 vehicles to ZINWA, 3 tractors to Harare City Council to 
assist in refuse collection and the transportation of equipment towards the anti-cholera 
programme. The Bank provided all fuel requirements for the containment of the cholera 
outbreak (Ibid). In mid-2008  the government  authorized  the  RBZ  to  print  “Special  Agro-
Cheque”  notes  to  finance  farmers. The purpose of these agro cheques was to act as currency 
which was bankable for farmers to use in buying farming inputs. Noko  (2011) notes that this 
support added  to  the  inflationary  quasi-fiscal  activities  of  the  RBZ,  which  were  a  key 
contributing factor to the rampant growth in inflation rate. 
 
5.8 Phase 3: 2009 to current 
5.8.1 Dollarization in 2009 
While the Zimbabwe dollar was still legal tender, the market had already dumped it, with some 
service providers not accepting it as tender for payment. The GNU eventually became 
operational after a protracted period of negotiations amongst the political parties. Some of the 
sticking points were on which political party was to take which ministry. One of the issues 
agreed on without a lot of contestation was the adoption of multi-currency system. This was 
partly because the new government did not have a choice since the US dollar and South African 
Rand were the currencies that were circulating in the informal market. Tendai Biti, the newly 
appointed Minister of Finance, acknowledged in his first midterm budget review that "since 
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February this year, the Zimbabwe dollar is no longer a currency that the public and any trader 
will accept. Our national currency has, thus, become moribund" (Biti, 2009). On April 12, 
2009, the Zimbabwe dollar was suspended as a legal tender and the multi-currency system 
became operational.  
 
Immediately after the adoption of the US dollar, the monthly inflation declined significantly 
between January and May 2009: -2.3 percent for January, -3.1 percent for February, -3.0 
percent for March, -1.1 percent for April, and -1.0 percent for May (Kwesu, 2009). The growth 
rate also improved soon after dollarization. Graph 5.5 below shows the growth trend which 
Zimbabwe went through after the introduction of the dollar as the official currency. 
Figure 5.5: Zimbabwe growth rate 2009-2015 
  
Source: World Bank (2015) 
 
Whilst the growth rate was positive, the farmers had hardly recuperated from the legacies of 
the second phase crises 2007-2008. For the farmers who had not managed to recoup any 
meaningful income from the bankrupt GMB, the situation became dire since they could not get 
the scarce United States Dollar. It meant that the farmers had to start afresh. Farmers found 
themselves owing some of the parastatals in electricity, water which they had used for irrigation 
and loans which they had taken. The farmers were not able to pay their bills. For those who 
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had taken loans using their houses as collateral, they lost the houses to the banks. With the 
Damocles’ sword of debt hanging over them, the farmers were left with no choice except to 
work the land with the little resource they had (Kwesu, 2009). Most sold their cattle or any 
form of assets they had to have capital so that they could start afresh.  
 
Understanding of these dynamics can help explain the current outcomes of the land reform. It 
is my argument that interrogation of the social policy outcomes of land reform should not be 
undertaken as though the period in question had similar operating conditions with all factors 
held constant. Most farmers had to start afresh from 2009 henceforth since GMB had not paid 
them for the proceeds of previous good seasons. One farmer retorted: 
The year 2008 really got me out of sorts. I lost everything from my house to cattle and 
all. What made the situation worse was that the good harvests I had obtained in 
2006/2007 season did not account for much since GMB could not pay for what I had 
given them. I did not have money to reinvest so I am literary starting afresh (In-depth 
Interview, 11/04/2015, Female A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm).  
 
Another farmer reiterated the foregoing when he noted that: 
I am really stuck. I can’t get a loan from the bank because I don’t have collateral. The 
situation of 2008 returned me to 2001 when I came to this land. I have to start again. I 
have no option. So I will use a small portion of the land until I raise enough capital to 
fully utilise my whole plot. I have to rely on my own labour and perhaps get remittances 
from my children to get seed, hoping that the heavens will smile on us and send us rain 
on time (In-depth Interview, 19/07/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block). 
 
It is worth noting that land utilisation was also affected by the fateful 2008.  The writing of this 
thesis is hardly seven years from 2008 and not many changes have been witnessed on the farms 
except for those farmers who managed to get starting capital again from either remittances, 
pensions or employment. All these factors have a bearing on the social policy outcomes of the 
FTLRP. 
 
5.9 Conclusion  
The purpose of the chapter was to set the context through which a nuanced understanding of 
the FTLRP social policy outcomes can be understood. In this chapter, I have argued that 
interrogating the outcomes of the FTLRP should not be glossed over as though the period under 
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review was the same. From interacting with the farmers, I observed that there were three phases 
which the farmers put their time after getting the land. The three phases are 2000-2006, 2007-
2008 and 2009 to current. The chapter has shown that in all the three phases, there were 
different dynamics which impacted the prevailing situation on the farms right at the time of my 
field research. The first phase was characterised by farmers occupying the land and most of 
them enthusiastically working on the land. The production trends showed that whilst 
productivity drastically dropped between 2001 and 2002, there was a gradual increase in 
productivity up to 2006. This was despite the 2002 drought which affected farmers’ yields.  
 
The second phase of 2007 to 2008 was observed by the farmers as the one when they were 
taken back to the starting point. This phase was characterised by drought and hyperinflation. 
Due to the latter, the Grain Marketing Board could not pay farmers for the agricultural produce 
which they had supplied to the marketing board in good faith. This meant that most farmers 
did not have capital to use for the season that followed, hence they had to start afresh. The third 
phase is linked to the second one. To salvage the hyper-inflationary environment, the 
government introduced a multicurrency system, with the US Dollar being the main currency. 
This compounded the situation for the farmers as they did not have means to get much needed 
capital to invest in the proceeding agricultural season. Hence, phase three is about farmers 
trying their own machinations without much help from the state.  I argue therefore that 
understanding social policy outcomes of the FTLRP has to be done in the context of these three 
phases in order to fully appreciate what is happening currently.  Having set the context, the 
next chapters now look at the five social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. The proceeding 
chapter looks at the redistributive outcome, exploring how the agrarian structure has changed 
from a bi-modal structure to a tri-modal arrangement. 
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CHAPTER 6: REDISTRIBUTIVE SOCIAL POLICY OUTCOME OF THE FTLRP 
 
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I interrogate the redistributive outcome of the FTLRP. I weigh in on the debates 
around the question of who got the land. In this chapter, I rely significantly on the AIAS 
quantitative data in understanding the character of the new agrarian structure at national level. 
I then narrow down to Kwekwe district using both my data and that of AIAS. I confirmed the 
assertion by Moyo that the FTLRP transformed the agrarian structure from a bi-modal system 
to a tri-modal arrangement. The composition of the new structure is explored in details in the 
chapter. The chapter also provides detailed accounts of how the land beneficiaries access the 
land. Some of the beneficiaries got the land during farm occupations, which were mainly 
orchestrated by the war veterans. The majority of the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District got 
the land through formal allocation by the government, without having invaded the farms 
initially.  
 
The chapter provides profiles of the land beneficiaries.  The data I collected and that of AIAS 
refutes the narrative that only the elite benefited from the FTLRP. Civil servants, former farm 
workers, senior politicians, war veterans and ordinary citizens all benefited from the FTLRP. 
In answering the question of who got the land, the chapter provides gender disaggregation of 
the land beneficiaries. The data collected confirms the earlier findings that women did not 
constitute a majority of the beneficiaries. The percentage of the women beneficiaries is even 
lower in A2 type of farms. Lastly, the chapter explores farm residency trends in a bid to 
contribute to the debate around farmers who got land for speculative reasons as well as the 
concept of absentee farmers. I observed that most beneficiaries in A1 type of farming, 
especially the villagised type, can be said to have residency on the farms. This then challenges 
scholars who provided claims that farmers are not resident on the land. I conclude the chapter 
by setting the tone for the subsequent chapter on production outcomes, which will endeavour 
to answer the question of what the land beneficiaries are doing with the land.  
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6.2 The redistributive function of social policy 
Using empirical data from the World Bank programs, Birdsall and Londono (1997) observed 
that redistribution of assets was an indispensable component to growth and addressing poverty. 
This observation was made after witnessing the failure of the World Bank programs which 
were pushing growth only without redistribution. Deininger  and  Squire  (1998) later 
confirmed this when they  argued  that  redistributive  land  reform  can  improve growth and 
address poverty.  On the other hand, Ghatak and Roy (2007) found an overall negative impact 
of land reform on agricultural productivity in their study on India, although some state-specific 
effects suggest heterogeneity in the impact of land reform across states. In Korea, land reform 
was found to have increased agricultural production through enhancing economic incentives 
(Jeon and Kim, 2000). In view of the forgoing, Kinsey (2004) argues that ‘a redistributive 
growth path is always likely to be superior to a distribution-neutral path (the discredited notion 
of ‘‘trickle-down’’) for reducing poverty’’. 
 
Redistribution can be said to be one of the unequivocal outcomes of the FTLRP as it 
significantly changed the agrarian structure of the country. As has been noted earlier, the 
settler-colonial regime was configured to plunder the country through accumulation by 
dispossession thereby creating a labour reserve economy (Amin, 1972) dependent on cheap 
domestic and foreign migrant labour (Arrighi, 1973). There was little room for peasant farming 
to flourish as it was repressed through extra-economic regulations and taxes (Moyo and Yeros, 
2005). This scenario did not however create full-scale proletarianisation (Bush and Cliffe, 
1984; Yeros, 2002). The skewed racial inequalities in agrarian structure were consolidated by 
discriminatory subsidies to large-scale white commercial farmers introduced by the state 
(Moyo, 2002) and narrow import substitution export-led strategies. This created a bi-modal 
agrarian structure characterised by 6000 white farmers and a few capitalist agro-industrial 
estates, operating alongside 700,000 peasant families and 8000 small-scale black commercial 
farmers (Moyo, 2011). By 1999, approximately 3.4 million hectares had been redistributed 
under the willing seller/willing buyer arrangement. This reduced the land under white farmers 
to 11 million hectares, which translated to approximately 35 per cent of the total agricultural 
land, most of which was ‘prime’ land (Moyo, 2011). 
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The bi-modal agrarian structure diminished the prospects of every member of the community 
to have certain minimum living standards and opportunities, which is the mainstay of social 
policy (UNRISD, 2006; Adesina, 2007a; Mkandawire, 2007).  The social relations that existed 
favoured white farmers as they owned the land on freehold tenure which assisted them to access 
capital and state subsidies to finance agricultural productivity. The 4500 white farmers, who 
were a minority of the population were assured of quality of life and social wellbeing while the 
majority of the black populace had to sell their labour in the market or to these white farmers 
to meet their social reproduction needs. The labourers did not have any leverage to negotiate 
for wages that would cushion them from the failures of the market and any external shock 
(Moyo and Yeros, 2005). This was a phenomenon exacerbated by the structural adjustment 
programme which affected both agriculture and the manufacturing sector.  As has been noted 
earlier, the state had failed to cushion people by withdrawing social services subsidies. 
Consequently, the general population was subjected to market forces. Compounded by the 
skewed agrarian structure, this exposed the peasantry to vulnerabilities. The effects of 
economic structural adjustment programmes made acquisition of land a strategic move that 
would cushion vulnerability while ensuring dignity, belonging, and protection (Jiririra and 
Halimana, 2008; Moyo, 2011b). 
 
6.3 The new agrarian structure 
The FTLRP restructured Zimbabwe’s agrarian relations by reconstituting the agrarian 
structure, primarily through expanding the numbers of small and middle-scale agricultural 
producers and reconfiguring the underlying labour relations (Moyo et al, 2009; Moyo, 2011; 
Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo, 2012). The land tenure system also changed significantly, 
warding off private ownership of land towards state ownership of most land. A total of 150 000 
households were settled in A1 scheme with 30 000 households allocated A2 farms (Scoones, 
2015); 180 000 households benefited in both the A1 and the A2 in the FTLRP. About 30 
percent of the A1 beneficiaries are made up of urban workers and a few former farm workers 
(Moyo et al, 2009). 90% of the farmers are small holders working on 80% of the land (Scoones, 
2015). 
 
The new tri-modal agrarian structure (Moyo, 2011) is made up of the peasantry who are 
variegated and consist of Communal Area and A1 farmers, small to medium capitalist farmers 
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as well as conservancies, private and public agro-industrial estates. It is important to note that 
the peasantry are a differentiated group, based on the labour they hire, sources of income, and 
access to markets (Moyo and Yeros, 2005; Bryceson, 2000; Shanin, 1997). The peasantry is 
characterised by heavy reliance on family labour (Yeros, 2002; Moyo, 2014). More often, the 
poor peasants sell their labour to supplement their income or for social reproduction. This 
labour is usually sold to the better off peasants and small to middle capitalists farmers (Moyo, 
2014). Within the peasantry there are those that are ‘better off’ who are able to hire wage labour, 
be it permanent or casual (Moyo, 2011; Bryceson, 2000). These also have better access to 
credits and markets. In some ecological regions of the country where agriculture relatively 
flourishes, these farmers are able to negotiate for contracts with capital (Moyo, 2011). In 
Sherwood area, 15 percent of the land beneficiaries fitted into this category. They employ on 
the average 2 permanent labourers. These also have other sources of income to cushion them 
from vulnerability during bad seasons. Some of their incomes come from pensions, gold 
panning, and remittances from children and households in towns. 
 
This structure was more pronounced in Sherwood Resettlement area which saw the foregoing 
three types of peasants getting land in the same vicinity. Bonstead Villagized A1 plots were 
given mainly to poor peasants. Most of the beneficiaries of this area were former farm workers. 
To supplement their income, they sell their labour to the A2 farmers who were allocated land 
in Devilwood Farm which has irrigation infrastructure and water canals. Bonstead Village is 
located in a dry area where they get water from a borehole that was sunk at a central place. The 
village has 53 households. All of the land beneficiaries of this village are based there. Due to 
the arid nature of the area, the peasant farmers are not involved in any contract farming. They 
wait to receive government input for their agriculture.  
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Table 6.1: Kwekwe District Agrarian Structure 
Source: Compiled by author from MLRR data sheets (2012); framework adopted from Moyo (2011) 
 
 
Farm 
categories 
Farms/households Area held  (ha) Average Farm size 
(ha) 
 
2000 2014 2000* 2014* 2000 2014 
 No   %   No   %   ha   %   ha   %  
  
 Peasantry  29065.68 98.65 33801 98.58 485977.2 52.54 659496.9 71.79 16.72 19.51 
 Medium   108 0.37 260 0.76 12485.33 1.35 37752.64 4.11 115.60 145.20 
 Large scale  243 0.82 205 0.60 265192.9 28.67 146583.1 15.96 1091.33 715.04 
 Agro-estates  47 0.16 22 0.06 158926.7 17.18 70191.96 7.64 3381.42 3190.54 
State land    
   
2442.05 0.26 4574.05 0.50 
  
 Total  29463.68 100 34288 100 925024.3 100 918598.7 100 31.40 26.79 
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The third prong to the agrarian structure are large-agro industrial estates (Moyo, 2011). Their 
existence post FTLRP contradicts the radical nature with which the process happened and 
deliberate inclusion of international capital. Several large agro-industries remained which 
include two sugar plantation estates in Chiredzi which are owned by a South African 
transnational corporate; Tongaat Hulett found in Masvingo Province and Hippo valley (Moyo, 
2011). There are also 16 private forestry plantations that are owned by international companies, 
tea estates owned by domestic capital and other 40 large estates owned by the state (e.g. ARDA) 
(ibid). 
 
Table 6.2: The Tri-modal agrarian structure  
Farm type Hired labour Source of 
income 
Source of 
capital 
Marketing 
Differentiated 
peasantry 
Few permanent 
plus casual labour; 
family labour 
Farm income, 
some wages, 
and 
remittances 
Own equity, 
some formal 
finance 
(contracts)  
Self-marketing; 
contracts; 
farmers 
associations 
Small to 
medium 
capitalist 
farmers 
Over 2 permanent 
and many casual 
workers, 
manager/supervisor 
Farm Income, 
business, and 
employment 
Formal 
finance, 
Equity, 
contracts 
Self-marketing 
(urban); 
contract exports   
Private and 
public 
plantations 
More permanent 
and casuals; 
managers 
Farm income, 
agro-industry 
Share capital, 
profits; loans 
Vertically 
integrated urban 
and export 
markets  
Source: Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo, (2012) 
 
As can be noted from the Table below, overall, the FTLRP increased the peasantry and the 
number of ‘middle farmers’ (Scoones, 2015), while downsizing the number, farm size and area 
of large-scale capitalist farms, as well as of the agro-industrial estates (Moyo, 2011).  
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Inevitably, the tri-modal dispensation however brings with it new class formation and struggles 
on the farms. The relations of the peasantry are mainly defined by use of family labour in the 
production of food for consumption and selling any surpluses that may be realised. The 
peasantry also relies on various non-farm work and short-term wage labour. More often, the 
selling of the labour is done to the middle farmer and the large-scale farms. 
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Table 6.3: The new agrarian structure at the national level 
 
 
Source: Moyo, (2011a) 
 
Farm  
category 
Farms/households (000’s) Area held (000 ha) Average Farm size (ha) 
1980 2000 2010 1980* 2000* 2010* 1980 2000 2010 
No % No % No  % Ha % ha  % Ha % 
Peasantry  700 98 1,125 99 1,321 98 16,400 49 20,067 61 25,826 79 23 18 20 
Small/middle 
commercial 
farms 
8.5 1 8.5 1 30.9 2 1,400 4 1,400 4 4,400 13 165 165 142 
Large farms 5.4 1 4.956 0.4 1.371 0.1 13,000 39 8,691.6 27 1,156.9 4 2,407 1,754 844 
Agro-Estates 0.296 0.1 0.296 0.02 0.247 0.02 2,567 8 2,567 8 1,494.6 5 8,672 8,672 6,051 
Total 714 100 1,139 100 1,353 100 33,367 100 32,72 100 32,878 100 46.7 28.7 24.3 
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6.4 Land access in Kwekwe District 
In Kwekwe District, land redistribution took place mainly between 2001 and 2002. At the 
national level, this was when government gazetted the farms that were to be acquired. Key 
informant interviews with the leadership of war veterans in Kwekwe District who led the land 
occupations indicated that these were targeted and organised. The war veterans in Kwekwe did 
not occupy all the large-scale commercial farms that were owned by Whites. Instead, selection 
was done primarily on the basis of how the white farmer had been treating his employees and 
cooperating with the governance structures of the area. There were those farmers who were 
targeted first because they had a reputation for racism and exploitation of farm workers.  
 
One farmer was known in the district for having ordered women whom he had found fetching 
firewood to strip naked for his amusement. He took photos of these women and shared them 
with his colleagues. The photos unfortunately got into the hands of political leadership of the 
area. When the farm occupations started, he was one of the first to be targeted. He did not want 
to negotiate with the war veterans. When he heard that the war veterans were scheduled to 
occupy his farm, he hired rangers from fellow white farmers who were given the instruction to 
shoot the team of war veterans that were coming. The war veterans had intelligence that had 
informed them about the rangers. They then strategized on how they would subdue the rangers 
since they were only seven to an entourage of about 300 war veterans. This narrative 
corroborates Sadomba (2011) and Scoones (2010) that war veterans played a key role in the 
occupations. It further confirms that the occupations were not done in ad hoc fashion. There 
were reasons that justified the farms that were occupied before the government regularised the 
occupations. 
 
Umlala Farm was not targeted by the war veterans in their occupations. There are several 
reasons proffered. The first was that the farmer, whose father was a reverend, treated his staff 
with dignity. The other reason given was that the farmer was the only producer of oranges in 
the periphery of Kwekwe town. The thinking was that occupying Umlala Farm was going to 
disturb the supply of the oranges to the town. Moreover, the farmer understood political 
dynamics in his area so once in a while he supplied both traditional and political leadership 
with oranges. In May 2001 when the government gazetted farms that were to be taken over, to 
the surprise of the war veterans’ leadership, Umlala Farm was on the list. As a result, the farm 
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was partitioned into 44 A1 plots. The character of the occupants of these plots will be explored 
later.  
 
The story of Umlala Farm is corroborated by the AIAS 2014 Surveys which indicated that 
64.5% of the beneficiaries in Kwekwe District had obtained access to land by 2003. Umlala 
Farm was allocated in 2001 through the Land Committee that had been established. Names of 
the people who had applied for land in this area were put in a hat. Randomly, the names were 
picked simultaneously with the plot number. This explains why a poor peasant who does not 
have equipment like ploughs and any livestock is located next to the dam on the farm. This 
presents opportunities for the poor peasant households to undertake horticultural farming and 
get money from the better off neighbours.  
 
The graph below shows that 17.1% of the occupations happened before formal allocation. This 
was when the government had not gazetted farms that were to be redistributed. The majority 
of the redistribution happened under the government land allocation programme through the 
District Administrator’s Office. It is worth noting that before 2008, redistribution had reached 
the lowest figure as there was little activity going on. Through key informant interviews, the 
researcher realised that there were farm abandonments that occurred after the 2008 elections. 
An agricultural extension officer in one ward posited claimed that: 
Before the 2008 elections, all parties preached peace and tolerance. People’s true 
political ideologies came out. Some even started wearing the regalia of their parties 
every here in Kwekwe. But when the results were announced and there was no clear 
winner, things changed. In building up to a run off, the tone of the political parties 
changed. ZANU PF wanted to win in areas they had not done well. Kwekwe District 
was one such area. The process brought with it violence targeted at those in the farming 
communities who were known to support MDC. In my district, two land beneficiaries 
abandoned their land in fear of being victimised (Key Informant Interview, 14/04/15, 
Umlala Farm).  
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Figure 6.1: Year of formal land allocation of newly resettled land beneficiaries in Kwekwe 
District  
 
Source: Adapted from AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14  
Figure 6.1 above shows that the number of new land allocations declined after 2002, to the 
lowest level in 2008. There was however a 6.3 percent surge in the number of new allocations 
after 2008. The Extension officers attributed this trend to the politics of the day where there 
were abandonments and forced evictions. As a result, new land beneficiaries were identified to 
take over the plots that had be left vacant.   As was noted by the agricultural extension officer 
in one of the wards, the scenario was the same in the other ward.  The extension officer noted 
that: 
In my ward, there was one person who left their farm after the general elections. The 
farmer was very vocal speaking about need for change. The ZANU PF leadership told 
him to vacate since he did not understand that the land came at the barrel of the gun. 
Voting for MDC would reverse the land reform so the leaders of ZANU PF wanted to 
make sure that ZANU PF wins in the resettled areas since they would be accountable 
to their superiors (Key Informant Interview, 20/08/2015, Female, Sherwood Block).  
The initial general election results for Kwekwe District saw MDC-T gain a lot of ground 
against ZANU PF. In preparation for the runoff, the district was targeted by ZANU PF as one 
they needed to get back, especially the resettlement areas. By the time the runoff election 
happened, the district had so much tension with ZANU youth mobilising the farmers against 
MDC-T. That created unprecedented polarization that forced the farmers who had shown 
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support for the MDC-T to abandon the farms. ZANU PF leaders seized the opportunity to 
replace those farmers with another one who was on the waiting list. 
 
Using the AIAS 2014 Baseline findings, for A1 famers, the majority obtained 5.1-10 hectares 
of land. These are mainly self-contained plots where the maximum number of cattle 
permissible is 6. For those in more arid areas, they accessed 10.1-20 hectares.  
 
Figure 6.2: Kwekwe District land holding for A1 beneficiaries 
 
Source: Adapted from AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14  
 
The A2 farms are fewer compared to A1 allocations. These farms are meant for the small to 
medium capitalist farmers who have their tools and can access their own capital to engender 
production on these farms. The research noted however that some of the people who obtained 
these farms did so for speculative reasons, hoping that the state would provide them with 
support to work on the land. It must be noted that from the start, the state had made it clear that 
this group of farmers were meant to support themselves or be able to outsource support. This 
is important because there are some narratives that criticise the state for not providing any 
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support or A2 farmers, yet this was not part of the terms for taking these A2 farms. As a result, 
ideally, A2 farms are not supposed to receive any inputs from the state. This research however 
observed that some of the A2 farmers, because of their political connections, are able to 
leverage these to get government inputs. 
Figure 6.3: Kwekwe District A2 land beneficiaries 
 
Source: Adapted from AIAS Survey 2013/14 
The sizes of the A2 farms depend on the natural region in which the farm is located as provided 
for by the farm size guidelines (see Moyo et al, 2009). Kwekwe District, which is 
predominantly in NR III, does not have any small-scale A2 farms. The chat shows that those 
occupying farm sizes of 250 hectares or larger are the single largest group. Over 83% have 
farms that are 120 hectares or bigger. These are mostly small sized A2 plots in NR III and IV 
and those with 100-120 hectares are considered to be medium scale in NR I. A reflection on 
the two graphs above confirms Moyo’s (2011a) assertion that the FTLRP increased the size of 
the peasantry; 48 households obtained A2 farms compared to 107 households in A1.  
 
6.5 Profiles of land beneficiaries  
This has been the core subject of contention between the various narratives on the outcomes of 
the FTLRP. On the one hand, there are scholars who usually cite Chabal and Jean-Pascal’s 
narrative on ‘instrumentalization of disorder’ to argue that the beneficiaries of the FTLRP were 
primarily the elite political figures (see Marongwe, 2009; Davies, 2004; Hammar et al, 2005; 
0 0 2 1 0
5
19 21
48
0 0 4.2 2.1 0
10.4
39.6 43.8
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
0.1-20 20.1-30 30.1-40 40.1-50 50.1-60 60.1-120 120.1-250 250.1+ Total
N
o
. o
f 
A
2
 b
e
n
e
fi
ci
ar
ie
s 
an
d
 p
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
Plot Size
Kwekwe District A2 Beneficiaries
No. of A2 Beneficiaries %
 121 
Raftopoulos, 2004; Richardson, 2010). On the other hand, there are scholars who have gone to 
lengths to prove that while there were elite beneficiaries, these constitute a small percentage 
(see Moyo, 2005; 2009; 2011a; 2011b; AIAS, 2014; Matondi, 2012; Scoones et al, 2010; 
Scoones, 2015). Citing a research that was conducted by Zimbabwe Independent Institute 
covering 375 A1 farmers located in Mashonaland West, Mashonaland East, Manicaland, 
Masvingo and Matebeleland South Province, about 53.1% of the beneficiaries were previously 
unemployed. 
 
Table 6.4: Redistribution patterns in selected provinces of the country 
Category  Number  Percentage  
Business people 7 1.6 
Civil Servants (Agriculture and Lands Ministries) 18 4.8 
Civil Servants (Education) 24 6.4 
Civil Servants (Other) 15 4 
Ex-Security 20 5.3 
Ex-Combatants 3 0.8 
Ex- Farm workers 4 1.1 
Informal sector 24 6.4 
Gold panners 5 1.3 
Local councils 3 0.8 
Pensioners  3 0.8 
Parastatals  2 0.6 
Private sector (finance) 3 0.8 
Private sector (other) 14 3.7 
Security ministries  13 3.5 
Unemployed  119 53.1 
Others  12 3.2 
Total  375  100 
Source: Zimbabwe Independent Institute, 2007 
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Table 6.4 confirms the assertion by scholars like Moyo et al (2011) that while the elites12 benefited 
from the land reform, the majority of the beneficiaries were ordinary people as can be deciphered 
from this table where 53.1% of the beneficiaries in the sample used were the unemployed. Table 
6.5 confirms Zimbabwe Independent Institute’s findings in that 85.8% of the A1 beneficiaries did 
not have any other employment except tending to the land. For A2 farmers, 68.7% were also 
previously unemployed. The figure is lower than that of A1 farmers because some of the A2 
farmers are still employed in urban areas. As shall be noted, they use some of the money from their 
employment to invest in agriculture which cushions them in bad seasons. The next highest 
percentage is of beneficiaries who are in civil service for A2. This speaks to some of the discussions 
raised by Marongwe (2009) and Scoones et al (2010) who noted that obtaining A2 farms needed 
political connections which the senior civil servants had. Civil service is also the second highest 
percentage for A1 as well. The take away from the two tables under discussion is that redistribution 
predominantly benefited ordinary people that were land hungry but civil servants also leveraged 
their positions to access land albeit in smaller proportions. 
Table 6.5: Profession of land beneficiaries in 6 districts surveyed by AIAS 
Employment status Settlement type 
A1 A2 Communal 
Area 
Total 
 
N % N % N % N % 
Not currently 
employment 
412 85.8 204 68.7 245 78.5 861 79.1 
Private sector 
managerial 
7 1.5 26 8.8 4 1.3 37 3.4 
Civil service managerial 23 4.8 32 10.8 6 1.9 61 5.6 
Self-employment 7 1.5 12 4.0 19 6.1 38 3.5 
Uniformed forces 3 0.6 5 1.7 5 1.6 13 1.2 
Private sector semi-
skilled 
11 2.3 6 2.0 13 4.2 30 2.8 
Civil service semi-
skilled 
10 2.1 8 2.7 8 2.6 26 2.4 
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Farm worker 4 0.8 2 0.7 4 1.3 10 0.9 
Other 2 0.6 0 0 8 2.6 12 1.1 
Total 478 100 296 100 312 100 1086 100 
Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14 
 
6.6 Educational levels of land beneficiaries 
The FTLRP benefited people of all educational levels. Table 6.6 below shows that the highest 
percentage (27.4%) of plot owners completed secondary education. The second highest (17.2%) is 
for those who had some secondary education. These figures confirm that the majority of the land 
beneficiaries are ordinary citizens who did not hold high profiled jobs. With the competitiveness 
that is in Zimbabwe, completing primary or secondary education would not ordinarily propel one 
to be an elite. Due to the limited formal employment opportunities, there is a tendency to invest 
more in education amongst some Zimbabweans so that they remain competitive.  
Table 6.6: Education levels for Kwekwe District FTLRP plot owners 
Education Level Attained by plot owner Kwekwe District 
N % 
No formal education 6 3.8 
Some primary education 27 17.2 
Completed primary education 24 15.3 
Some secondary education 27 17.2 
Completed secondary education 43 27.4 
Completed advanced level 2 1.3 
College education 11 7.0 
University degree 16 10.2 
Vocational training 1 .6 
Total 157 100.0 
Source: Adapted from AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14 
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The flip side to looking at education is interrogation of how the education received translates to 
added value in farming, understanding how agriculture should be run as a business. The secondary 
education levels set a basic foundation for ensuring comprehension of technical knowledge needed 
for farming. This comes in light of the fact that the government has Agritex extension officers in 
all the wards of the district. I observed that these support services from the state are readily 
available for any farmer to tap into them. Of note is a fortnightly program that is run by the Agritex 
extension officer of Sherwood Block. In these sessions, she trains the farmers on subjects like 
understanding the pesticides used, animal husbandry, horticulture and book keeping. Such training, 
coming to farmers who already have obtained basic education will improve their farming skills 
and understanding of agriculture.  
 
6.7 Ages of land beneficiaries 
The majority of the land beneficiaries are above the age of 50. When looking at the future of 
farming in the country, this does not speak well for continuity of experience and 
reproduction. The graph below outlines the age distribution of land beneficiaries in Sherwood 
farm. It can be noted that there are more people who are above 65 years of age than any other 
age. This is followed by the 50-64 age range.  
Figure 6.4: Age distribution of land beneficiaries in Sherwood Plots
 
Source: Own fieldwork, (2015) 
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I have the desire to farm but now I am old as you can see. Amongst my children, there 
is no one who has the same desire to do farming. They now have their families in towns. 
Perhaps they will consider it after my death (In-depth Interview, 5/08/2015, Male, A1 
Farmer, Sherwood Farm).  
Another farmer, noted that: 
I was very lucky. My last born has a passion [for] farming. He actually went to Mlezu 
Agricultural College. I don’t have any worries should I die now. My son will come and 
take over (In-depth Interview, 6/08/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Farm).  
In both Sherwood and Umlala farms, there were cases where the husband and the wife died 
and there was no one to take over. The farms laid idle waiting for a decision from the state. In 
Umlala, 6% of the farms were in this category. There are some however where children took 
over. Looking at the graph above, this explains primarily the 18-29 and 30-39 age ranges 
having plots. Indeed there were some young people below the age of 40 years who participated 
during the redistribution exercise, though their number is very small. In Umlala and Sherwood, 
the majority had to take over after the death of their parents. This mostly happened to families 
who moved totally either from the communal areas or the urban areas. The idle farms are those 
of beneficiaries who either did not totally relocate to the land they had been allocated or to 
those whose children had grown and are living elsewhere.  
 
6.8 Gender composition of land beneficiaries  
A lot of work has been done by various scholars on gender roles in an African context (see 
Tsikata, 2003; Roth and Gonese, 2003; Hellum, 2004; Jacobs, 2010; O’Laughlin, 2009; 
Goebel, 2005; Gaidzanwa, 1985, 1994, 2011; Mutopo, 2011). The general analysis notes that 
gender relations in an African setting short-change women. The social environment for women 
to access land is not supportive as it is riddled with patriarchal dispositions as well as the legacy 
of colonialism that subjugated women through structural framing of families which colonialism 
brought. 
 
As a result, rural peasant women face exclusion particularly from different political and 
traditional regimes that control land, in spite of their immense contribution to food production 
(Mutopo, 2011). This narrative was confirmed by how the FTLRP unfolded. Derman and 
Hellum (2004) and Mazhawidza and Manjengwa (2011) note that women mostly from urban 
and rural areas were discriminated against on political, social and economic grounds. This 
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could explain why the Government of Zimbabwe’s Utete Report on the FTLRP (2003:40) 
noted that a total of 18 percent of the land beneficiaries including both A1 and A2 resettlement 
schemes were women. This figure is corroborated by Gaidzanwa (2011) who postulated that 
13-22% of the settlers under FTLRP in various provinces of the country were women.  
 
There are several figures from other scholars hovering in the same region. Moyo (2011b) 
asserts that 14 percent of women benefited countrywide; Scoones et al’ s (2010: 55) research 
found that women constituted 8 percent of the A2 plots, 14 percent of the A1 villagised 
resettlements, 13 percent of the A1 self-contained sites and 15 percent of the unofficial sites, 
which were not formally registered under fast track. Matondi (2012)’s research noted that 14 
percent of women had acquired land in Mazowe. In Zvimba district, 25 percent of A1 
beneficiaries were women and 22 percent of A2 beneficiaries were women (Murisa, 2007).  
The research conducted confirm the aforementioned figures. The average figure of the women 
that accessed land in Kwekwe District is 21.6% which is in line with national figures that were 
obtained by various other researchers. 
 
Figure 6.5: Gender disaggregation of land beneficiaries  
 
Source: Own fieldwork, (2015) 
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The above statistics serve to demonstrate that access to land had gender biases. Women did not 
get equal access to land compared to men. The situation is even more deplorable for A2 farms. 
In Sherwood Block, there are 8 A2 farmers and none of them are women. In Umlala, out of the 
6 A2 farmers there, only one is a woman. This finding confirms the observations that were 
made by Gaidzanwa (2011) that the application criteria for A1 farms were not accommodative 
to women as has been noted earlier.  
 
6.9 Land ownership versus land access 
The research observed that most of the land beneficiaries in Umlala Farm and Sherwood Block 
of Farms, are Shona. Naturally therefore, it is the Shona customs that I found to be dominant. 
One of the issues that stood out in the research was the different appreciation of the concept of 
land ownership. The neoclassical discourse emphasises property rights and individual land 
ownership. There is a tendency to impose neoliberal values on a people who have their own 
culture and way of thinking. Mafeje (2003) argues that the concept of individual land 
ownership is alien to the African customs. Individuals did not own any land. It belonged to the 
clan, the lineage, and the household or production unit. In this context, landholders are 
vertically organised groups with corporate rights (Ibid). In the resettled areas, the land does not 
fall under customary regulations. Instead, the land is vested in the state while usufruct rights 
are vested in the individual beneficiary.  
 
Whilst usufruct rights are vested in the individuals, I observed that the land beneficiaries 
brought their customs and norms in managing the land. This transference of norms and cultures 
informs how land use happens in the resettled areas. As such, Mafeje’s conceptualisation of 
land ownership is still valid in practice, though on paper, usufruct rights   of the land are vested 
in individuals. Using the formal ownership of land has made some scholars to protest that the 
FTLRP did not have mechanisms to include more women in land ownership (see Mazhawidza 
and Manjengwa, 2011; Matondi, 20012; Gaidzanwa, 2011).  
 
Mutopo’s (2011) research found that ownership did not hold much premium in the farming 
communities as women still had access to the land even though it was not in their names. Most 
land ownership was vested in men, with women only accessing the land as extension of a male 
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holder. For these women who could not access the land for themselves, they had access through 
the institution of marriage. In the Shona culture, the institution of marriage has a deeper and 
more symbolic meaning for access to resources (Mutopo, 2011). Schmidt (1992) and 
Bourdillon (1992) state that in the Shona culture, marriage carries important symbolic, social, 
political, and economic significance for the couples and their families. As a result, when the 
researcher asked one woman about who owned the land, she retorted: 
This is our plot. The permit is not in my name but that does not matter... (In-depth 
Interview, 11/07/2015, Female, Umlala Farm)  
I asked a follow up question on repercussions of a divorce on the plot since it is not in her 
name. She responded: 
Where would I go, my son? We have grown old together and have raised our children 
who are now adults. I will not go anywhere… 
Another lady registered the same sentiments when she noted that: 
You children of these days you trouble yourselves because of self-interests saying this 
is mine and that is mine too. In marriage, you care for each other, doing things 
together… (In-depth Interview, 18/06/2015, Female, Sherwood Farm).  
This perspective addressed both the neoliberal conception of ownership as well as the Shona 
traditional view of marriage as postulated by Schmidt (1992) and Bourdillon (1992). The 
concept of ownership did not seem to mean much in the day-to-day management of the 
families. The reason why the issue of ownership did not matter much to women can be 
attributed to the socialisation of patriarchy which normalised the subjugation of women. 
Patriarchal thinking would argue that what matters is land access, not necessarily ownership. 
The consequences of such thinking are seen in instances of divorce or where the husband wants 
to bring another wife. The current wife would not have much to leverage on strategic decision 
making. Having access to land without having it in one’s name means that when decisions are 
made either with the state or the community about issues of the land, the women would not be 
consulted as they are not permit holders.  
 
6.10 Gender dynamics amongst farm workers on the resettled farms 
I observed that there are two types of families on the resettled land. There are land beneficiaries 
who are based on their plots. There are also labourers who are based on the plots whose owners 
reside either in towns or elsewhere. For farm worker’s family households, both the husband 
and wife would engage in wage labour also known as maricho. Maricho is a Shona concept 
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where farm owners hire labour to undertake a specific task. Payment for the task may be in 
cash or in kind. In years of drought, farm workers would engage in maricho for grain or basic 
groceries. The latter was primarily the case for those farmers who are based in towns who 
would bring groceries items such as soap, cooking oil, salt, sugar and clothing as methods of 
payment for maricho.  As they sold their labour, they negotiated for a combined wage since 
they would work together. For farm workers, the wives however still had to take care of the 
children and cook for the husbands after jointly doing maricho. Talking to a Mrs Bodo, the 
wife of a farm worker, she asserted that: 
Eish my brother, it’s tough. You would have come from maricho exhausted, then you 
start cooking. If the father of the house would assist by at least slicing the tomatoes, it 
was going to be better. You just have to be strong as a woman… (In-depth Interview, 
21/05/2015, Female, Umlala Farm).  
Mrs Bodo discussion illustrates some frustrations which the burden of patriarchy places on 
women. This corroborates Hartmann (2010)’s assertion that patriarchy uses men who are 
even at the lowest level to oppress women. There are however some women who did not 
consider this as oppression because they argued that: 
This is what we are used to… do you think it’s possible to relax while my husband 
cooks for me? It can only happen when I’m sick (In-depth Interview, 24/06/2015, 
Female, Sherwood Farm).  
Another retorted that: 
While the father does not cook, there are other tasks in the home which the father 
does in the home which I do not do. I don’t see any problem… (In-depth Interview, 
14/06/2015, Female, Sherwood Farm)  
Such tasks which the father does include fetching water since the water is far away. This was 
the case also in Mrs Bodo’s experience, the father of the house fetched water and firewood. He 
would engage in other activities such as thatching houses or clearing people’s fields to generate 
money. The foregoing citations present stories of women who see nothing wrong with the 
patriarchal social ordering though it is oppressive to them. This shows the power of social 
orientation which conditions the women not to question the repressive system of patriarchy. 
 
6.11 The tsewu 
One way in which the patriarchal system appeases its segregation of ownership is through 
provision of a portion of land to the women of the family for their own use. Mutopo (2011) 
argues that in the concept of marriage, women were enabled to have access to their own fields 
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within the husband’s family after a certain period. These fields are called tsewu. A tsewu is a 
piece of land that is given to a wife to engage in her own agricultural activities and grow crops 
that are considered to be feminine like groundnuts, roundnuts, soya beans, sugar beans and cow 
peas. The forgoing is corroborated by Scoones et al (2010:95) when he notes that within 
households, there is often some specialisations structured along gender lines. He further notes 
that often, women, focus particularly on gardening and the production of vegetables, 
groundnuts and Bambara nuts, while men focus on the outfields and maize production. 
Similarly, women may specialise in goats and chickens, while men focus on the cattle. This 
results in a gendered division of labour and potential competition over resource allocations 
within the household (Scoones et al (2010:95). 
 
For this division of labour to play out well, in the context of the resettled farms, the farmers 
had to subdivide the land to make room for the tsewu. The allocation of tsewu confirms the 
notion that the resettled farmers brought with them their customs and norms to inform how 
land use happened.  Bourdillon (1992) is in consonance with this notion when he notes that the 
Shona mythology of agriculture should be understood from the fact that young and older 
women were able to survive as agriculturalists because they had a portion of their own 
individual land where they could grow crops and vegetables that feed the household all year 
round. The research spoke to one farmer Mr Ngende who was settled on an A1 plot in Umlala 
Farm. He noted that: 
It’s our culture that the mother of the household gets a tsewu where she decides on the 
crops that she grows without my interference (In-depth Interview, 23/05/2015, Male, 
Umlala Farm).  
The down side of this concept is that women have to double their effort since they will first 
work on the family farm then on their tsewu. The observations noted that main crops such as 
maize, wheat and tobacco were prioritised on the family farm since their returns were also 
more on the market. One wife noted that: 
It’s a good thing that I have a tsewu. The problem however is that I then will not get 
enough support to work on it even though I would have worked on the family farm 
(In-depth Interview, 07/08/2015, Female, Sherwood Farm).  
These sentiments expose the double burden that is on the women in farming communities.  
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6.12 Place of origin of Kwekwe land beneficiaries 
The significant number of land beneficiaries in Kwekwe came from communal areas within 
the district (30.1%) followed by those that came from other districts (22.9%). This scenario 
confirms a narrative that was made by scholars like Moyo (2004, 2011), Matondi (2012) and 
Scoones (2010, 2015), inter alia, that the land reform helped to decongest the communal areas. 
One of the beneficiaries of an A1 self-contained plot expressed that: 
I wanted to stay at a free and spacious place where my livestock would get good 
pastures while I will be ploughing on these red soils… (In-depth Interview, 11/04/2015, 
Male, Umlala Farm). 
 The citation denotes an intrinsic value that the beneficiaries from communal areas got by 
finding a spacious place. The grazing areas in communal areas were overcrowded which 
affected the health of the livestock. For this A1 plot beneficiary, the 30 hectares he got will 
suffice for both his agricultural production which is on 6 hectares, and grazing ground for his 
livestock.  
Table 6.7: Place of origin for land beneficiaries 
 Kwekwe District 
N % 
CA in this district 46 30.1 
CA in this province 35 22.9 
CA from other provinces 21 13.7 
LSCF in this district 7 4.6 
LSCF in this province 2 1.3 
LSCF in another province 0 .0 
Diaspora 0 .0 
Urban area 30 19.6 
Place of employment in another area 1 .7 
Old resettlement 8 5.2 
Other 3 2.0 
Total 153 100.0 
Source: Adapted from AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14 
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It is worth noting that 19.6% of the beneficiaries in Kwekwe district came from urban areas. 
This is understandable because the district is close to three towns namely Gweru, Kadoma and 
Kwekwe. Interestingly, some of these urbanites are the ones that got A2 farms because they 
could demonstrate ability to source for capital and also the simple issues of filing in the forms 
in a convincing way. In an interview with the Agritex extension worker, she lamented that: 
The people who came from towns to occupy the land did not have a lot of knowledge 
on what they needed to do with it. They had not had exposure to agricultural education 
compared to those who came from communal areas. We had worked with these for a 
long time so they did not need much education compared to their urban counterparts 
(Key Informant Interview, 20/08/2015, Female, Sherwood Block).  
 
The comment shows that most of the land beneficiaries who had come from communal areas 
had necessary knowledge about what they needed to do on the land since they had access to 
government extension services in the communities where they were based prior to their 
relocation. This dismisses the myth that the land beneficiaries were all ‘new farmers’ who were 
not knowledgeable, not having any clue about agriculture. This assertion cannot hold when it 
comes to land beneficiaries who came from the communal areas where extension services were 
available. 
 
6.13 Farm residency and homesteads  
Consideration of farm residency for the land beneficiaries is important for several reasons. 
Firstly, residency speaks to availability to engage in agricultural work. The farmer will be able 
both to work on the farm and supervise the progress that will be happening in real time. 
Residency on the farm can be said to make a statement on commitment and elimination of 
options of occupation. Secondly, residency will also confirm the notion that has been noted by 
several scholars that the FTLRP benefited ordinary people in the country. This view is premised 
on Sen (2005)’s concept of development as freedom to choose. In this case, residency would 
mean that the beneficiaries did not have another choice of where to stay because of their 
economic status. They therefore had to settle on the farm which they were allocated. The flip 
side of this is also true when land beneficiaries are not staying there. Though this may be a long 
shot, but those who would not reside at the farm could be categorised as the better off farmers 
in the small to medium capitalist production of the tri-modal structure. Table 6.8 shows that 
87.1% of the A1 and 61.1% of A2 beneficiaries stay on the farms.  
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Table 6.8: Residency of plot owners in newly settled areas by settlement type 
 
Residency of plot owner 
Settlement type 
A1 A2 Total 
N % N % N % 
On farm 412 87.1 179 61.1 591 77.2 
Communal area 4 0.8 6 2.0 10 1.3 
Urban area 49 10.4 95 32.4 144 18.8 
Diaspora 4 0.8 6 2.0 10 1.3 
Other 4 0.8 7 2.4 11 1.4 
Total 473 100 293 100 766 100 
Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14  
There is a higher percentage of A2 farmer who stay in urban areas (32.4%) compared to 10.4% 
of A1 farmers. This speaks more to the middle farmer who still has his or her job in town and 
comes often to the farm to monitor progress. In the Sherwood area, some of these farmers are 
able to use the money they generate from their various vocations in urban areas to sustain their 
agricultural interests. Some have bought equipment and inputs even after drought seasons when 
other farmers would not have starting capital. 
Figure 6.6: A1 Farm residency trends in Kwekwe District 
 
Source: Own fieldwork, (2015) 
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Figure 6.6 shows that in villages, all the beneficiaries reside at the plots they were allocated. 
The research observed that these villages are made up of former farm workers and individuals 
who came from communal areas. Those who came from towns did not accept to be given 
villagised A1 farms. The farms with highest numbers of people who are not based at the farm 
are those that are close to the high way where transport to and fro is not difficult to find. Some 
of the push factors for those with options of staying in urban areas include non-availability of 
electricity on most plots. All the households of Umlala farm are not connected to electricity. 
Some of the households have invested in solar panels that can mostly charge the phone and 
play the radio for some time. Furthermore, access to drinking water is a problem. Water has to 
be collected from Sebakwe River which is an average of 5 kilometres from most residences.  
 
6.14 Conclusion  
This chapter interrogated the redistributive social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. In the 
chapter, I demonstrated that one of the major outcomes of the FTLRP was the changed agrarian 
structure from a bi-modal arrangement to a tri-modal structure. The new agrarian structure has 
about 150 000 households settled under the A1 scheme and 30 000 under the A2 scheme with 
some transnational agro estates still operating in the country. The new agrarian structure has 
created a broad base for the peasantry in its variegated categories. Indeed the process had its 
own shortcomings since it was mostly a revolution from below. As a result women did not get 
access to land on equal footing as men. This was mainly pronounced in A2 resettlement scheme 
where in Sherwood Farm there are no women who received A2 plots. There is consensus 
among scholars that between 13-22% of the land beneficiaries are women. The majority of the 
women then access land through their husbands, which reinforces the patriarchal nature of the 
society. I observed that the land beneficiaries brought their cultural relationship with the land. 
As a result, the allocated plots are subdivided by the households to make provision for tsewu 
for the women and the main field for the household. I however observed that this increases the 
women’s burden of labour as they are supposed to work on their tsewu and contribute to the 
household plot. 
 
The chapter also provided detailed accounts of how the land beneficiaries accessed the land. 
Some of the beneficiaries got the land during the informal farm occupations, which were 
mainly orchestrated by the war veterans similar to other districts studied by scholars such as 
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inter alia Scoones et al (2010), Murisa (2007, 2010), Sadomba (2011) and Mkodzongi (2013). 
The majority of the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District got the land through formal 
allocation by the government. The chapter also provided profiles of the land beneficiaries.  The 
data I collected and that of AIAS refutes the narrative that only the elite benefited from the 
FTLRP. Civil servants, former farm workers, senior politicians, war veterans and ordinary 
citizens all benefited from the FTLRP. The beneficiaries also had varied education levels 
ranging from no formal education to degrees. The average age of the land beneficiaries is 55 
years. Lastly, I explored farm residency trends in a bid to contribute to the debate around 
farmers who got land for speculative reasons as well as the notion of absentee farmers. I 
observed that most beneficiaries in A1 type of farming, especially the villagised type, can be 
said to be resident on the farms. Having appreciated the new agrarian structure that was brought 
about by the FTLRP, the next chapter interrogates production outcomes of the FTLRP. The 
chapter will endeavour to answer the question of what the land beneficiaries are doing with the 
land.  
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CHAPTER 7: PRODUCTION OUTCOME OF THE FTLRP 
 
7.1 Introduction 
It is instructive to note that the enhancement of productive potential of members of society is 
a key variable in realizing social policy outcomes. The purpose of this chapter therefore is to 
answer the production question of what land beneficiaries are doing with the land they got, 
looking at both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. In this chapter, I rely on the AIAS 
data at national level and for Kwekwe District. The chapter interrogates agricultural trends of 
key crops such as maize and tobacco.  
 
The issue of financing is also covered, attending to the question how the land beneficiaries are 
coping with this aspect. Concerns of means of production such as inputs, access to tools, labour 
and access to information about agriculture are attended to. The chapter interrogates the 
availability and accessibility of quality extension services in Kwekwe District. Access to 
markets is a key element in realising agricultural success.  Looking at the how farmers engage 
with the markets is important in answering the question of value derivation. The chapter ends 
with looking at non-farming activities which take place on the resettled farms. In the context 
of Kwekwe District, gold panning is one non-agricultural activity which most land 
beneficiaries are involved in so I gave some attention to the nuances around this issue.  
 
7.2 Production and productivity- whose productivity? 
Production and productivity in the aftermath of the FTLRP has been a subject of debate among 
various scholars as shall be envisaged. This is not surprising considering the argument by 
Helliker (2010) of polarized views on the outcomes of FTLRP. On the one hand, some scholars 
argue that the FTLRP had progressive outcomes and brought success to the beneficiaries. On 
the other hand, other scholars argue that it undermined production and food security. An 
empirical interrogation of land beneficiaries’ production and productivity is one key way to 
address the polarity amongst the scholars. Production can only be better assessed empirically 
and several scholars have taken that challenge to provide empirical evidence (see Scoones et 
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al, 2010; Moyo, 2011a; Moyo, 2011b; Chambati, 2011; Zikhali, 2012; Hanlon et al, 2012; 
Binswanger-Mkhize  and  Moyo,  2012; AMID, 2012a; AMID, 2012b).  
 
While there has been empirical research that has been conducted to appreciate production and 
productivity levels of the FTLRP beneficiaries, it is worth noting that productive outcomes take 
at least a generation to be fully realized (Hanlon et al, 2012). As has been noted earlier, I argue 
that reviewing the outcomes of the FTLRP should be periodised appropriately in view of the 
various phases which characterise the period 2000 up to 2015. Failure to do so will result in 
gross generalizations that will not depict the correct picture on production outcomes. As such, 
Hanlon et al’s (2012) argument of the need for a generation to fully appreciate the production 
outcomes has been marred by a lot of exogenous factors which have compromised the concrete 
realization of the production outcomes of the FTLRP.  
 
In my interaction with the land beneficiaries, I observed that there is an important question 
which had been neglected by the literature which explored the production outcomes of the 
FTLRP.  The question is ‘whose expectation will be measured when assessing the productivity 
of the land beneficiaries?’ The dominant narrative seems to suggest that every beneficiary who 
got land was motivated by the need to produce surplus and contribute to the GDP of the country. 
The reality on the ground as I observed, was not the case for all the land beneficiaries. In my 
interviews with the farmers, there was a significant group of land beneficiaries whose primary 
motivation for getting the land was to establish a home (musha) for their families and 
generations that follow: 
I participated in the land reform to secure my children’s future. I did not have anything 
to leave them before the land reform. Now I have something to give to my children. 
What kind of a father doesn’t leave a musha to his family? My dignity has been 
restored… (In-depth Interview, 10/05/2015, Male, A 1 Farm, Umlala Farm). 
Another farmer noted that: 
My primary objective has been achieved, my family now has a musha. When I shall 
die, they will not be migrants without a base. If things don’t work out in their lives, they 
can now come back home and no one will chase them. If my daughter’s marriage does 
not work out, she can come back home… (In-depth Interview, 12/04/2015, Female, A1 
Farmer, Umlala Farm). 
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The foregoing citations show that the concept of musha is entrenched in the understanding that 
land is not only a commodity for production as the political economy approach views it as. 
Beyond being an economic commodity, the land is a social endowment that is in principle 
inalienable (Mafeje, 2003). It is associated with corporate existence that is fixed in space but 
transcends time. The research found that several land beneficiaries consider land this way. This 
view motivated them to participate in the land reform so that they secure a social endowment 
for their grandchildren in the future. As has been shown in the previous chapter, the average 
age of the land beneficiaries is 55 years of age.  This means that their productivity is relatively 
lower considering the physique that is needed in agriculture. As one farmer noted: 
I do not have the strength to work all this land. I can only do so much.  I know that my 
children, when they shall realise that the wealth is in the soil, they will come with their 
knowledge and strength to make the best use of this land… (In-depth Interview, 
6/08/2015, Male, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm). 
If appreciation of production and productivity is alive to the foregoing perspectives of the 
farmers, it then becomes imperative to not paint all the farmers with a single brush as though 
they got the land for business. 
 
7.3 Production trends 
Hanlon, et al’s (2012) titled Zimbabwe Takes Back its Land corroborates the findings of Fox, 
et al, (2007), Chambati (2011), Moyo (2011), Binswanger-Mkhize and  Moyo  (2012), Zikhali 
et al (2012), that while production levels in the short term plunged, these have increased 
gradually. Production and productivity started declining unevenly among the major crops 
mainly from the 2001-2 season, sliding to their lowest levels in 2004-5 and 2006-7 seasons. 
Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo (2012) observed that the 2012 agricultural season production 
levels for most crops were at least 40% below the 1990s average. From 2009 however, the 
agricultural sector has been recovering and grew by 21 percent in 2009, 33.9 percent in 2010 
and 7.4 percent in 2011 (Ministry of Finance, 2011; European Union, 2012). The 2012 growth 
rate was 11.6 percent (Ministry of Finance, 2012). Hanlon et al (2012: 10) observed this steady 
upward trend and posited that: 
…small holder farmers ... now produce together almost as much as the big white 
farmers did’; given that ‘on average, in just a decade the farmers have caught up to the 
white farmers’ production ... so the new farmers can be expected to develop 
significantly in the next decade. 
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This is happening against the backdrop of the fact that large-scale farms always benefited from 
vastly superior access to inputs and technical services which the land beneficiaries do not have. 
Zikhali et al (2012) conducted a comparative study of FTLRP land beneficiaries and communal 
farmers.  She observed that while FTLRP beneficiaries have not achieved their full potential 
(as measured by commercial farm production before the onset of the FTLRP), they do seem to 
have been able to mitigate the reductions in output per hectare accompanying the FTLRP better 
than communal farmers (Zikhali and Chilonda, 2012). The foregoing empirical researches can 
be demonstrated using the graph below: 
Figure 7.1: Production trends for maize, tobacco and sorghum 
 
Source: AIAS Database, 2015 
The data in Figure 7.1 shows trends for three crops. There are two trends coming out.  Firstly, 
there is a lower level average output in the post 2000 period than for the period before.  
Agricultural outputs for 2014, though not a drought year, are generally lower. Even for soya 
beans, average of post-2000 is lower than for 2000. Secondly, the volatility is not limited to 
the drought years (2002, 2008 and 2012) alone. Further, the graph shows that tobacco 
production in 2013 (highest for the post 2000 period) was less than the output for 1998, 
although on an upward trajectory if you take 2006 as the base year. Maize production continues 
to show huge volatility, while the output for the post-2000 years was on the average lower than 
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similarly highly volatile production for 1980 to 2000 period. Soya beans production has been 
similarly volatile. The post-2000 production average was lower than the output in 2000. Using 
2001 as the base year, then the production level since has been higher. 
 
Overall, the graph shows that despite the volatility on production outputs, there seem to be a 
growth trajectory with major slumps in production trends in drought years. This speaks to 
unavailability of irrigation equipment and water management systems so that even in drought 
years, production should not fall significantly. This scenario was witnessed also in the 
1992/1993 drought where, for example, maize production decreased by almost 75 percent 
leaving a large percentage of the population in dire need of food aid. In that same drought, over 
one million head of cattle died of starvation during the year.  
 
The steady growth has been happening at a time when UNEP (2010) called it a decade when 
the country has been receiving rainfall that has been regular to the multi decadal mean. In 2012, 
a drought saw agricultural deficit of approximately 45 per cent in the nation’s staple food 
source, maize, (FDI Global Food and Water Security Research Programme, 2012). About 1.4 
million Zimbabweans faced food insecurity in 2012 (Ibid). Thiswas a result of a drought hardly 
four years after another severe one in 2008.  
 
Wilhite and Glantz (1985) note that there are four types of droughts. These are meteorological, 
hydrological, agricultural and socio-economic droughts. Zimbabwe has been plagued mainly 
by the meteorological and agricultural droughts.13 In 2008, in-depth interviews I conducted 
revealed that the rains only fell in December up to January. They had already planted their 
seeds in November. When the rains fell, the crops had already wilted. When it rained however, 
dams were filled and all water bodies. One farmer noted that: 
The amount of rains that fell in two months were equivalent to the usual rains for the 
entire season. For the crops that had survived the sun, they got too much rain that they 
also died. (In-depth Interview, 11/04/2015, Male, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm).  
Based on the explanation of the farmer, this was an agricultural drought. Whilst the rainfall 
was equivalent to what is recorded in the area on a good season, all of it fell in a span of one 
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irregular month. Crops experienced impaired growth. The AIAS 2013/2014 Survey 
corroborated this aspect in the six districts where the study was conducted. The graph below 
shows Kwekwe District as the most affected. This is because the farmers in the district do not 
have irrigation facilities. In Umlala Farm, there is no farmer who has any irrigation equipment. 
They rely on rain for agriculture. The nearest source of water is Sebakwe River which is an 
average of 5 kilometres from the households. The other source of water is a dam that was 
constructed by the white farmer for his livestock. Of the 44 households in the area, the dam is 
only close to five households.  
Figure 7.2: Land beneficiaries’ crop production affected by drought  
 
Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2013/14 
Below, the Meteorological Office of Zimbabwe developed a trend analysis of the rainfall 
patterns up to 2008. Resonating with the UNECA (2010) observation, it can be noted that from 
1999, the rainfall patterns have been going down. While the data for 2008 suggests there was 
an improvement, most of the rain fell in one month which was not beneficial for the agricultural 
season. This however was helpful for the livestock and those who had water harvesting 
mechanisms. The research did not find such mechanisms in both Sherwood and Umlala Farms. 
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Figure 7.3: Time series showing the extreme rainfall years in Zimbabwe 
 
Source: Meteorological Office of Zimbabwe, 2009 
Figure 7.3 above shows the rainfall patterns of Zimbabwe from the 1950s up to most recent as 
2008. The graphs shows that the amounts of rainfalls which the country used to get have been 
generally on a decline. Even in high rainfall seasons such as 2005/2006 season, the amount of 
rainfall received was just above normal. These rainfall patterns have had a bearing on the 
outcomes of the FTLRP.  
During my fieldwork, I observed that the 2014/2015 agricultural season was characterized by 
an agricultural drought. This is because the expected rains did not fall at the intervals they were 
expected. One farmer noted that: 
This season the rains let us down. They were playing hide and seek with us. When we 
expected it to rain, it was dry so the seeds we had planted could not grow. After the sun 
had wilted our crops, the rains came down heavy in one month. So the rains fell between 
December and January only… (In-depth Interview, 24/06/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, 
Sherwood Block). 
The effects of this are still going to be seen. In spite of the drought, the Ministry of Finance 
projected a 3.4% growth in agricultural production. This projection is premised on the fact that 
the farmers were coming to grips with the weather variability trends and will be able to adjust 
accordingly.  
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7.4 Tobacco production  
Binswanger-Mkhize and Moyo (2012) argue that the trends over the decades in the aftermath 
of the FTLRP have experienced differentiated growth patterns in crop production and 
productivity. One of the crops that can define the progression of productivity after 2008 is 
tobacco. Tobacco used to be produced primarily by the large-scale commercial farmers where 
the average production capacity was 198,000 tonnes in the 1990s. Immediately after the 
FTLRP, the production levels plummeted to 82,000 tonnes between 2000 and 2004. This 
decline was 40 percent below the average of the 1990s. The production levels further declined 
to 55,000 tonnes in 2005/06 which was 28 percent of the 1990s average production. From 2009 
after dollarization, tobacco production levels started picking up to reach 103,900 tonnes which 
was over half of the 1990s averages. The 2010/2011 season witnessed another improvement in 
production level to 132,400 tonnes which were two thirds of the 1990s production levels. The 
growth in production was propelled by the entry of many smallholder farmers into tobacco 
production and the entry of new contractors into the sector. What motivated the smallholder 
farmers into tobacco production was availability of lines of credit through contract farming 
arrangements that were being offered by private companies. Further, dollarization also made 
tobacco farming to be a worthwhile venture as the farmers could realize profit and had a 
guaranteed market.  
 
Total flue cured tobacco output in 2014 amounted to 216 million kilograms, compared to 
165.85 million kilograms realized in 2013 (Ministry of Finance, 2015). The surge in tobacco 
output was attributed to a 10.3% increase in the number of growers, from 78 756 in 2013 to 86 
900 in 2014. Correspondingly, hectarage rose by 21.2% from 88 626 hectares in 2013 to 107 
371 ha in 2014. In terms of tobacco sales, a total of US$684.87 million was realized in 2014 
compared to US$610.31 million achieved in 2013, at an average price of US$3.17/kg compared 
to US$3.68/kg in 2013. 
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Table 7.1: National tobacco sales in 2013 and 2014 
Seasonal  Total 
auction 
Contract Total 2014 Total 2013 % change 
Mass sold in 
kilograms 
50 745 154 165 253 617 215 998 771 165 846 412 30.24 
Value in 
USD 
136 669 850 548 200 219 684 870 070 610 309 838 12 
Average 
PRICE 
USD/kg 
(2.69) (3.32) (3.17) (3.68) (13.84) 
Source: Tobacco Industry Marketing Board, 2015 
In preparation for the 2014/15 season, about 86 751 growers had been registered as of 7 
November 2014. Below is a disaggregation of the distribution of the growers for the 
2014/2015 season: 
Table 7.2: Disaggregation of the distribution of tobacco growers 2014/2015 season 
Grower sector  Registered growers % 
A1 31879 37 
A2 7 688 9 
Communal Area 40 359 46 
Small scale commercial 6 825 8 
Total  (86 751) (100) 
Source: Tobacco Industry Marketing Board, 2015 
Table 7.2 shows that communal areas lead in tobacco production followed by A1 farmers and 
lastly A2 farmers. This means that most farmers in communal areas have abandoned producing 
food crops such as maize. In 2014, an overall hectarage of 90 000 hectares was under the crop, 
with a projected output of 222 million kilograms. In support of this planned output, the 
respective seed sales of about 1 032 869 kilograms were made by the cut-off date of 5 
September 2014. In 2015, exports are projected to increase by 5% to US$3.832 billion. Growth 
in exports will be driven mainly by flue-cured tobacco (3.4%), raw sugar (4.7%), gold (4%) 
and ferrochrome (1.4%). 
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7.5 Maize production 
The 2011 harvests were observed to be 86% of the 1990s averages (Binswanger-Mkhize and 
Moyo, 2012). Of that overall percentage, 49 per cent of the maize came from resettlement 
farmers and 43 per cent from communal farmers; 
Figure 7.4: Maize production trends for the first decade of the FTLRP 
 
Source: Compilation from RBZ Annual Reports 
Maize yields remain far below potential even though there is a steady increase (Binswanger-
Mkhize and Moyo, 2012). Scholars argue that the low yields have not been a result of poor 
farming skills. Instead, they have been caused primarily by capital scarcity. In tobacco and 
cotton, where access to credit is easier due to the contract farming, yields have started to rise 
for the same farmers that also produce the commodities where production levels are not yet 
rising. As a result, the production trends for tobacco and maize seem to suggest that halfway 
through their two-decade settling in period, and with none of the support given to the white 
farmers, the land beneficiaries are poised to be on a trajectory that will make them more 
productive than the white farmers they replaced. 
 
These farmers however have a plethora of challenges to deal with, which are slowing down 
their production levels. These challenges range from working capital, as was noted by 22% 
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
1400000
1600000
1800000
Maize Maize Maize Maize Maize Maize Maize Maize Maize Maize Maize
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Maize production trends for the first decade of FTLRP
 146 
(Figure 7.5) of the farmers in Kwekwe District. The farmers also suffer from draught power 
shortages. The major challenge for most farmers is access to inputs, which is related to working 
capital as well. Talking to an A1 farmer from Umlala Farm, he lamented that: 
If the government would help us with inputs and equipment, we would be better off. 
We are not lazy to work… (In-depth Interview, 14/05/2015, Female, A1 Farmer, 
Umlala Farm). 
Another farmer noted that: 
After the losses I incurred in 2008, I would have wanted the government to assist me in 
getting off my feet. Help with inputs is important. I know that in countries like South 
Africa, the farmers’ inputs are heavily subsidized compared to ours (In-depth Interview, 
28/06/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Farm). 
This sentiment was also echoed by another farmer who noted that: 
If I were to get the inputs I need, my produce would significantly improve. Whilst the 
desire to make use of the land I have, my capacity is limited… (In-depth Interview, 
9/06/2015, Male, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm). 
The foregoing quotes from the farmers confirm AIAS finding, as deciphered in Figure 7.5 
below, that the major production challenges that the farmers have are inputs. 
 
Figure 7.5: Production grievances for Kwekwe District 
 
Source: Adapted from AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14 
Figure 7.5 shows that the major grievance which the farmers have is access to inputs. The 
second highest challenge which the farmers raised is shortage of draught power. The third 
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challenge which farmers noted which impedes their production is access to credit. One farmer 
encapsulated these aspects when he summarised his challenges to improved productivity as: 
I have the land which is the most important thing. The next issue for me, is for 
government to help us in accessing loans from banks like the former white farmers used 
to get. Hiring tractors is very expensive, I end up using my hoe or if I get money, I hire 
draught power from my neighbours. These neighbours also have their own fields and 
families to feed so even though they may be willing to help, I can’t be going to them 
every time… (In-depth Interview, 19/07/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block). 
 
These production challenges share similar trends for A1 and A2 farmers. The difference 
however is on credit unavailability where A2 farmers are not able to get so that they can 
maximize production on their farms. Due to the land sizes on A2, agricultural production is not 
sustainable when it is not mechanized. This notion can be witnessed on land utilization matrix. 
The AIAS survey noted that, an average of 50.3 percent arable land was utilized in the A1 
model in the 2013/14 season compared to 41.4 percent in A2 model. The underutilization of 
land is a result of the tools that the farmers use. A2 farmers are on large tracts of land which is 
an average of 100 hectares. On such land, it will not be possible to maximize land use using 
basic tools in the Table 7.3 below. 
Table 7.3: Access to productive tools at national level – A2 model, 2013 
Type of asset HH with asset 
access 
Mean Type of access (%) 
% accessed  
% 
Owns 
 
% Borrows 
Hand tools 
Hoes 95.3 11 99.6 0.4 
Axes 93.2 3 99.6 0.4 
Mattocks 59.1 2 94.3 5.7 
Picks 77.4 2 95.6 4.4 
Spades 70.6 3 98.1 1.9 
Spade folks 32.8 2 91.8 8.2 
W/barrow 81.4 2 96.7 3.3 
Knapsack 82.8 3 99.6 0.4 
Animal drawn 
Scotch carts 38.9 1 82.6 17.4 
Ploughs 47.6 1 94.3 5.7 
Planters 6.1 1 38.9 61.1 
Power driven 
Tractor 52.4 2 80.6 19.4 
Plough 38.2 1 78.8 21.2 
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Planter 14.9 1 70.5 29.5 
Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14  
Table 7.3 shows that most A2 farmers have basic hand tools such as hoes, axes and knapsacks. 
82.6% of the A2 farmers have scotch carts. The equipment which is not owned by the majority 
of the A2 farmers is the animal drawn planter with 38.9%. The table also shows that borrowing 
is relatively low on hand tools but grows when going to animal drawn tools. The power driven 
tools are the most borrowed (29.5% for planters) by the farmers without the tools. This speaks 
to solidarity amongst the farmers as they work on increasing their productivity. 
 
Contrary to the AIAS data captured in the table above where 80.6% of the A2 farmers own 
tractors, at Umlala Farm, all the 6 A2 farms do not have tractors. They rely on borrowing from 
individuals who have seized the opportunity to have tractor-hiring services. Hiring the tractor 
costs USD40 per hectare. For a farmer who would want to use the 100 hectares to their disposal, 
this may be a challenge. As a result, the farmers end up utilizing the land within their means. 
In a focus group discussion, one of the farmers noted that they assign their children to adopt a 
hectare through hiring a tractor for the hectare. This is how they have been able to work on the 
land. As a result, the major production grievance for A2 farmers in Kwekwe District is credit 
unavailability and the high cost of inputs.  
 
7.6 Agricultural Inputs and financing 
The government initiated a Presidential Input Scheme to mobilise resources to support A1 
households, communal, old resettlement and former small scale purchase area farmers. For the 
2013/2014 season, the Scheme managed to mobilise US252.3 million. The program covers crops 
like maize and small grain inputs which were financed to the level of US$184.8million, 51.2 
million to livestock farmers US$9.9 million to cotton farmers and US$ 6.2 million for soya beans 
or cow peas farmers (BAZ, 2014). The financial support will reach 1.6 million households.  
 
The US$9.9 million intervention in cotton should reverse the decline in output realised in 2014, 
when production fell to an estimated 140 000 tons. This should complement continued contract 
farming arrangements between farmers and cotton merchants in 2015, estimated to mobilise about 
US$28 million for the crop (Ibid). The research observed that distribution of these inputs is one of 
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the responsibilities of the agricultural extension officers. The extension officers noted that one of 
the challenges with the distribution of these inputs is timing. Sometimes the inputs are delivered 
late to the farmers. One of the informants in an interview noted that the allotment they had gotten 
from the 2012/2013 season were used in the 2014/2015 season since they had been delivered late. 
 
In addressing the issue of government support, attention has to be given to the macro economic 
environment of the country. Access to agricultural credit for famers can be said to be one of the 
herculean tasks which is hanging over the government like the sword of Damocles. The country is 
riddled with international debt which compromises its opportunities to get lines of credit. In 2014, 
the Zimbabwe debt to GDP ratio was 77%. This raises concerns of the ability of the country to pay 
back creditors. As a result, most of the agricultural credit which farmers got after the FTLRP was 
through private agribusiness contracting firms (Mkhize-Binswanger and Moyo, 2012). The 
Government of Zimbabwe does not have adequate resources to comprehensively fund agriculture. 
As a result its initiatives like the President Input Scheme end up having limited coverage. The 
individual farmers have been taking the initiative to approach banks as a possible option. The graph 
below shows agriculture to be the fourth most funded sector by the banks. In view of the fact that 
Zimbabwe is an agro-based economy, one would have expected investment in this sector to be 
higher. 
Figure 7.6: Bank loans by sector in 2014 
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Source: Adapted from the RBZ August 2014 Monetary Policy 
Of the loans that were issued by banks in 2014, only 15.68 went to agriculture. Farmers would 
get funding if they go to the bank looking for a loan as long as they would have a property to 
use as collateral.  
 
 Given the high real interest rates prevailing in Zimbabwe and the prevailing short lending 
terms, informal lenders and loan sharks have also entered the field, and they too prefer to lend 
against urban properties. However, lending against collateral is dwarfed  by  short  term  
agricultural  financing  that  has  come  in  through  contract  and out grower  farming  
(especially  for  export  crops),  with  banks  playing  a  significant  role  in  lending  to such 
contractors. When farmers are unable to access the foregoing lines of credit, they resort to other 
sources such as own savings, wages from formal employment, pensions and remittances as can 
be seen in the graph below. 
Table 7.4: Kwekwe District sources of agricultural credit for farmers in 2013 
 
 
Sources of credit 
Settlement type 
A1 A2 CA Total 
% % % % 
Government scheme 12.5 0 0 1.9 
Private company 37.5 77.5 50 68.5 
Commercial bank 0 15 0 11.1 
Relatives and friends 0 2.5 0 1.9 
Cooperatives 0 2.5 0 1.9 
Microfinance institutions 37.5 2.5 0 7.4 
Chimbadzo (high interest rate 
loan) 
12.5 0 0 1.9 
Other sources 0 0 50 5.6 
Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14  
As can be noted from the table above, A2 farmers have been able to access private credit more 
than any other settlement type. Private companies enter into contract farming arrangements 
with the farmers. In the year of introducing the contract scheme, 23 percent of the tobacco crop 
was under that arrangement. In the 2011/12 summer, 13 companies contracted farmers on a 
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total area of 39,227ha; this constitutes 60 percent of the total area under tobacco cultivation 
(AMID, 2012a; AMID, 2012b) and 65 percent of the total crop under cultivation (Irwin et al, 
2012). In this arrangement, each contracted farmer is obliged to deliver a crop to the contracting 
company to a value equivalent to the level of support provided. Contract arrangements and all 
marketing of tobacco are regulated by the Tobacco Industry and Marketing Board (TIMB); a 
quasi-state institution; an arrangement that has helped ensure a cordial relationship between 
contracting companies and the contracted (Ibid). 
 
7.7 Livestock production patterns 
Resettled households rear livestock as part of their farming. Cattle, are held in high regard by 
the farmers. This is because they are both a means of production and a source of reproduction. 
In the Shona culture, which is dormant in Kwekwe District, cattle are considered a form of 
wealth. Having plenty of them would mean that the owner is wealthy. Below, the graph shows 
ownership patterns in Umlala farm for A1 farmers. 42.2 percent of the farmers do not have any 
cattle while 100% of A2 farmers have at least five cattle. The percentage of those that do not 
have draught power is more at 48.8%. This means there are some of the farmers who have 
cattle that have not been trained for farming. In cases like this, the research observed that 
households hire draught power from each other. 
Figure 7.7: Cattle ownership in Umlala Farm 
 
Source: Own fieldwork, 2015 
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Outside cattle, poultry, and goats, donkeys and guinea fowls are other common types of 
livestock, owned by 6.90 percent and 5.50 percent of the households respectively. The other 
livestock types continue being owned by less than 5.0 percent of the households. On other 
forms of livestock such as sheep, rabbits and pigs, A2 households are the dominant players. 
Communal sector households own more goats, donkeys and free-range chicken in comparison 
to the two resettlement models.  
 
7.8 Agricultural labour 
The FTLRP drastically changed the agrarian labour structures that had been in existence for 
several years. It is estimated that between 30,000 and 45,000 workers were displaced from the 
former LSCFs to Communal Areas, towns, informal settlements (Chambati and Moyo, 2004, 
Chambati and Magaramombe, 2008) and neighbouring countries (Rutherford and Addison 
2007). Since not all LSCF land was acquired, the remaining plantations and LSCFs (Moyo, 
2011b) retained an estimated 100,000 full-time and part-time wage workers as of 2003 
(Chambati and Moyo, 2004, Chambati and Magaramombe, 2008).  
 
Another change was the displacement of an estimated 200,000 formal farm jobs nationally 
(Chambati and Magaramombe, 2008), of which about 50 percent were part-time. Nationally it 
is estimated that over two thirds of the former farm workers remained on the former LSCF land 
(Chambati and Moyo, 2004; Moyo et al, 2009; Magaramombe, 2010). This change in the 
agrarian structure brought with it different dynamics for both the farmers and the labourers. 
Some of the farm workers got land. This can be exemplified in Umlala Farm where 18% of the 
land beneficiaries were former farm workers. For those who could not get the land, 69 per cent 
of the former farm workers indicated that the majority of their colleagues were still resident in 
the compounds (AIAS farm worker survey, 2006). These labourers established different type 
of relations with the new farmers.  
 
The FTLRP land beneficiaries do not have total control of farm workers as was the case under 
the white farmers. In the latter dispensation, the employers enforced residential tenancy which 
inhibited the labourers from looking for other opportunities. As a result, the white farmers 
wielded extensive political and social control over the labourers. The current arrangement is 
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not a master and servant relationship. Instead, the new employers have less total control over 
farm workers as they only have land user rights and cannot enforce the residential labour 
tenancy (ibid).  
Figure 7.8: Hiring of farm labour in Kwekwe District for both A1 and A2 farmers 
 
Source: Adapted from AIAS Survey, 2013/2014  
As can be observed from the graph above, 57.6% of the labour in Kwekwe District is not 
committed to a specific farmer. Instead the labourers rove within the district and some of them 
have established labour gangs especially in summer to do big jobs. This arrangement empowers 
the worker because for every task which they have to undertake, they can negotiate their wage 
with the farm owner unlike if they were to be set on a monthly salary.  Also, the workers are 
able to engage in other productive activities like gold panning. The research observed that those 
labourers who are roving have the liberty to be on several contracts which broadens their social 
reproduction. This has been term semi-proletarianisation of the labour force (Bush and Cliffe, 
1984; Moyo and Yeros, 2005; Moyo, 2011a). 
 
Overall there has been a net gain in livelihoods, as 45,000 farm workers and 4,000 physically 
displaced farmers have been replaced by 170,000 farm households (see Moyo, 2011a).  By 
2011, the total number of people working full time on resettlement land had increased five-
fold, from 167,000 to over one million (Chambati, 2011).  Chambati also estimated that in 
2011, 240,000 people were employed full time on A1 farms and 115,000 on A2 farms. Another 
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crucial point to note is that 510,000 people from the A1 farmers' families were ‘self-employed’ 
full time and 55,000 from extended families on A2 farms. In view of this, it can be said that 
the FTLRP created employment from a meagre 167 000 to over a million, when taking into 
cognisance the more than 100 000 that remained on large scale commercial farms which were 
not redistributed.  
 
For the employees who are in permanent employment, more often it is because the land owner 
is based in town. In such scenarios, the labourer runs the farm. In an in-depth interview with 
one A2 farmer, he indicated that his success was directly linked to the labourer he had hired. 
The labourer understood agriculture and livestock rearing. When the farmer decided to plant 
tobacco, the labourer had in depth knowledge of the timing, pesticides, fertilisers to be used 
and so forth. Though the permanent labourers do not have leverage to negotiate for their wage 
each time they work, they are more often chosen as permanent employees on the basis of their 
honesty, knowledge and skills. Such reputations mean that they are in much demand and 
renowned so that they can negotiate for other things which are not necessarily wages. I spoke 
to a farm worker who had managed to negotiate with the farmer for his children’s fees and all 
educational requirements. He noted that: 
Sometimes pay day is on the 52nd day of the month (indefinitely).  I don’t even know 
when next I will be paid. I have obligations to meet for my family. This means that I 
have to go and talk to the headmaster so that my child is allowed into class before I pay 
the fees. The school is now used to my request almost every term… (In-depth Interview, 
17/05/2015, Male, Sherwood Farm).  
This citation demonstrates how the labourer negotiated for his children’s education which was 
important for him, even though he may not be paid on time. The farm worker’s sentiments are 
confirmed by the research on mechanisms of wage determination. 77.2% of the farm workers 
claimed that they were able to negotiate for the wages which sometimes were paid in kind. 
Beside money, some of the payment methods included sharing of the harvests, covering all the 
subsistence costs of the worker and providing stationery for the worker’s children. 
Table 7.5: Wage determination methods in Kwekwe District 
 
 
Method of wage determination 
Kwekwe District 
 
No. % 
Permanent labour 
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Government gazetted wages 7 12.3 
Local farmers agreement 6 10.5 
Negotiated  44 77.2 
Other 0 0 
Total 57 100 
Casual labour 
Government gazzetted wages 2 2 
Local farmers agreement 6 6 
Negotiated  92 92 
Other 0 0 
Total 100 100 
Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14  
 
Asked for their perceptions on the conditions of work between the old dispensation (working 
for white farmers) and the new employers, 36% of the labourers indicated that the conditions 
were now much better than before. This can be attributed to the freedom which the workers 
have as they are not tied to a single farmer. As has been noted, the new arrangement gives the 
farmer workers a lot of leeway to increase their incomes by engaging in petty commodity 
production. About 21 percent of the former farm workers were involved in the extraction of 
natural resources on a full-time basis (AIAS, 2006). Alluvial mining (especially gold and 
diamonds) has created an alternative source of income for farm workers and others in various 
provinces (Chambati, 2011). 
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Figure 7.9: Kwekwe District farm worker perceptions of working conditions compared 
to LSCF 
 
For those who said that the conditions are worse, I observed that these were permanent workers 
whose employers were struggling with meeting their obligations of paying the wages. Most 
farmers who fell into this category are those who are not based at the farm but are invited as 
and when work arises. In such instances, the resettled farmer will not feel obligated to pay the 
worker as he/she argues that they are also providing them with a place to stay and livelihood. 
This speaks to the changing pattern of agrarian relations between land beneficiaries and farm 
workers. 
 
7.9 Support services for production 
Agricultural extension officers provide technical support to the farmers. Entry into the case 
study area was easy because the researcher used the extension officers ‘presence on the ground’ 
to access the farmer. This observation confirms Murisa (2010) assertion that public extension 
services are present at local level and remain active. Murisa’s argument was in response to 
some scholars who anecdotally claimed that public extension services had collapsed since 
2000. Agricultural extension officers in Kwekwe District reside in the areas where they are 
supposed to provide assistance. The agricultural extension officer who covers Umlala Farm 
demonstrated intimate knowledge of the area and the farmers who were allocated land. He 
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conducts monthly farmers meetings. At these meetings, he addresses agricultural challenges 
that he would have observed while doing his regular visits.  
 
The extension officer was equipped with a motor bike by the government for ease of travel. 
The other extension officer of Sherwood farm however does not have a bike. Instead, she uses 
public transport when conducting her routine monitoring visits. To address her transport issue, 
she conducts single monthly visits where she combines all her activities to be done in the ward. 
It must be noted that whilst it is commendable that the agricultural extension officers are 
located in each ward, these officers need to be well equipped for the farmers to take them 
seriously. The extension officer for Sherwood registered frustrations that the government was 
not giving them ample support to deliver on their work. Figure 7.10 shows contact with 
government support services by the resettled farmers. It can be noted that agricultural extension 
workers have a heavy presence in the farming communities than any other department of 
government. The extension officers are supposed to provide training and visits to the farmers; 
facilitate the Master Farmer Training Schemes and share new technologies and information.  
 
Figure 7.10: Contact with Government agencies for resettled landholders Kwekwe 
District for 2013 
 
Source: Adapted from the AIAS Survey, 2013/2014 
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As can be seen from Figure 7.10, extension services are available in Kwekwe Disitrict. The 
challenges which these extension officers face were captured by Hanyani-Mlambo (2002) 
when he noted that: 
…AGRITEX is only able to recommend technologies that were made available 15 to 
20 years ago. The problems of inappropriate technology are most serious in the low-
rainfall and marginal agro-ecological zones (i.e. agro-ecological regions III to V). Most 
farmers indicated that, where they have not adopted recommended technologies, they 
use either technologies from their own informal experiments or modifications of 
recommended technologies. AGRITEX has neither systematically identified farmer-
developed technologies that work nor adapted these for extension to other farmers in 
other wards, districts or provinces. This problem has been compounded by an ever-
dwindling operating budget and lack of transport, which have also severely limited 
extension agents' contract with farmers. According to one key informant, "AGRITEX's 
financial woes and the government's expectations are like trying to milk a cow without 
feeding it", a scenario reflected by too many demands and insufficient financial 
backing. 
The foregoing sentiments were corroborated by Scoones (2014) when he noted that: 
… Today the extension service is a sorry reflection of past glories. Many qualified staff 
left or passed away (the ravages of HIV/AIDS hit many government services very 
badly), posts are unfilled, the transport capacity virtually non-existent and the ability to 
offer up-to-date advice severely hampered by the parallel decimation of government 
research services. Most farmers rely on private input suppliers, agro dealers and their 
neighbors for advice these days. Of course there are extension workers in the field, and 
they are usually extraordinarily committed and informed, despite the poor conditions 
of their posts. 
 
In consonance with Scoones,  I observed that Agritex extension workers maintained a presence 
and were available to provide training to the resettled farmers in spite of their many challenges. 
The AIAS survey however revealed that only 9 percent of the sampled A1 and A2 beneficiaries 
had received training up to Master Farmer Certificate level and a mere 1.65 percent in both 
categories attained the Advanced Master Farmer Certificate (AIAS, 2014).  The uptake of the 
training was low leading to the extension officer complaining that: 
These farmers think that they know everything. When I invite them for the trainings, 
they don’t come but if you visit them, they start asking questions of things they could 
have learnt during the training. I have never started a class Master certificate class with 
farmers who complete the course, farmers come when doing a lesson they think they 
need then abscond [for] the rest. It’s frustrating… (Key Informant Interview, 
20/08/2015, Female, Sherwood Block).  
 
 159 
On the other hand, the farmers registered concerns that the extension officers did not have 
much to offer them, despite their willingness to help. One farmer noted that: 
The reason for not attending training sessions by the extension officers is that they do 
not have information that can improve my farming much. I once attended the trainings 
but did not learn anything. I think the extension officers need to be equipped with new 
information on how we can do farming better. They are still teaching the same material 
even though the farming environment and conditions have changed… (In-depth 
Interview, 16/07/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block). 
 
It has been argued that the absence of formal agricultural training does not necessarily translate 
to poor farm management as land beneficiaries are generally educated so they can conduct their 
own research when they want certain information (Moyo et al, 2009). 
 
7.10 Media and production 
Beside the government departments, farmers have been getting a lot of information from 
various other sources. The research observed that every farmer has a radio that is either 
powered by batteries or a solar pan. Having a radio is essential because most of the hands on 
information about farming is obtainable from there. Successful farmers are brought on the 
program to share their experiences as well. I had several opportunities of listening to the 
farming programs, these were a wealth of information. Different experts would come on radio 
to address different issues. Television programs such as Murimi Wanhasi (Today’s Farmer) 
and the Radio Zimbabwe program Zvevarimi (About Farmers) proved to be very popular with 
the farmers.  
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Figure 7.11: Sources of agricultural information in new resettlement areas 
 
Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2013/14 
It is not surprising that in the 21st century, the media is playing such a key role in supporting 
agriculture in Zimbabwe. Radios and televisions as mediums to relay information have wider 
reach to even those areas where the government personnel would not reach. Such support 
mechanisms need to be strengthened by making sure that the media addresses farmers’ 
concerns in a systematic way, following a tailor-made program that would have been developed 
in collaboration with the farmers. The absence of a structured way to addressing issues of 
farming can be said to be one conspicuous gaps in working with mainstream media. 
 
7.11 Agricultural markets  
Between 2002 and 2008, the state has been controlling both input and outputs markets. This 
scenario was characterized by bottleneck on imports and the GMB used unrealistic prices to 
the detriment of the farmers. When the GMB collapsed after the 2008 inflation crisis, 
agricultural markets were re-liberalised. As a result, the markets have been dominated by 
private actors; 31.5 percent of A1 farmers have been selling their formerly controlled staple 
cereals to the private market (AIAS, 2014). This AIAS survey finding was corroborated by my 
interaction with the farmers who expressed lack of confidence in the GMB after the 2008 
fiasco. Sales which were done mainly through the GMB around 2005/06 (52.5 percent for 
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maize and 73.8 percent for wheat) in accordance with the law have since declined significantly 
to 16.1% of A1 maize producers respectively. In consonance with the foregoing assertion, one 
farmer posited that: 
After the losses I incurred in the 2007/2008 season, I will be a fool to go back there. 
Once beaten, twice shy. Their buying price is higher than that of the middlemen who 
come to the farms. This saves us transport costs. GMB would want us to take our 
produce there at our costs. Though the private buyers offer lower prices, and they pay 
immediately… (In-depth Interview, 19/07/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block). 
 
 
The wheat crop was mainly marketed through on-farm middlemen (66.7 percent) and private 
players in nearest towns (33.3 percent). No maize or wheat crop was sold to on-farm contractors 
(Ibid). Overall, the current agricultural marketing policies have adversely affected the 
production of maize, wheat and other controlled crops due to unintended market distortions 
(Mukwereza, 2013). There seems to be little incentive for farmers to produce beyond their 
subsistence needs, given the lack of alternative marketing channels and price controls with 
inflexible procurement prices (Ibid).  
 
The trajectory is fairly different for A2 farmers where 37.6 percent of the households in 
Kwekwe District choose to sell part of their produce through the state marketing board (AIAS, 
2014). This is motivated by the need to access the GMB input schemes which have a 
precondition of a farmer having to sell a certain amount of produce to qualify for the subsidized 
inputs. Although offering the highest prices for grain in the market, the GMB has largely been 
unable to pay for grain deliveries on time resulting in farmers selling at cheaper prices from 
the private sector players. More recently, the government has gazetted regulations compelling 
all buyers to purchase maize from farmers at the GMB price. Its effect on the market however 
requires further examination. The production, marketing and pricing of small grains have 
remained uncontrolled as the Government tries to promote their production and consumption. 
Production of small grains (sorghum and millets) is only undertaken by a few A2 farmers who 
sold all their sorghum to the local village markets while A1 farmers sold most of their sorghum 
to on-farm consumers (35.7 percent), on-farm middlemen (21.7 percent), and local village 
market (7.1 percent) while only 21.4 percent was sold to the state marketing board. 
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Table 7.6: Marketing channels used by A2 resettled farmers in Kwekwe District 
Type of crop  pp marketing channel used (No and % of market participants in parenthesis ) 
local/village 
market 
on farm to 
middlemen 
nearest 
town 
on farm to 
consumers 
road 
side 
state 
marketing 
on farm to 
contractors 
auction 
floor 
other Total 
Main food crops 
maize crop  228(0) 11(7.1) 34(24.1) 31(22) 7(5) 0(0.7) 53(37.6) 1(0.7) 0(0) 4(2.8) 141(100) 
wheat crop  4(0) 0(0) 1(100) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 1(100) 
 millet crop  0(0) 0(0) 1(100) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 1(100) 
sorghum crop  4(0) 1(100) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 1(100) 
groundnuts 
crop  
67(0) 1(8.3) 4(33.3) 2(16.7) 5(41.7) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 12(100) 
 sweet 
potatoes 
19(0) 0(0) 2(50) 1(25) 1(25) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 4(100) 
sugarbean 
crop  
50(0) 3(8.8) 13(38.2) 10(29.4) 4(11.8) 0(0) 1(2.9) 0(0) 0(0) 3(8.8) 34(100)  
8.8 38.2 29.4 11.8 0(0) 2.9 0(0) 0(0) 8.8 100 
roundnut crop  18(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) (100) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(100) 
Oil seed crop 
 sunflower 
crop  
3(0) 0(0) 1(50) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 1(50) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 2(100) 
 soybean crop  41(0) 1(2.4) 17(41.5) 10(24.4) 1(2.4) 4(9.8) 6(14.6) 0(0) 0(0) 2(4.9) 41(100) 
Key export crops 
 tobacco crop  53(53) 0(0) 0(0) 2(3.9) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 6(11.8) 43(84.3) 0 51(100) 
Estates crops 
Sugarcane 37(0) 0(0) 1(2.7) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 0(0) 17(45.9) 0(0) 19(51.4) 37(100) 
Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14 
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Quite different from the situation obtaining in the A1 sector, on farm middlemen was 
thechannel mostly used by A2 farmers for marketing oilseed crops. Fifty percent and 41.5 
percent of A2 sunflower and soya bean farmers, respectively, sold their output through the on 
farm middlemen while 50 percent and 14.6 percent farmers sold their sunflower and soya bean 
through the state marketing board, respectively (Table 7.6) (Ibid). In the absence of regulation 
compelling farmers to sell their oilseed commodities through the GMB, the parastatal is no 
longer the major option for most of the farmers. The farmers opt for middlemen who reach out 
to them instead of the arrangement which exists with GMB where farmers incur transport costs 
taking their produce to the latter (AIAS, 2014).  
 
7.12 Non-farm income generating activities 
Besides agriculture, the resettled land beneficiaries are engaging in several non-farm activities 
such as gold panning, woodcarving, firewood selling and river/pit sand selling. In the case of 
Kwekwe District, gold panning is one of the non-agricultural activities that the land 
beneficiaries are involved in.  Prior to the FTLRP, the natural resources were controlled 
exclusively by the white farmers. Some of the resettled farmers noted that there is a lot of 
evidence to suggest that these farmers were involved not only in agriculture. One farmer 
highlighted this when he noted that: 
I am certain that the white farmers were not only involved in agriculture. We see 
aerodromes at almost all the farms. What were they flying out? I don’t believe it was 
for transport. The best example for this was what happened to Marange which was part 
of the farm that was owned by a renowned white farmer, a former MDC cabinet 
member. Only when the farm was repossessed [did] Zimbabwe realised that it had 
diamonds. We hear of stories that he would send his staff to look for the shiny stones 
for a reward. Because there was an aerodrome, he would fly out to go and trade… (In-
depth Interview, 2/06/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block). 
 
One farmer echoed the same sentiments when he noted that 
Some of the farmers were involved in trophy hunting and tourism which they did not 
declare to the state. At a conservancy close to here, there are chalets showing that the 
farmers used to provide accommodation to their guests. This thing of doing non farming 
activities is not new. Why is it made to be something out of this world when it is done 
by us? (In-depth Interview, 11/06/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block). 
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Scoones et al (2010:89) posited that there was a lot of alluvial gold panning in resettled farms. 
He noted that getting permits to undertake small scale mining operations is extremely difficult, 
and is usually captured by those with power and influence. He further argues that unregulated 
gold panning can cause major erosion in riverine areas, resulting in substantial erosion and 
downstream deposition with the silting of dams and pools.  
Figure 7.12: Involvement in non-farm income generating activities 
 
Source: Adapted from the AIAS Survey, 2013/2014  
Despite these environmental detriments, the AIAS survey noted that 72.6 percent of the 
beneficiaries were involved in gold panning (Figure 7.12). During my fieldwork, I discovered 
that about 69 percent of the former farm workers chose to do gold panning instead of looking 
for employment. The extension officer who was assisting me in this research noted that: 
…Almost every plot has a pit. Most farmers tried to dig in their fields to find the gold. 
Some found it whilst others did not find much. Since gold panning is a labour intense 
activity, most farmers’ ages do not allow them to do such work. For those who got 
something, they used young people whom they paid to dig. There is no field without a 
pit (Key Informant Interview, 20/08/2015, Female, Sherwood Block).  
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In the Sherwood area, almost every farmer was curious to know whether there was gold on 
their farm. Some indeed found the gold. I spoke to one farmer who had found alluvial gold on 
their plot without digging much. The farmer noted that: 
When I got this plot, I did not expect to find gold. I was one of the farmers who were 
struggling to make the best use of the land. In a discussion with my neighbours, they 
indicated to me that there were possibilities of finding gold on our land because of the 
type of the soil. I asked my son to find out about how we would know if there was gold 
here. He came back with good news. I wanted to keep this a secret so that the 
makorokoza would not know about availability of gold here. I invited my family to 
come and dig. To our surprise, we did not have to dig very deep before we started 
finding the gold. I enquired with my neighbour, he was digging discreetly as well. I 
investigated about the markets for the gold. There were people who could buy it for 
cash on the black market. Their rates were not very good compared to selling to the 
government. The problem with selling to the government is that they would need a 
permit and also they have so many charges. So I decided to sell the gold on the black 
market. On my first transaction, I made about USD10 000. This was a lot of money but 
I had a lot of obligations that I had to meet. I managed to pay the outstanding fees for 
my daughter at Midlands State University. I also managed to put a security wall on my 
house in Mbizvo suburb. On my other transactions, the money I got varied but I 
managed to buy my wife a fridge that she had always wanted in her kitchen. I replaced 
old sofas which were in my house there. I brought the old ones here at the plot. With 
the second and third times, I can’t remember but I think I got about USD8 000 dollars 
after about a month or so. The money I got the fourth time, I bought a family car that I 
am still using. The amounts kept reducing until the last time I made USD300 dollars. 
The problem with lower amounts is that I would not be able to pay the guys who were 
digging for me. The gold is still there but requires sophisticated equipment I do not 
have. Am hoping that I will be able to make more money from farming so that I can 
buy the equipment I need (In-depth Interview, 24/06/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood 
Block). 
 
Another farmer narrated his experience noting that: 
I was very fortunate to find a plot where there is gold. I specifically wanted a plot in 
this Sherwood area because I knew that it is in the gold belt. When I started digging, 
first few days, I could not get anything. What encouraged me were the stories I was 
hearing of my neighbours who were getting some gold without digging much. I changed 
the spot I was digging. I did not have to dig very deep to find my jackpot! I realised 
that the wait was worth it. I was surprised that I got a big stone that made me get some 
USD 14 000 at once! I was not guaranteed of having such money in one goal so I 
decided to buy two commuter omni-buses. This business has really helped me to get 
off my feet. I managed to buy two residential stands in town. After the big stone I got, 
I have been getting irregular amounts but averagely USD5000 in some two months. I 
have been using the proceeds of the omni-buses to build a house at one of the stands in 
town. The money I have been getting from digging has been going to buy cattle. I have 
bought some 10 cows. When I finish with the building project, I will now start working 
on the things that I need for this plot. Whilst the money from digging is good because 
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it comes as a lump sum, it is back breaking, hard labour. If I had all the strength, I would 
dig every day. But that is not possible. My only consolation is that as long as the gold 
is there in the ground, it will not go anywhere. I will have to rest my back before I start 
digging again… (In-depth Interview, 11/06/2015, Male, A2 Farmer, Sherwood Block). 
 
The foregoing stories of the farmers corroborate Maponga et al (2002) when they articulate 
that small scale mining increases economic power to rural communities, and in that way, 
contributes positively to social development. In my interactions with the land beneficiaries, I 
got a sense that there were a lot of incidences of farmers who were involved in digging for gold 
on their plots. This was predominant in Sherwood Block. The impact varied, with some having 
their lives transformed whilst others only managed to get relatively low money for their efforts. 
 
7.13 Conclusion  
Production is a centre piece in the realisation of social policy outcomes. Hence, enhancement 
of the productive potential of members of society is a key variable in ensuring that social policy 
outcomes become a reality for the people. The purpose of this chapter therefore was to answer 
the production question of what land beneficiaries are doing with the land they got, looking at 
both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. In this chapter, I relied on the AIAS data at 
national level and for Kwekwe District.  
 
In appreciating the productive outcomes of the FTLRP, it is imperative to realise that it was 
not every beneficiary’s aspiration to consider agriculture as a business which subsequently 
contributes to the national development. Some of the farmers I spoke to noted that their 
motivation for participating in the land reform exercise was to be able to get a musha for their 
children.  Indeed the government was well aware of this as can be explained by coming up with 
A1 farms meant for family production, compared to A2 and LSCF designed for commercial 
production. Be that as it may, empirical research by several scholars point to the fact that while 
production levels slumped in the period 2000 to 2003, productivity started picking up 
thereafter. 
 
The levels of production and productivity are differentiated by agro ecological region and 
producer type. Export and cash crops are mostly produced by A2 farmers. Tobacco production 
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has been on the rise across all the settlement models because of the support of private 
companies through contract farming arrangements. Even in districts such as Kwekwe which 
had no history of tobacco farming, farmers are slowly adopting this export crop. Overall, land 
utilization is constrained by access to inputs and capital, while recurrent droughts pose 
challenges to grain production, which is sensitive to rainfall patterns. Diversified markets now 
exist for a wide range of commodities produced by rural households beyond the state marketing 
system. 
 
In the chapter, I covered the issue of agricultural financing, attending to the question of how 
the land beneficiaries are coping with this aspect. I observed that after the collapse of the 
agricultural system in 2008, the government has not been able to provide adequate support to 
the farmers. As such, issues of means of production such as inputs, access to tools, labour and 
access to information about agriculture pose challenges to farmers. As a coping mechanism, 
farmers have come up with ways of mitigating the impact by sharing productive tools and 
information. Further, I interrogated the availability and accessibility of quality extension 
services in Kwekwe District. I observed that indeed extension services are available and also 
accessible though their quality is low due to resourcing. I end the chapter by looking at non-
farming activities which take place on the resettled farms. In the context of Kwekwe District, 
gold panning is a pronounced activity so I attended to the nuances around this issue. In 
Kwekwe, 72 percent of the farmers are also involved in gold panning. 
 
I have argued that the FTLRP created new agrarian labour structure which has resulted in the 
semi-proletarianisation of labour. The farm workers mostly do not have farm tenancy as was 
the case under white farmers. This has made them to be roving from one farm job to another 
while negotiating a wage for each task based at the compounds where farm workers used to 
stay. Under this arrangement, they are able to engage in gold panning and other productive 
non-agricultural activities. The next chapter now looks at the extent to which land reform is an 
ex ante social protection tool. 
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CHAPTER 8: LAND REFORM AS AN EX ANTE SOCIAL PROTECTION TOOL 
8.1 Introduction  
Social protection is one function of social policy that has received a lot of scholarly attention 
as a result of the diminution vision of social policy as has been articulated in Chapter One and 
Chapter Three. As a result, there are various approaches that have been suggested on addressing 
social protection. Some of these approaches include the Social Risk Management Framework, 
the Asset Vulnerability framework and the transformative social protection framework. In the 
first section of this chapter, I attend to some of the nuances of these frameworks, setting the 
context of appreciating the social protection outcomes of the FTLRP. I present evidence from 
the AIAS baseline as well as my own in to show that land reform is an ex ante social protection 
instrument.  I demonstrate that even in droughts and periods of economic crises, the severity 
of vulnerability is reduced for the farmers. Further, I posit that the land beneficiaries are 
affected differently in view of the tri-modal agrarian structure that now exists amongst the land 
reform beneficiaries. The most affected land beneficiaries are those in the ‘poor farmers’ 
category.  
 
One immediate social protection outcome of the FTLRP as shown in this chapter is opportunity 
for reliable shelter. The chapter presents evidence of land beneficiaries who have made the 
resettled areas their home where they do not pay any rentals. Another outcome noted in this 
chapter is potential of food security for the land beneficiaries. Since they own the land, they 
can use it to produce food for their families, grow gardens, and establish other income streams 
such as inter alia, selling firewood, selling grass for thatching houses, gold panning and mould 
bricks. 
 
The chapter also explores the idea of livestock being a safety net against the vagaries of the 
market and other exogenous factors which may affect the farmers. I observed that while 
livestock is a form of accumulation on the one hand, it is also a form of insurance when farmers 
are in dire straits. I end the chapter looking at social assistance initiatives that are available to 
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the land beneficiaries. The chapter set the tone to one form of capital that is available to the 
land beneficiaries through social capital. 
 
8.2 Social protection conceptual handle 
Social protection has been the most dominant component of social policy in OECD literature. 
Some of the reasons for this can be said to be the Bismarckian focus on sickness, injury, and 
old-age. During the Bismarkian reforms in Germany, social insurance-based social protection 
schemes proliferated.  This was coupled with the raft of legislations on social welfare which 
were passed by the Liberal government in the UK between 1906 and 1914. Using his 1942 
Report, Beveridge sought to expand on these earlier initiatives. In this report, Beveridge 
identified five ‘giants’ which had to be addressed in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
These giants were want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness. The primary emphasis of the 
Beveridge Report was to address want. This discourse later shaped the understanding of social 
policy in Europe where it then became characterised by ‘mono-tasking’ (Mkandawire, 2005: 
6). As such, most of the available literature on social policy consists of attempts to identify 
solutions to the social consequences of both economic decline and economic policy (Ibid). The 
neoliberal turn in social policy then reduced it to social assistance or social safety nets, which 
are components of social protection (Holzman and Kozel 2007).  The literature therefore has 
been dominated by ex post interventions with much neglect of ex ante interventions (Adesina 
2011). 
 
There are mainly two conceptual frameworks that are used in understanding social protection. 
There is the Social Risk Management (SRM) Framework, which is primarily used by the World 
Bank. The Bank posits that SRM focuses on the ‘critically poor’ as an approach to reducing 
vulnerability to poverty in countries with an incomplete space of instruments to manage risks. 
Holzmann et al (2000) submit that the basic thrust of the SRM framework is based on two 
assessments: firstly, that the poor are typically most exposed to diverse risks ranging from 
natural (such as earthquake and flooding) to manmade (such as war and inflation), from health 
(such as illness) to political risks (such as discrimination). Secondly, that the poor have the 
fewest instruments to deal with these risks (such as access to government provided income 
support and market-based instruments like insurance). The foregoing risks hit individuals, 
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communities, and regions mostly in an unpredictable way or cannot be avoided, which cause 
them to increase poverty.  
 
The challenge with this framework is that it does not question the class issues and power 
relations. Instead, it takes a survivalist approach without interrogating the root causes of 
vulnerabilities.  The framework characterise the poor as a static group that is identifiable in any 
community. Concomitantly, it also emphasises a lot on targeting of the ‘ultra-poor’ with 
beneficiaries categorised as the ‘deserving poor’ and ‘underserving poor’. The issue of 
targeting and means testing has received ample attention from scholars like Besley et al (1990), 
Sen (1992), Van Oorschot (2002), Castaneda et al (2003), Coady et al (2004), Mkandawire 
(2005), Johannsen (2006) and Sharif (2009). Further, the approach only addresses short-term 
emergency and humanitarian concerns. The framework does not have a strategic view to 
addressing vulnerability; the reason why it is ex post. 
 
Also, the SRM approach does not build on strategies that strengthen people’s own initiative 
solutions to their vulnerabilities (Moser 1998). Moser’s research through her ‘asset 
vulnerability framework’ demonstrates that even the poorest of all people are not ‘helpless 
victims’ but have many resources which  can be leveraged to build resilience against 
vulnerability (Anderson and Woodrow 1989,12). The approach further neglects Sen’s 
discussion of human capabilities in dealing with ‘politics of hope and despair’ (Sen 1985).  
 
In view of the shortcomings of the SRM approach, Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2004) 
came up with the transformative social protection framework. They defined transformative 
social protection as: 
All initiatives that transfer income or assets to the poor [emphasis added], protect the 
vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the 
marginalized; with the overall objectives of extending the benefits of economic growth 
and reducing the economic or social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalized 
groups. 
This definition recognises the role that is played by redistribution of income and or assets in 
reducing economic or social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised groups. The 
framework uses a rights approach as elucidated by Marshall (1950) which makes it grounded 
in the doctrine of entitlements as propounded by Sen (1981). The transformative approach is 
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long term oriented and seeks to pursue policies that integrate individuals equally into society, 
allowing everyone to take advantage of the benefits of growth and enabling excluded or 
marginalized groups to claim their rights (Devereux et al 2004). Using this approach 
transformative interventions are those aimed at addressing power imbalances that create or 
sustain economic inequality and social exclusion, and include legal and judicial reform, 
budgetary analysis and reform, the legislative process, policy review and monitoring, and social 
and behavioural/attitudinal change (Ibid). It is from this understanding that the FTLRP can be 
considered as an ex ante social protection tool that addressed power imbalanced which 
engendered or maintain economic inequality and social exclusion.  
 
8.3 Land reform as a social protection tool 
In addressing the FTLRP as a tool that brings about social protection, scholars like Scoones et 
al (2010), Mkodzongi (2013), Zikhali (2012), Mutopo et al (2012) have looked at the land 
reform from a livelihoods perspective. In line with the foregoing viewpoint, Mbwadzwo-
Siangombe et al (2014) have argued that land is a key asset in sustaining livelihoods and 
ensuring human security.  The scholars argue that access to land determines who lives or dies 
(Yeros 2001: 87; King and Murray, 2002:585). Consequently, access to land has strong social, 
political and economic implications by firstly guaranteeing protection from danger and any 
form of vulnerability. Sacco (2008: 368) corroborates this argument by noting that land reform 
in Zimbabwe is a means to achieve economic, social and cultural rights as well as fulfil the 
right to development as a means for achieving poverty reduction. 
 
Moser (1998) argues that having assets increases household ‘resilience, or responsiveness in 
exploiting opportunities, and in resisting or recovering from the negative effects of changing 
environment.’ The means of resistance are the assets and entitlements that individuals, 
households, or communities can mobilize and manage in the face of hardship. While in 
outlining what she considers as assets, land was not part of the list, the same argument holds 
even more when households have land, which Bardhan (1996) considered as a productive asset. 
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8.3.1 Shelter from vulnerability 
One of the fundamental issues that easily expose households to vulnerability is access to 
shelter. Using the Marshall’s narrative of social rights, shelter is a right which when not 
provided, households will be subjected to serious detriments which can harm life itself 
(Mbwadzwo-Siangombe et al, 2014). This research observed that all land beneficiaries erected 
houses for themselves using bricks which they had moulded themselves. They thatched the 
houses from the grass which they had collected from the farm where they had been settled. In 
the early years of settling, the farmers were reluctant in building high cost structures because 
they were uncertain about the length of time they were going to be allowed on the farms. When 
the government addressed tenure issues and promulgated the Statutory Instrument (SI) 53 of 
2014. The Instrument replaced offer letters which the government had given to the A1 farmers 
and 99 year leases that were issued to A2 farmers. The farmers would hold the land indefinitely. 
Tenurial guarantees prompted the farmers to develop lasting structures since the SI provides 
for compensation to farmers for any development made, should the state consider taking the 
land back. 
Figure 8.1: Land Reform beneficiaries’ residency on the farms 
 
Source: Own fieldwork, 2015 
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With the security which the SI guaranteed, farmers were at liberty to erect houses of their 
interests and budgets. The graph above shows that most of the beneficiaries of land reform 
reside on the farms they were allocated. In Bonstead Villages 12 and 13, the research observed 
that all the beneficiaries were resident on the farms where they do not pay any rentals or any 
bills that are related to accommodations such as water, electricity (primarily because all the 
households in the villages do not have electricity) and sewerage (this is because the farmer 
constructed Blair toilets).  In an interview with one farmer from Umlala Farm, she noted that: 
The problem of accommodation was solved by the land reform. What remains is for us 
to build ourselves good houses and toilets… In-depth Interview, 11/04/2015, Female 
A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm).  
Another farmer from Sherwood Farm noted that: 
Constructing accommodation for my family did not present any major challenges. The 
grass for thatching is there, for the bricks, we moulded for ourselves, for poles, we got 
from the forest. There is no reason that I could have given if I had not constructed my 
accommodation (In-depth Interview, 21/05/2015, Male A2 Farmer, Sherwood Farm).  
The conversations with the farmers demonstrated that constructing a basic shelter was not 
expensive as most of the raw materials needed are obtainable within their vicinity at little costs. 
As a result, there is no land reform beneficiary who can be stranded, without accommodation 
as long as they remain on their land.  
 
8.3.2 Food  
Golay et al (2013) argue that access to food is a human right enshrined in human rights 
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Article 11 of the ICESCR notes 
that ‘the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, 
including adequate food…’ as well as ‘the fundamental right of everyone to be free from 
hunger…’ While this scholar acknowledges the problematics that exist in the conceptual 
grounding of the above cited human rights instruments, it is important to note that the 
Zimbabwean government ratified the ICESCR and produces periodic reports on the progress 
of its implementation.  
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This research observed that while some of the beneficiaries FTLRP may not have cash some 
of the times, they would still manage to have balanced meals. This is because in the rainy 
season, there would be plenty of vegetables and fruits accessible to them. Because of 
communitarianism that exists among these communities, households are able to cushion each 
other by sharing grain, salt, productive equipment and livestock produce like milk. The table 
below proves this point that households are able to produce their own food where 96.9 percent 
of the A1 farmers and 93.9 percent of A2 produce their own food. 18.8 per cent of A1 depend 
on food aid for some of their nutritional intake (against 2.7 per cent of A2 farmers) and 24.5 
per cent depend on grain loan scheme. What this would suggest is that while 96.9 per cent of 
A1 farmers (for instance) engage in own food production, the food produced is not sufficient 
in many instances to meet their nutritional requirements. Dependence on food aid and food for 
work is higher in the communal areas but significantly lower in the land reform areas.  
Table 8.1: Household Source of food by settlement type in Kwekwe District 
Source of food A1 A2 Communal 
% % % 
Percentage of farmers who produce their own food 96.9 93.9 93.4 
Percentage of farmers who purchase their food 96.4 97.3 94.3 
Percentage of farmers who rely on food aid 18.8 2.7 48.1 
Percentage of farmers who rely on food for work 7.9 2.0 18.0 
Percentage of farm workers who rely on food rations from 
employer 
1.9 7.8 2.5 
Percentage of farmers who rely on grain loan scheme 24.5 2.4 13.6 
Source: Adapted from AIAS Survey, 2013/14 
Table 8.1 shows that grain loan scheme is higher among A1 farmers. A2 farmers are the least 
beneficiaries of this scheme. The scheme is a government initiative to provide food for the 
farmers who would have been affected by a drought. Since it’s a loan, the farmers are expected 
to return the grain when they have a good harvest. Figure 8.2 demonstrates that land reform 
beneficiaries are doing much better than their communal areas counterparts in terms of taking 
three meals a day. 
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Figure 8.2: Number of meals consumed per day by settlement type in Kwekwe District 
 
Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2013/14 
 
8.4 Beyond livelihood diversification to accumulation 
Devereux (2001) argued that dependence on a single crop for food or cash introduces 
unpredictable vulnerability to a collapse in production or price of such food or cash crop. He 
further argued that pursuing an undiversified livelihood strategy matters less if the source of 
income is secure and stable than if it is subject to uncertainty or inter-temporal fluctuation. This 
notion is corroborated by Scoones (2009) who argued that ‘diversity is the watchword, and 
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diversification as a survival strategy (which it very often is) and diversification that feeds into 
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As has been noted earlier (see Chapter 7), gold panning is the key non-agricultural activity 
which the farmers are involved in. This activity enables land beneficiaries to get substantial 
money to ensure accumulation as Razavi (2006) noted. Using the proceeds of gold panning, 
some of the farmers have gone beyond livelihoods to accumulation of productive assets like 
trucks, cattle, goats, equipment for farming like ploughs and farming inputs. Some of the 
farmers have managed to improve their quality of life through the proceeds of gold panning. 
To demonstrate this transition from just livelihoods to accumulation, one farmer from 
Sherwood farm noted that: 
Gold panning has really changed my life. I have managed to buy a vehicle that I use as 
a taxi operating in this farming community to take people to town (In-depth Interview, 
27/05/2015, Male, Sherwood Farm).  
Another farmer noted that: 
I bought new sofas for my house in town. I also bought my wife a fridge that she wanted. 
I managed to pay fees for my child who is at university (In-depth Interview, 14/06/2015, 
Male, Sherwood Farm).  
Another farmer noted that he had bought a truck as a strategic asset which he hires out for 
farmers to take their products to town. These testimonies demonstrate that beyond livelihood 
on the farms, the farmers are engaged in accumulation which is improving their quality of life 
as noted by Sen (2005). Beyond the enterprise activities noted above where farmers are 
exploiting the natural resources that are at their disposal, these households also receive income 
from other sources as outlined in the table below: 
Table 8.2: Source of Household Income by Settlement Type in Kwekwe District  
Source of Income A1 A2 Communal 
% % % 
% of farmers getting remittances from Diaspora 16.4 16.7 23.5 
% of farmers getting local remittances 21.7 19.6 32.6 
% of farmers on pension 16.5 28.6 7.0 
% of farmers in formal employment 12.9 31.3 13.0 
% of farmers relying on selling forestry products 4.6 0.7 2.9 
% of farmers relying on selling their labour on a 
permanent basis 
1.5 0.0 1.3 
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% of farmers relying on selling their labour on a casual 
basis 
8.6 1.0 19.0 
% of farmers relying on petty trading 9.9 7.9 9.2 
% of farmers on commercial loans 1.3 2.8 0.6 
% of farmers who sold their assets 1.5 1.4 1.6 
% of farmers on NGO Grant 1.9 0.0 4.1 
Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2013/14 
For A1 farmers, 21.7 per cent of land beneficiaries get financial support from children who are 
around the country. These send money to assist with subsistence and also the hiring of labour 
and equipment for production. One farmer in Umlala Farm noted that: 
For me, my children send me money several times. If I get into any trouble financially, 
I just send a WhatsApp message telling them that I need help. One child can send twenty 
dollars, another one ten dollars and so forth. But it is not my desire to trouble them 
because I know that they have families of their own (In-depth Interview, 09/04/2015, 
Female, Umlala Farm).  
Another farmer affirmed this AIAS finding by citing a Shona proverb: 
…isn’t it is said nurture them, they will nurture you in future. It’s their turn to support 
me when things are not well) (In-depth Interview, 12/04/2015, Male, Umlala Park). 
The foregoing show that diversification of incomes for land beneficiaries includes remittances 
from children who usually are working in towns. This argument builds on the earlier 
observation that the average age of the land beneficiaries is above 55 years of age. 
 
Table 8.2 also shows that a significant number (31.3%) of A2 farmers are still in formal 
employment. Besides farming, this group of A2 farmers sustains its livelihoods through formal 
employment. As noted in Chapter 5, these farmers use their income from formal jobs to finance 
their agriculture. Their ability to access that income helps them acquire productive assets which 
enhance productivity on their farms. Since they are involved in formal employment, these are 
the farmers who hire permanent farm workers who are based at the plots.  
 
In seeking to explore the diversification of the livelihoods and streams of incomes for the land 
beneficiaries, I observed that pensions are also a key source of income. 16.5 percent of A1 
 178 
farmers and 28.6 of A2 farmers receive monthly pensions. The average pension amount for a 
former civil servant is 70USD. One farmer noted that: 
The pension really cushions me when the harvests are bad. I also use it to buy inputs 
when my children are not able to support me. Whilst the amount is not much, at least it 
helps me to meet some of my needs. I can’t be desperate when I have it… (In-depth 
Interview, 14/06/2015, Male, Sherwood Farm).  
 
8.5 Livestock as insurance 
On the one hand, livestock represent a form of accumulation for farmers. On the other hand, 
they serve as insurance when the farmer is not able to meet his or her need. Interviews with the 
farmers noted that this is usually the last resort for the farmers in the direst situations. One 
farmer noted that: 
…you will sell the livestock when all else has failed… (In-depth Interview, 
13/04/2015, Male, Umlala Park).  
Another farmer corroborated this view when he posited that: 
When you see me selling a cow, you will know that there is no other way… (In-depth 
Interview, 17/05/2015, Male, Sherwood Farm). 
Whilst the quotes from the farmers suggest depletion of assets rather than accumulation, it must 
be considered that in the absence of insurance schemes, farmers invest in livestock which they 
know have high demand. This means that when a farmer is not able to meet some of his or her 
obligation, he or she can sell a cow so that proceeds from the sale can help in meeting the need. 
Such coping mechanisms are not considered in the OECD literature. The sale of livestock 
therefore speaks to a safety net, which the farmers have created for themselves.  
Table 8.3: Livestock sale patterns in newly resettled and communal areas of Kwekwe 
District 
Type  A1 A2 Communal 
% of farmers 
who sold 
% of farmers 
who sold 
% of farmers 
who sold 
Cattle 33 53.6 16.6 
Goats 20.2 18.9 11.4 
Donkeys 0 0 6.7 
Pigs 31.6 38 28.6 
Free range chicken 17.9 15.3 18.6 
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Source: AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14  
Table 8.3 shows that cattle and broilers are the most sold livestock by A2 farmers with 53.6 
percent for each. This is because for broilers, some of the farmers are involved in poultry 
farming as another activity on the farm. For cattle, this is because A2 farming does not receive 
support from the government since these types of farms were meant for people with their own 
means. The table shows that indeed the A2 farmers have their own means through selling of 
livestock when they want to meet their needs. Most of the sale of the cattle was to finance 
agriculture. Under the A1 scheme 33 percent of the farmers sold cattle as well. Speaking to the 
agricultural extension officer of Umlala area, he noted that: 
Generally people sell their cattle for several reasons. The most common reasons are 
financing of agriculture, payment of children’s fees be it at university or high school, 
to buy food in years of droughts. In drought years, the price for cattle comes down 
because there will be many farmers selling cattle compared to years with good harvests. 
I have discovered that the farmers sell cattle as a last resort, when they do not have any 
other option… (In-depth Interview, 6/04/2015, Agricultural Extension Worker, Umlala 
Farm).  
 
Following the Moyo (2011)’s tri-modal arrangement, some of the poor farmers do not have 
cattle. These are the households that sell their labour to the better off farmers to get food in 
drought seasons like the 2007/2008 and 2011/2012 seasons. The 2014/2015 agricultural season 
was a drought year as well. I spoke to one farmer who had not harvested anything on how he 
was going to cope since he did not have any cattle. He noted that: 
In drought years, we struggle a lot. We cannot afford irrigation like some of the farmers 
in this area. Others drilled boreholes on their plots so watering their gardens is not a 
challenge. For this season, I spoke to our neighbour who harvested twenty tonnes of 
maize. Since I do not have money to pay him, my wife and I will work on his farm, for 
the grain. Of the twenty four tonnes, he said he will keep fifteen tonnes for his family 
up to the next harvest. He offered us seven tonnes in exchange for working on his plot. 
I think this is a good deal for us… (In-depth Interview, 20/05/2015, Male, A1 farmer, 
Umlala Farm).  
What can be witnessed from the above quotes is the various levels of precarity amongst the 
land reform beneficiaries. It can be noticed that exogenous factors such as droughts and 
economic crises affect these beneficiaries differently. The land beneficiaries who fall in the 
Broilers 30.8 53.6 37.5 
Layers 33.3 0 0 
Milk (Litres) 5.6 12 4.8 
Eggs 0.9 0 2.1 
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‘poor farmers’ category of the tri-modal agrarian structure bear the brunt of market failures and 
droughts. The ‘better off’ farmers usually have formal jobs in towns hence they have reliable 
sources of income which they can use to cushion themselves in times of need. The availability 
of such incomes also gives them leverage in their farming as they are able to invest in 
productive assets which the poor farmers would not be able to do. 
 
8.6 Food sovereignty and social assistance  
Food sovereignty has been defined by Via Campesina (2007)’s Declaration, as: 
Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food 
produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define 
their own food and agriculture systems. It puts those who produce, distribute and 
consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of 
markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of the next generation. 
It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and food regime, 
and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems determined by local 
producers. Food sovereignty prioritises local and national economies and markets and 
empowers peasant and family farmer-driven agriculture, artisanal fishing, pastoralistled 
grazing, and food production, distribution and consumption based on environmental, 
social and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that 
guarantees just income to all peoples and the rights of consumers to control their food 
and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage our lands, territories, waters, 
seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. Food 
sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men 
and women, peoples, racial groups, social classes and generations. (Via Campesina, 
2007) 
As can be deciphered from the definition, food sovereignty is about the right of a household, 
community and nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods 
respecting cultural and productive diversity. The concept addresses questions of power, 
complicity, and the profundity of a commitment to egalitarianism. Food sovereignty is different 
from food security. Below, FAO (1996) defines food security as: 
Food security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels [is 
achieved] when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, 
safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy life. (FAO 1996 cited in FAO 2003) 
The definition shows that food security is primarily concerned with food provisioning, without 
interrogating the power relations in the production of the food. Food sovereignty addresses the 
autonomy of food production. In view of this, I observed that most land beneficiaries produce 
their own food. The number of land beneficiaries who rely on social assistance programmes is 
relatively smaller than that of communal areas. International agencies and non-governmental 
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organisations had been reluctant to provide social assistance through food aid to land 
beneficiaries because they considered the land that had been redistributed as contested land 
(Moyo 2011a). Furthermore, assisting the farmers who had obtained land was considered as an 
act of legitimising the FTLRP. Be that as it may, 16.3 per cent of A1 land beneficiaries (refer 
to table below) received food aid from NGOs.14 The number is significantly smaller for A2 
farmers where only 4.4 percent received food aid. This can be attributed to diversity of streams 
of incomes for A2 farmers ranging from remittances, employment, pensions, livestock and 
exploitation of natural resources. 
Table 8.4: Number of households receiving food aid by settlement type in Kwekwe District 
Households receiving food aid A1 A2 Communal 
% % % 
Yes 16.3 4.4 41.1 
No 83.7 95.6 58.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: AIAS Household Baseline Survey, 2013/14 
Table 8.4 shows that 16.3 per cent of A1 households and 4.4 of A2 households receive food 
aid from NGOs with 41.1 percent from the communal areas. This data is consistent with other 
data which shows that there are higher levels of vulnerability in the communal areas relative to 
the land reform areas.  
 
8.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have presented data to show that land reform is an ex ante social protection 
instrument.  I demonstrated that even in droughts and periods of economic crises, the severity 
of vulnerability is reduced for land beneficiaries.  The vulnerability is reduced due to one 
immediate social protection outcome of the FTLRP being the opportunity for reliable shelter. 
I presented evidence of land beneficiaries who have made the resettled areas their home where 
they do not have to pay any accommodation costs. Another outcome that has been noted in this 
chapter is potential of food sovereignty for the land beneficiaries. The land beneficiaries can 
use the land to produce food for their families, grow gardens, and establish other income 
streams such as inter alia, selling firewood, selling grass for thatching houses, gold panning 
and moulding bricks. I also observed that livestock is a form of insurance against the vagaries 
of the market and other exogenous factors which may affect the farmers. While livestock is a 
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form of accumulation, it is also a form of insurance when farmers are in dire straits. The farmers 
can sell their cattle, goats or chickens to get the money they may need for other things. They 
can also do batter trade in exchange of the products they need. Lastly, they can use the livestock 
for food. 
 
Overall, I discovered that there are different levels of precarity amongst the farmers. These 
levels are characterised according to the tri-modal agrarian structure as posited by Moyo 
(2011). As a result, the farmers are affected differently by such things as droughts and 
economic crises. Farmers who fall into the first category of poor peasants are the hardest hit by 
droughts and economic crises. This is because they do not have diversified livelihoods that are 
sustainable. More often, they end up selling their labour to those with diversified livelihoods. 
Land beneficiaries who receive remittances from their children and are on pensions had lower 
levels of precarity compared to the land beneficiaries who do not have any reliable streams of 
incomes. Despite the challenges which farmers in resettlement areas faced, their levels of 
precarity were lower than their communal areas counterparts. This is based on the statistics of 
food aid recipients in a particular year; these were more in the communal areas than in the 
resettlement areas. Further, the AIAS survey showed that land beneficiaries in the resettlement 
areas indicated that they ate three meals on an average day whilst in communal areas the 
average number of meals per day was two. 
 
In the next chapter, I will look at the social cohesion outcomes of the FTLRP. The purpose of 
the chapter will be to interrogate the extent of social solidarity amongst the land beneficiaries 
in the process of nation building.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9: SOCIAL COHESION 
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A nation is a goal rather than an actuality. Put simply, nations are not creatures of ‘God’s 
hand’, as post-Herder prophets of nationalism often claimed: instead they are synthetic—they 
have to be created in a complicated educational process. 
(Alter, 1989:21) 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter interrogates the social cohesion outcome of the FTLRP in the context of social 
policy. In the chapter, I acknowledge that there has been a lot of academic attention on this 
subject by several scholars. The difference with my approach is that I look at the social 
cohesion outcomes using social policy lenses. I start the chapter by delving into the conceptual 
issues concerning social cohesion. I used Jenson (1998)’s conceptualisation which posits that 
there is vertical cohesion and horizontal cohesion. In the context of this research, horizontal 
cohesion will look at how land beneficiaries relate with each other, especially in view of the 
fact that the FTLRP brought people of different backgrounds, religious beliefs and value 
systems to be neighbours. Horizontal cohesion also explores the land beneficiaries’ agency and 
solidarity in addressing common problems. Vertical cohesion will attend to how the land 
beneficiaries mobilise each other to engage with institutional mechanisms that are established 
in these communities. Such mechanisms include state, political parties and traditional authority 
structures. I end the chapter by looking at one of the institutions that has significantly facilitated 
cohesion in the resettled areas, the church and mutual aid societies that emerge from it.  
 
9.2 What is social cohesion? 
Jenson (1998) posits that the concept of social cohesion was popularised by one of the “fathers” 
of sociology, Émile Durkheim. Durkheim’s writings at the end of the 19th century, in a Europe 
that had been shaken for several decades by rapid social change associated with 
industrialisation, urbanisation, massive immigration and population movement across Europe 
changed social roles in that context. She observed that interdependence was sine qua non in 
the complex division of labour that existed where shared principles and expectations could be 
fostered by well-functioning institutions such as formal state law and markets (Jenson, 1998). 
Several scholars have sought to build on Durkheim’s work by unpacking how interdependence, 
which translates to social cohesion happens in different contexts (see Albert, 1953, 
Bettenhausen, 1991; Carron, 1982; Cartwright, 1968; Doreian  and Fararo, 1998; Drescher et 
al, 1985; Evans and Jarvis, 1980; Hogg, 1992; Kellerman, 1981; Levine and Moreland, 1990; 
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Lott and Lott, 1965; McPherson  and Smith-Lovin, 2002; Mudrack, 1989; Shaw, 1981; Stein, 
1976).  
 
Despite the much attention on the subject of social cohesion, there have not been consensus on 
its definition (Jenson, 1998: 17; Chan et al, 2006). Various scholars take different approaches 
in defining it. Those scholars that take a social psychological approach emphasize on 
individual’s attitudes and behaviours in relation to membership of a society or community 
(Friedkin, 2004). Some scholars take a horizontal dimension to looking at social cohesion. This 
approach focuses more on cohesion within civil society (see Lockwood, 1992; Maxwell, 
1996:13; Chiweshe, 2011). Other scholars focus on the vertical dimensions of social cohesion 
where the attention will be on the relationships between the state and its institutions with the 
citizen (see Mkodzongi, 2013). Chan et al (2006: 290) however tried to combine all these 
approaches in their definition of social cohesion: 
social  cohesion  is  a  state  of  affairs concerning both  the  vertical  and the  horizontal  
interactions among members  of society as  characterized by a  set  of  attitudes  and  
norms  that  includes trust, a  sense  of belonging and  the willingness to participate and 
help, as  well  as  their  behavioural manifestations [emphasis added]. 
 
Chan et al’s definition recognises the various levels of interactions that exist firstly amongst 
the individuals within a given locality and the coming together of these individuals to engage 
with the outside world which includes the state and capital. The definition includes both 
objective and subjective components of social policy (Ibid). The former alludes to people’s 
actual participation, cooperation, and inclusion in community initiatives. The latter refers to 
the norms and subjective feelings of trust, a sense of belonging, and the willingness to help 
others (Bollen and Hoyle, 2001).   
 
One of the ingredients that ensure cohesion of any community is social capital. Jane Jacobs in 
her seminal work titled The Economy of Cities (1994), cites Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s argument 
that successful communities have a glue called social capital, which attracts. This glue is 
composed of, for example, cultural amenities, safety, health care, and sociability. In this view, 
social capital is almost “infrastructural” (Jacobs, 1994). Bourdieu (1986:249) conceives of 
social capital as one of four  key  forms  of  capital,  along  with  economic,  cultural  (embodied,  
objectified  or institutional) and symbolic. He defines social capital as:  
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The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance 
and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each 
of its  members  with  the  backing  of  the  collectively  owned  capital,  a credential‘ 
which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word (Bourdieu 1986: 249–
250).  
Social capital is thus a collective asset that grants members social credits ‘that can be used as 
capital to facilitate purposive actions (Glover and Parry, 2005:452). Social relations, in this 
fashion, constitute useful resources for actors through processes such as establishing 
obligations, expectations and trustworthiness, creating channels for information, and setting 
norms backed by efficient sanctions (Burt, 2000; Coleman, 1988; Putman, 2000). Chiweshe 
(2011) analysed the institutions that were formed in the aftermath of the FTLRP using this 
perspective. The challenge however of using the social capital approach in analysing the social 
formations that happened after the FTLRP is that social capital focuses primarily on the  
individual  and group  levels, like  the  networks  maintained by each  individual  and  the 
personal benefits  that  flow  from  them. This analysis falls short in appreciating the cohesion 
in a particular community since the latter is a holistic way of looking at the relations and is 
mainly concerned with the overall condition of the community (Chan et al, 2006). 
 
Looking at social cohesion is instructive to appreciating the FTLRP as a social policy tool. 
Social cohesion is linked to T.H. Marshall’s thesis on citizenship. He argued that ‘citizenship 
is essentially a matter of ensuring that everyone is treated as a full and equal member of society’ 
(Kymlicka and Norman, 1995: 285). Central to the citizenship thesis, is the role of social 
institutions, both formal and informal in ensuring the dignity of each citizen. This concept 
dovetails with Jenson’s (1998: 15-17) five dimensions of social cohesion in that citizenship 
inculcates a sense of belonging while being inclusive and ensuring that there is meaningful 
participation of the citizenry in processes that affect their lives.15 For many of those who use 
the concept of citizenship, belonging (that is, having the status of full citizen) includes attention 
to distributional questions, social justice, and equity. Only full citizens can be said to enjoy real 
equality of opportunity (Noël, 1996; Jenson and Phillips, 1996; and McAll, 1995). 
 
9.3 Social cohesion in the African context 
In the African setting, several scholars have done some work in appreciating social cohesion 
of their contexts (see Rahmato, 1992; Mbembe, 1992; Mamdani, 1996; Murisa, 2010; 
 186 
Mkodzongi, 2013; Chiweshe, 2011; Mafeje, 1993, 1997, and 2003). In these studies, three 
critical facets have emerged on the subject:  
(i) the nature of local authority (Mamdani, 1996),  
(ii) the manner in which rural communities organise  themselves  for  production  and  
consumption  (Mafeje,  1993,  1997,  2003),   
(iii) The role of associational forms in redefining social organisation (Rahmato, 1991). 
 
Archie Mafeje (1993, 1997 and 2003) argued that the dominant form of rural sociability in 
rural Africa  is  in  some  form  of  a  structural  relationship  within  a  lineage  grouping  and  
an ethnic clan. At the helm of the customary model is the office of the chief and its subordinate 
structures. The organisation for access to natural resources, production and consumption is 
based on principles  of  inclusion  in  or  exclusion  from  the  clan  or  lineage  group. The 
hierarchy of institutions within the traditional framework establishes criteria for access to land 
and also the norms for defending these land rights (Murisa, 2010). The clan asserts political 
and ritual rights over land,  followed  by  the  lineage,  which  establishes  concrete  claims  
over  land supported  by  actual  ties  of  consanguinity  and  corporate  interests,  and  finally  
use  rights conferred  on  the  household,  in  most  instances  through  the  male  household  
head.  Only the products of social labour such as crops and livestock are objects of 
appropriation (Mafeje, 2003:3). 
 
9.4 Social organisation in the aftermath of the FTLRP 
The social organisation that existed prior to the FTLRP was interfered with. A criticism of the 
process by some scholars notes that the FTLRP led to the ‘unravelling’ of local state institutions 
(Hammar, 2003 and Alexander, 2006:187). As a result, there was a makeover in the political 
and social organisation of the resettled areas. Chiefs and war veterans emerged as key actors 
in the resettled areas’ polity with a lot of authority over land since they led some of the land 
occupations. Local government structures such as Village Development Committees 
(VIDCOs), Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and District Administrators (DAs) 
had to contend with having to share their role over rural administration with war veterans and 
chiefs who in some places had become powerful political figures (Mkodzongi, 2013). Murisa 
(2010), Chiweshe (2011) and Mkodzongi (2013) delved in details about the relationship that 
formed between local state structures and the traditional authority structures as they overlapped 
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in their interface in the resettled areas. Murisa used a social economy approach in appreciating 
the vertical and horizontal relationships that now exist. His thesis explores the association-
based economic initiatives founded on solidarity, autonomy and citizenship. In the horizontal 
dimension, he provides analysis of the way the farmers relate to each other, how they resolve 
their conflicts and how they collaborate to ameliorate common challenges. In the vertical 
dimension, he traces the formation of local governance structures and how they are relating 
with the traditional structures that existed already in Goromonzi and Zvimba Districts. It is 
instructive to note that the dynamics which took place in these districts are not generally similar 
to those in Kwekwe District even though the state structures are similar, which would suggest 
that the organisations are products of local agencies exercised by the beneficiaries.  
 
Chiweshe (2011)’s thesis primarily looks at the taxonomy of the horizontal dimension social 
institutions which resettled land beneficiaries came up with. His focus provides details on the 
aspects of membership and the dynamics which happen in the informal social institutions which 
the farmers established. This approach is beneficial in appreciating the level of cooperation that 
exists amongst the farmers. It however falls short in answering the cohesion question since the 
latter requires an interrogation of all social cohesion dimensions as elucidated by Jenson 
(2008). While Mkodzongi (2013) straddles all the dimensions of social cohesion, his main 
focus is on livelihoods, which I have dealt with earlier in this thesis. The section below looks 
at the social cohesion as a social policy function, recognising both the horizontal and vertical 
dimensions of social cohesion. 
 
9.5 Strangers all around! 
The FTLRP brought together people who came from different backgrounds and classes, and 
had different value systems. The resettlement program randomly brought land beneficiaries 
from different classes, belief systems and backgrounds to be neighbours. Dekker and Kinsey 
(2011: 6) observed that, besides living as neighbours, ‘the new inhabitants had to solve various 
problems of collective action together relating to natural resource management, inputs for 
agricultural production … and the management of risk and uncertainty’. The graph below 
shows places of origin for Kwekwe District land beneficiaries.  
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Figure 9.1: Place of origin of land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District 
 
Source: Adapted from AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14 
 
It is worth noting that the majority of the land beneficiaries came from the communal areas 
within the district. This however does not mean that they knew each other or had social 
relations. The variable that brought in interesting dynamics on the graph above is the 
percentage of beneficiaries who came from urban areas.   For those who were formally 
employed, they were coming from a general worldview characterised by a well-defined 
relationship between the individual and capital. The ethos for survival and cohesion can be said 
to be generally different between the communal areas and the urban areas. Bringing together 
people with such different worldviews in relation to cooperation, problem solving and 
adherence to norms and practices of the area as dictated by a chief and his surrogates posed 
challenges to land beneficiaries. Mkodzongi (2013) observed these dynamics when he noted 
that the ‘relationships among newly resettled households have been dynamic, influenced also 
by their heterogeneity based on class, ethnicity and geographical location’.  
 
Compounding the new neighbours’ relationship is an aspect of competition in accessing 
livelihoods opportunities linked to the land. This created tacit animosity amongst the land 
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beneficiaries. These can be epitomised by one farmer in Sherwood Farm who complained that 
their neighbour, an A2 farmer:  
… has a big problem. When my cattle get into his field, even when it’s out of season 
with no crop on his field, he close the cattle in his kraal then he would demand a chicken 
for the cattle to be released. Where have you seen something like that? What kind of 
co-existence is that with others? He thinks of himself too much as a ‘white man’16 
because he stays in town] (In-depth Interview, A1 Farmer, Sherwood Farm, 18/07/15).  
As Mkodzongi (2013) noted, the relationships at first were not so romantic among what has 
been called the ‘land occupation movement’ by Moyo and Yeros (2005). It can still be said, 
even after fifteen years, that the relations are not overly characterised by solidarity and 
camaraderie. There is still competition and more complex issues like witchcraft, political 
polarity and conflict of values amongst the resettled farmers.  
 
9.6 Witchcraft  
Everything connected with witchcraft takes place in a fantasy realm which is, almost ex 
hypothesi, intangible and beyond empirical verification (Nadel, 1952). In my interaction with 
the land beneficiaries, this subject kept coming up. It is a tacit element that compromises the 
‘glue’ (Jacobs, 1994) that strengthens cohesion and collaboration for livelihood and 
production. Since this is difficult to prove, there have been accusations and counter accusations 
amongst the land beneficiaries. In one instance, three houses were struck by lightning (maenza) 
after an altercation amongst the neighbours. Could this has been coincidence or pure super 
natural powers that summoned the lightning to strike specific houses? When the lightning 
struck, the farmer lost all the valuables that were in the house since it was thatched by grass. 
From the victim’s perspective, the issue was a result of a GMB policy. GMB has a policy where 
more agricultural inputs are given to those farmers who would have sold their produce to them. 
In this particular instance, three farmers from Umlala Farm had sold more tonnes of maize to 
GMB than the rest of the land beneficiaries in Umlala Farm. So GMB gave these three farmers 
more inputs compared to what every other farmer got in Umlala Farm. This did not auger well 
with a farmer who registered his disapproval at what GMB had done.  
 
The following day when it was raining, lightning struck the homes of all the three farmers who 
had gotten more inputs. For one of the farmers, the lightning struck the very house where the 
inputs had been put. They were all destroyed by the fire. I mapped out how far the three houses 
which were struck by lightning were, I noted that the houses were on average 5 kilometres 
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apart. There was no possible explanation how lightning that struck at the same time would 
affect the houses in different locations at the same time whilst leaving other houses in between. 
This issue boggled the land beneficiaries in Umlala. One of the three farmers’ sentiments to 
this were telling: 
Up to now, I can’t understand how lightning can strike my home, leave the next four 
households and strike another one, then leave seven houses to strike the third one at the 
same time! I was greatly afraid. I am convinced that it was Gavi who did it because he 
is the one who said a lot of things when we got inputs from GMB. The whole 
neighbourhood was afraid. This was really a lesson because we don’t know where some 
of these people here came from. They could have been chased away from their villages 
because of witchcraft… [indepth Interview, A1 Farmer, Umlala Farm, 27/06/2015] 
 
Another farmer raised similar witchcraft concerns during an informal discussion. He noted that 
he had harvested 20 bags in the 2014/2015 season which was a drought year when the rest of 
the farmers had harvested, on the average, 5 bags. He noted that he was afraid of putting his 
maize cobs in a ngarani17 where everyone would see the amount of maize he had gotten. He 
said he feared to be labelled a witch that uses goblins to get maize from other people’s fields. 
As a result, when he harvested his crop, he did not put it in a ngarani, instead, he put in a house 
where the sun could not reach. The maize then took long to dry up. Mr. Gwanya’s experience 
shows that there are a lot of suspicions amongst some of the farmers.  
 
It is noteworthy that I did not find these issues among A2 farmers in this area. This is primarily 
because they are not as close to the rest of the A1 land beneficiaries. The issues of conflict 
amongst the land beneficiaries were more pronounced also amongst the villagised land 
beneficiaries. This can be attributed to proximity. Because of their proximity to each other, the 
likelihood of crossing each other’s paths is high. Some of the conflicts are caused by livestock 
getting into the neighbour’s field. The animosity could be caused by the children beating each 
other as they play. The foregoing horizontal dimension of social cohesion narrative serves as a 
testament that it is not all romantic amongst the land beneficiaries. 
9.7 Agency and norms of solidarity 
When there is need to address common challenges, the people are able to put aside their 
differences for common good. This notion is affirmed by Rahmato (1992:27) when he noted 
that men and women often find common ground to work together and establish networks that 
work as a form of insurance against hard times. Giddens (1984) posited that ‘agency depends 
heavily upon the emergence of a network of actors who become enrolled in the project of some 
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other person’. Murisa (2007: 5) argues that within the context of the FTLRP, agency is 
‘concerned with how rural households respond both collectively and individually to the 
opportunities and constrains that have the potential to alter their way of living’ (Murisa 2007: 
5). In view of this conceptualisation of agency, there have been several collective efforts by 
the land beneficiaries in trying to address constraints that affect their ways of life. 
 
9.7.1 The water project at Umlala farm 
At Umlala Farm, one of the major challenges which the farmers had to grapple with was that 
they were resettled on dry land which was not under irrigation. This meant that they had to rely 
on the rains which have been erratic in the recent past. Not only did they need the water for 
irrigation, they needed is also for home use. As such, a lot of time was lost with family members 
going to fetch water from as far away as five kilometres.  The opportunity that exists however 
is that there is Sebakwe River that is hardly 5 kilometres away.  Seven farmers took the 
initiative, with the blessing of the headman whom they elected, to call for a meeting to discuss 
how they were going to address the water challenge. Mr Gambu, an A2 farmer led the process 
of bringing the farmers together. This was also because his farm is central for farmers to attend 
the meeting. Several meetings were held and there was consensus on the need to have a 
mechanism to pull water from the river. One of the farmers was tasked with getting quotations 
for a water pump and the pipes needed for the water to reach each household that was interested. 
It took too long for the quotations to come as the identified potential service providers needed 
to visit the place before giving a quotation. Several quotations were sought. A meeting was 
called to discuss the way forward when the figures were now known for drawing water from 
the river to interested farmers’ plots. The arrangement which was made was that each farmer 
would pay pro rata since some of the farmers were not as far from the river as others. The 
cheapest cost for buying a water pump and installation of water pipes to Umlala Farm was 
almost USD20 000. Some of the farmers were willing to contribute to this amount. Others did 
not have it. In a focus group discussion, one farmer retorted: 
I really wanted water to come to my house and farm but the cost was beyond my reach. 
I did not have a clue of where I would get the money. If I were to sell cattle, I would 
have sold the whole herd. So I opted out of the project. It then never took off. We should 
try it later when we shall have good harvest… [FGD at Umlala Farm, 27/06/2015] 
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The water project was not completed. Several efforts were made by the farmers to their 
members of parliament to support the initiative and the politicians made empty promises. In 
his frustration, one farmer in the FGD decried: 
Ah these politicians, they make promises which they can’t keep. We had done our 
homework and all we needed was USD20 000 which is not a lot of money to them, 
especially if you compare with the impact that will come out of it! We will keep on 
reminding them towards elections. I’m sure they will deliver, since they want our 
votes… [FDG at Umlala Farm, 27/06/2015] 
 
While the desire to draw water from the river was there, the initiative brought together A1 and 
A2 farmers whose means were not the same. The A2 farmers could contribute to the cost that 
was needed but with their means they still could not do it alone. The A1 farmers who were 
interested could not contribute the cost that was needed. As a result, the project did not see the 
light of day. The need for water amongst land beneficiaries was also captured by Scoones et 
al, (2010: 84) when they noted that: 
When the land was taken there was little water and sanitation infrastructure, although 
the former ranches occasionally had some small scale irrigation near the main house 
farm, which also had running water and toilet facilities. Elsewhere there were scattered 
cattle troughs, possibly a dip and sometimes some small dams. In other words, the 
infrastructure was not set up for settlement. As a result the new settlers have had to 
invest substantially in the development of water and sanitation facilities across the 
schemes. In the absence of external support, this has almost exclusively been done 
through the settlers’ own efforts. The investments have been substantial.  
While the Umlala Farm water initiative failed, the farmers use similar mechanisms to help 
each other in accessing inputs, relevant information, sharing of productive assets and in some 
instances sharing cooking ingredients such as salt and cooking oil.  
 
9.7.2 The secondary school project in Sherwood Farm 
In the research areas, I observed that there were no secondary schools. This could be attributed 
to the legacies of the white capitalist farmers who chose to build primary schools only as a 
strategy to reproduce labour for their farms through denying farm workers’ children access to 
secondary education. I observed that each farmer, or a consortium of farmers would come 
together and build primary schools for their farm workers’ children. In Kwekwe District, no 
farmer built a secondary school in the farming communities. The available schools are in urban 
centres which is more than 30 kilometres away.  
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As such, one of the challenges which the resettled farmers had to tackle was access to secondary 
schools for their children. In Sherwood Farm, the farmers had to use as the secondary school 
the residential house in which the white farmer who previously owned the farm used to stay. 
The farmers, through their farmer group, approached the Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts 
and Culture so that they would have their school registered and get teachers with other support 
that the government provides. After several years of going back and forth, Bonstead Secondary 
School was registered in 2005. The school has qualified teachers and recently got text books 
from United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) under the Education Transition Fund (ETF).  
 
Bonstead Secondary School is provisionally using the former residential house of the white 
farmer as classrooms and teachers’ offices. In an interview with the chairperson of the School 
Development Committee, he noted that they had managed to negotiate with some farmers to 
donate part of their land for building the secondary school. The farmers then donated their 
grazing land for the school. At the time of this research, parents had moulded 84 000 bricks out 
of the 248 000 needed to complete the first phase of building the school made up of 5 classroom 
blocks and a teachers’ house. The parents, through the SDC have built a 10 hole Blair toilet. 
The parents dug the pit toilet and also carried sand from the river using their scotch carts and 
draught power. The toilet is not being used yet because the children are still attending class at 
the former white farmer’s residential house. The Rural District Council drilled a borehole at 
the school site which provides water for the construction work.  The SDC Chairperson ended 
this discussion by noting that: 
…White people built Lomagundi Private School for their children. It was the farmers 
who built it, not the government. We should do the same for our children and this school 
project is an opportunity we have to do as they did… (In-depth interview with Mr Dube 
at Sherwood Farm, 08/08/2015). 
 
9.8 Horizontal agency in action 
Murisa (2010) argues that at the centre of rural struggles for social change is a variety of 
structured and unstructured local organisations that employ both legal and illegal tactics to 
achieve their goals. This is in consonance to the observations that I made in Sherwood Farm. 
As a way of background, three white farmers, known as the Burger Brothers were not totally 
dispossessed of land. Their hectarage were reduced to 400ha each. They remained with their 
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infrastructure and equipment. A social contract was agreed on where they were supposed to 
assist the resettled farmers with equipment and mentorship. A SADC Ministerial Delegation 
which sought to understand how the land reform had happened was brought to Sherwood. 
Subsequently, the mission came up with a positive statement about how the land reform had 
happened to the dismay of the activists and scholars in the neopatrimonial camp. 
 
In informal discussions with the farmers of Sherwood area, they cited two reasons why the 
Burger Brothers were able to retain part of their farms. The first reason is that the farmers 
treated their workers well so the war veterans did not consider them as deserving to lose their 
farms. The second reason is that the Burger Brothers had built social capital with the political 
elite of the country hence they had protection. Some of the farmers I spoke to noted that the 
white farmers owe allegiance to the now vice president of the country, Emmerson Mnangagwa. 
This aspect corroborates Rahmato (1992)’s assertion that: 
Men and women would always ‘attempt to spread their personal relationships as widely 
as possible, often through marriage and other personal ties, as a form of insurance 
against hard times; this involves forming  relationships not just in one's own community 
but in others. Not infrequently, localized, small-scale disasters affect one community 
and  not another next door,  or at times  only a part of a  community with the  other 
remaining unscathed, and a peasant in dire straits but with friends or relatives untouched 
by the disaster will recover less  painfully than another without these kinds of ties.  
This assertion proved correct for the Burger Brothers. The ZANU PF Ward Chairperson for 
Sherwood area corroborated this by noting that: 
The Burger Brothers know how to live well with others. They treat our people with 
dignity, which was different from most white farmers whom we dispossessed of the 
land. Not only that, they knew how to give honour to whom it was due. When they had 
their produce, they would take some tokens to our leaders in this area, who is now the 
vice president, just to inform him that their crops are ripe. It might look like a small 
thing but those gestures made them to be seen by party structures favourably when we 
were listing farms for occupation…(In-depth interview with ZANU PF Sherwood Ward 
Chairperson, 08/08/2015). 
 
In the first few years of settling by land beneficiaries in Sherwood area, the social contract was 
adhered to by all parties. The Burger brothers would plan for their agricultural season to include 
using their tractors for the resettled farmers and also providing irrigation equipment. The 
arrangement worked with very few glitches.  
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After a decade, there has been slackening especially on the part of the white farmer in providing 
the support they committed to deliver. One of the changing dynamics is that the resettled 
farmers have not been having inputs to use. In such a scenario, the resettled farmers get into 
informal arrangements for the Burger brothers to use the resettled farmer’s land at a cost. In 
the 2014/2015 agricultural season the Burger brothers accessed approximately 100 hectares of 
the A1 farmers who could not undertake production for themselves. For 10 hectares, the Burger 
Brothers pay USD1 500 for the season. In return, they will use the land as they wish and all the 
proceeds would be theirs. The resettled farmers tried to negotiate for an increase in the amount 
but they were not successful. For those who protested, they were left out of the deal and their 
fields were idle since they could not finance their production. About 6% of the farmers in 
Sherwood area are part of this arrangement. Most of them are dissatisfied with the arrangement. 
The land beneficiaries do not have any leveraging power to renegotiate the deal afresh. Their 
consolation is that they get some USD 1 500 per season for owning the land only, without being 
involved in any productivity. 
 
9.9 Whose water? 
Since some of these resettled farmers in Sherwood Farm are not engaged in any production, 
having leased their farms to the white farmer, they are then limited to horticulture production 
as a mechanism of fending for their families. They grow such crops as tomatoes, onions, 
vegetables and potatoes on approximately a hectare having leased about 40hectares per 
household. The challenge which faces the land beneficiaries as they do horticultural production 
is water. There is however an opportunity. The Burger Brothers, well before the FTLRP, 
constructed a water canal from Sebakwe River to cover the whole Sherwood Farm. The canal 
stretches for more than ten kilometres, passing through various fields which have now been 
allocated. The Burger Brothers invested in a powerful water pump which they worked on 
securing so that it may not be stolen. Resettled farmers take the opportunity of the flowing 
water to water their gardens. I observed that every household which is close to the canal has a 
garden with vegetables, tomatoes, onions and other vegetables.  The Burger Brothers know that 
these resettled farmers use the canal water to water their gardens. The Burger Brothers have 
tried to discourage it arguing that they pay a lot of money to pump the water for the resettled 
farmers to take it for free. One farmer in a FGD defiantly noted: 
These white people say that this canal water is theirs. Then it should not pass through 
my field. As long as the canal passes through my field, it’s my water too. They should 
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build a flying canal which does not pass through here. Then I won’t get the water. Can 
I ignore this water flowing to go and fetch in the river that is far away? They are crazy. 
I will continue to do my garden for my family using this water… [A1 Farmer in a FGD 
at Sherwood Farm, 15/08/2015] 
This confirms Murisa (2010) assertion that ‘at the centre of rural struggles for social change is 
a variety of structured and unstructured local organisations that employ both legal and illegal 
tactics to achieve their goals.’ Would this defiance by the resettled farmers be deemed as 
illegal? These are efforts which recognise the injustices that existed and seek to establish equity 
since the remaining white farmers still have an upper hand on infrastructure and equipment. 
The A1 farmers who were resettled along the canal have worked together to defy the Burger 
Brothers’ instructions for not using the water. The farmers have collaborated to negotiate with 
these white farmers so that they get favourable conditions on leasing the land as well as 
accessing water. The farmers have been using the water for their household horticultural 
gardens. I observed that along the canal, there is a green stretch where each household has a 
garden of mainly tomatoes, vegetables, onions 
 
9.10 Social organisation and agency  
This aspect has been a subject of much examination by Murisa (2010), Chiweshe (2011) and 
Mkodzongi (2013). Murisa provided conceptual grounding for rural social associations tracing 
from the colonial, to post-colonial times. He showed the overlaps between the informal 
formations and the extension of the state in the resettled areas. Chiweshe then took the 
discussion further by analysing the formation, taxonomy and membership systems of these 
rural associations. As has been noted earlier, Mkodzongi provided a critique of how these 
institutions are contributing to livelihoods of the resettled farmers. The foregoing works were 
informed by Rahmato (1991)’s appreciation of the rural communities’ nine forms of 
associations: 
1. Mutual  support networks;   
2. Welfare  associations;   
3. Societies  for  resource  mobilisation;   
4. Self-help organisations;   
5. Cooperatives;   
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6. Non-governmental  organisations;   
7. Farmer organisations;  
8. Secret societies; and  
9. Political organisations.  
The above mentioned theses confirmed the existence of most of Rahmato’s identified forms of 
association. The graph below shows that the major point of collaboration amongst the farmers 
is through the farmer groups. The farmer group is where farmers cooperate in dealing with 
common challenges and also sharing of ideas and equipment for production. Most often these 
formations seek to maximise group synergies such as improved ability to mobilise  finances  
for  travel  to  the  local  government  offices  to  request  assistance (Murisa 2010). They were 
also formed as part of an effort to improve the means by which inputs are obtained from 
government agencies. 
Figure 9.2: Cooperation among resettled households in Kwekwe District  
 
Source: Adapted AIAS Household Survey, 2013/14 
 
The farmers share animal drawn power and labour on the basis of household rapport and 
negotiation. I observed that the farmers have created a lot of synergies where they help each 
other especially with productive tools. Whilst there is a lot of sharing of productive assets, the 
graph shows that there is limited joint agricultural production (2.5%). The other area where 
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there is limited cooperation amongst the farmers is on sharing tractors. One A2 farmer who 
owns a tractor noted that: 
We can share the ploughs, cattle, hoes and labour, but one thing I will not release for 
sharing is my tractor. The reason is that the more I use it, the more it can break down 
easily. And when it breaks down, all these farmers will not contribute a dime to fixing 
it. That will be my problem. So I will keep my tractor so that it can serve me for 
longer… [In-depth interview with an A2 Farmer, Sherwood Farm, 08/08/2015]. 
 
9.10.1 The role of chiefs in social cohesion 
It can be said that one major outcome of the FTLRP is the opening up of former LSCF areas 
to the authority of chiefs and or through their surrogates. The chiefs played an important role 
in mobilising the peasantry in land occupations. In the aftermath of the FTLRP, chiefs have 
emerged as a vital part of the rural polity wielding some authority over land. The foregoing 
was corroborated by Mujere (2011:7) in their study in a southern part of Zimbabwe when he 
observed that:  
FTLRP has thus provided traditional authorities with an opportunity to pursue an 
agenda akin to land restitution as they have been making a number of claims both 
substantiated and unsubstantiated over the new settlements which they regard as their 
Matongo (old homes). 
Under the Ministry of Local Government Urban and Rural Development Act (1982), customary 
authority was limited to communal areas. The LSCF were outside their jurisdiction, a situation 
which has now changed. As a way of background, the post-independence political regime 
sought to side-line chiefs in rural administration (Moyo et al, 2009: 146). Its efforts were 
fruitless as they continued to dominate rural administration, deciding on who could get the land 
even though the Rural District Councils (RDCs) had the state authority (Herbst, 1990; Munro, 
1998 and Alexander, 2006). The government then made a shift in its policy on customary 
authority around the 1999 when traditional leaders were given the status of salaried civil 
servants through the Traditional Leaders Act’ (Moyo et al, 2009: 147). This development made 
chiefs to be in a position where they felt like they owed the government when they were 
receiving salaries and eventually got trucks for transport. The chiefs then became more like an 
extension of state machinery both in speech and execution of their bona fide responsibilities. 
 
Sherwood area was under the jurisdiction of Chief Samambwa before the current chief’s 
grandparents were driven off the land by the white farmers. Together with state agents, the 
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incumbent Chief Samambwa participated in the allocation of land in this area. In each of the 
villages, he seconded a headman from his family to stay with the people and enforce the 
traditional value systems of the area. The chief moved from Zhombe where he was based and 
established a new musha on an A2 farm that he got. He however administers his duties from 
the Zhombe home which he did not abandon completely. The urbanites who were resettled in 
this area registered reservations in offering allegiance to a chief whom they did not know or 
have kinship ties with. One A2 farmer who is based in town retorted:  
I am surprised to hear that there is a chief in this area. One of the most important 
relationship I need to maintain is with ZANU PF leadership, not with the chief. If I 
were to be evicted from my plot, can he save me? I don’t think so. So I will stay here 
on my plot and he can have his authorities everywhere, not in this plot, sorry… [Mr 
Dube, at Sherwood Farm, 08/08/2015] 
Mkodzongi observed similar attitudes towards chiefs in his study of Mhondoro-Ngezi District 
when he noted that people who had come from faraway places with no kinship ties with chiefs 
did not see any reason to submit to their authority. These people would prefer the authority of 
local state structures such as VIDCOs and WADCOs which they feel better represent their 
interests. In an interview with the chief, he expressed frustrations because he did not have 
sanctioning power for the people in the resettled areas who choose not to recognise his authority 
[In-depth Interview with Chief Samambwa at Sherwood Farm 15/08/2015]. Such people would 
prefer civil law than traditional authority. He noted that land beneficiaries who had come from 
the communal areas recognised his authority and were inclined to submit to his authority.  
 
In an interview with one of the Sabhuku (headmen) in villagised Bonstead resettlement area, 
she noted that she did not have any issues of people who would refuse to submit to her authority 
[In-depth Interview with Bonstead Headwoman at Bonstead Village 20/08/2015]. She noted 
that each household is always represented at the monthly village meetings that she calls. She 
noted that people comply with the directive that each household should donate a dollar or a 
bowl of mealie-meal when a funeral happens in the village. She noted that there were no 
incidences of revolt against her rule. It thus can be noted that in areas made of A2 farmers who 
reside in urban areas, traditional authority does not wield much influence compared to the 
villagised A1 farms where land beneficiaries are permanently based. 
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9.10.2 Role of rural authorities in fostering horizontal cohesion 
In Kwekwe District, there were contestations between the government local structures on one 
hand and chiefs with war veterans on the other hand (See Chapter 6 on how the redistribution 
process happened in Kwekwe District). The contestation of land authority can be traced to the 
onset of the land occupations in 2000 when chiefs and war veterans led the occupations and 
subsequently became figures with authority in the politics of the day over land. Local state 
structures such as Village Development Committees (VIDCOs), Ward Development 
Committees (WADCOs) and District Administrators (DAs) had to negotiate with the chiefs 
and war veterans so that they could undertake their responsibilities.  
 
In all this conundrum, ZANU PF activists played an important role in both the traditional and 
state structures at the local level. As Mkodzongi (2013:86) observed, ZANU PF patronage 
networks operated in complex ways while being influenced by a plethora of factors such as 
ethnicity, class and intra-party factional politics. He further posit that the relationship between 
ordinary people and ZANU PF structures was dynamic and influenced by prevailing factional 
politics pitting ZANU PF politicians against each other (Ibid). At the time of carrying out this 
research, ZANU PF was riddled with intra-party fights which subsequently resulted in the 
ouster of Joyce Mujuru from the party. She had formed strong networks at grassroots levels. 
Her ouster split the party as she had loyalists at every level. More than half of the cabinet 
ministers who were aligned to her were either suspended or ousted with her. Against these intra 
party conflicts, the farmers in Kwekwe District had to align themselves appropriately so that 
they would access inputs for agriculture. One farmer noted that: 
It is important not only to be known as a staunch member of the party, but also to 
be known that you are on the right side. If you get all those right, you will be safe. 
You will also be guaranteed of getting inputs and other government subsidies… 
[In-depth interview with Mr Chivhi, Umlala Farm, 7/06/2015] 
In consonance to the foregoing citation, another farmer posited: 
When I participated in the land reform, my objective was to give my family a better 
future. I will not lose focus by starting to be vocal in the politics within ZANU PF. 
If I do that, I may find myself on the wrong side then lose the opportunity of getting 
input under the presidential scheme… (In-depth Interview, 18/06/2015, Female, 
Sherwood Farm). 
The foregoing citations are epitomes of how some resettled farmers handle ZANU PF 
patronage networks as a way of negotiating access to essential government services. Since the 
input scheme is run by the president’s office, I observed that ZANU PF local leadership 
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consider it to be a strategic tool to consolidate political support for the president. This means 
that those farmers who would have shown support for either opposition political parties or intra 
ZANU PF opponents of the president would not be prioritised in getting the farming inputs.  
 
Mkodzongi (2013) corroborates this notion by arguing that some of the resettled farmers 
pretend to be ZANU PF members so that they can access essential services. He cited the 2008 
general election results where some ZANU PF candidates lost parliamentary seats in these 
resettled areas where they were expected to win overwhelmingly. After the elections, those 
areas where ZANU PF had lost became centre of focus for campaigning and witch hunting for 
opposition political party supporters.  Further, the members of the communities started 
suspecting each other of surreptitiously supporting the opposition political parties. Such 
undertones increased polarization among land beneficiaries. As land beneficiaries want to ward 
off any doubts of supporting the opposition, participation in ZANU PF meetings and projects 
increased. When community projects were called for, people availed themselves to show 
support. I observed this in the process of building Bonstead Secondary School. The ZANU PF 
ward Chairperson indicated that support from the community was overwhelming. Of course 
one of the reasons for such support would be the nature of the project, where each farmer’s 
child would benefit hence the solidarity. The other way of looking at it is the aspect of land 
beneficiaries not wanting to be considered as an outsider by party leadership of the area as 
articulated by Mkodzongi (2013).  
 
The collaboration of farmers in tackling issues that affect them is witnessed in the way which 
they leverage the relationships they have to their advantage. Sherwood Farm is where the 
current vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa was allocated land. Farmers have been taking 
advantage of the proximity to the vice president to highlight their grievances. One farmer noted 
that each week they visit the vice president’s residence to relate with his staff so that they can 
be told when he is around. This tacit lobbying has managed to get the vice president to 
appreciate the plight of the resettled farmers. Mr Maki noted that: 
We take advantage of the vice president’s vicinity to us so that we can air out our 
grievances. Some of the policies that they are implementing are detrimental to the 
farmer. How can you sign a bilateral agreement with Turkey to supply flour when we 
are producing wheat here? So the other time he was around and we highlighted this 
issue to him, saying that they should first of all see the amount of wheat that we would 
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have produced then decide on how much to import. Again they should not import flour, 
they should import wheat so that we can create employment. After we told him, the 
following week, the issue was raised in parliament. It really is an opportunity to have 
the vice president here… [In depth interview with Mr Maki at Sherwood Farm 
27/07/2015] 
The Ward Chairperson of ZANU PF corroborated this point when he noted that: 
We are very privileged to have the vice president in our area. Every time he comes to 
his farm, we take time to share with him the general sentiments of the people, how life 
is difficult and offer suggestions of what the government can do. Last time we raised 
the issue of importing flour from Turkey and hardly a month later, he raised the issue 
in parliament. During question and answer time, he asked the minister of agriculture 
about it and newspapers captured the issue. So what we raised as farmers in Sherwood 
became an issue of national debate. I heard that they are going to review the agreement 
with Turkey… [In-depth interview with ZANU PF Sherwood Ward Chairperson, 
08/08/2015]. 
 
The quotations above are an illustration of how farmers are leveraging their social capital in 
addressing some the challenges bedevilling them. I observed that the few farmers who could 
have access to the people in power would take it upon themselves to represent their counterparts 
who may not have similar access. Of the farmers who spoke about wheat important, none of 
the farmers are involved in wheat production, but it was an issue of solidarity with fellow 
farmers involved in wheat production. 
 
9.10.3 Churches and mutual aid societies 
Several churches have emerged in the resettled areas of Umlala and Sherwood. These include 
the main line churches, such as Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches, the African Apostolic 
Faith churches (popularly known as white garment) and Zionist sects. Despite their theological 
differences, they have played an essential role in promoting cohesion among the newly 
resettled households. They have been a point of assistance for resettled people lacking draught 
power such as widows and the poor. Scoones et al, (2010:71) observed this when they noted 
that: 
Religion and church affiliation have emerged as a vital component in the construction 
of social relations and networks on the new resettlements. These play an important role 
in shaping the outcomes of resettlement in terms of agricultural production, access to 
inputs and productive assets. Church affiliation has been an important source of labour, 
as settlers have contributed pooled labour based on it… these connections have been 
important for contribution of labour, draught power and other resources.  
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In Kwekwe District, I observed that mostly women have collaborated within their churches to 
form micro finance schemes locally known as mukando (mikando is plural and mukando is 
singular). A mukando is essentially a type of informal credit-rotating association in which a 
group of people enter into an agreement to contribute a fixed amount of money to a common 
pool on a weekly or monthly basis or as frequently as the members may agree upon (Schulze, 
1997). In the case of Kwekwe District, these groups have been a source of peer mentorship 
amongst the members on inter alia planning, budgeting and household management. In 
consonance with Moyo (2011)’s submission that the FTLRP created a tri-modal agrarian 
structure, I observed that mikando are organised around people of the same class, who share 
similar challenges. As a result, mikando have become a platform for solidarity and shared 
learning. Some of the initiatives of mikando have led to members of these schemes to acquire 
livestock, household groceries and other productive assets. Talking to Mai Chivhi, she noted: 
Mikando have been very helpful to me. It’s an opportunity to meet with other women 
and share ideas, and plan. Men often think that when women meet, they will be 
gossiping only. Last time when it was my turn to get the money, I bought a cow. Right 
now the cow is expecting. We however have since giving each other money because it 
has been difficult to come by. We now give each other groceries. They are helpful 
because you can use them in your house. You can also use them to pay for labour when 
planting, weeding or harvesting. We made sure also that the scheme is for people who 
share same beliefs as us because last time we opened it up to our neighbours and they 
were not faithful in making their contributions…[In-depth Interview with Mai Chivhi 
at Umlala Farm, 22/05/2015] 
As can be deciphered from the quotation above, some of the schemes have been helpful in 
acquiring productive assets and leveraging the participation of women in the rural economy. 
One woman spoke of how mikando helped her: 
We have developed trust amongst ourselves. We have time each month to share our 
plans and review our progress. It will be embarrassing to go to that meeting with 
nothing to report. This puts us under pressure since I know there will be people who 
will ask me what I would have done to develop myself and also my household. The 
way our mukando works is that we agree on what we should buy each other. Towards 
end of year, we usually do groceries so that come Christmas time, every household has 
the basics like sugar, cooking oil, soaps, mealie meal, salt, and so forth. Around 
midyear, we buy each other things that we need for the households. Last time I told my 
colleagues that I needed a plough so the money I got from mukando contributed to the 
plough we use here…[In-depth Interview, 14/05/2015, Female, A1 Farmer, Umlala 
Farm]. 
The quotes above show that the mutual assistance societies are tailor made to meet the needs 
of the members. On the average, each group has five members. The reason they limit the 
number of members is that the cycle of receiving contributions should not take too long.. Such 
 204 
initiatives have been a glue within the resettled farms and have brought households together 
and to be in solidarity with each other’s problems.  
 
9.11 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I used Jenson (1998)’s conceptualisation social cohesion which denotes that 
there is vertical and horizontal cohesion. I appreciated that several scholars had attended to the 
aspect of social cohesion outcomes of the FTLRP albeit using primarily the horizontal cohesion 
lenses. In the chapter, I showed that the FTLRP brought together people of different 
backgrounds, religious beliefs and value systems. Be that as it may, they were faced with 
similar challenges which made them to collaborate as they tried to address the challenges. I 
have noted that the land beneficiaries collaborated, in some instances, successfully whilst in 
other instances without much success.  
 
I also observed that the collaboration of the farmers transcends the categorisations which 
characterise the tri-modal agrarian structure. A1 farmers work with A2 farmers in solving 
common challenges such as water and building of schools. The building of Bonstead Secondary 
School is one example of a project where the farmers are working together to make sure that 
the school is established. This project is on the road to succeeding since most of the materials 
needed have been provided by the farmers. The success of this project is because for the A1 
farmers who are not able to provide financial contributions provide their labour. An example 
of a project that was not so successful was the Umlala Water Project. The failure of the project 
was because when financial contributions were needed, most farmers in A1 resettlement 
scheme were not able to raise the required amounts, to the frustration of the A2 farmers who 
could provide their own portion of the required amounts.  
 
The other major areas of cooperation for the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District is on sharing 
productive tools and participation in farmer groups. As a result, there has been some solidarity 
amongst the farmers as was noted in the lobbying activities done by those close to government 
leaders on behalf of those who do not have such access. One institution in horizontal cohesion 
that has played an instrumental role in bringing people together is the church. Through it, 
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members have come up with mutual aid societies (mikando) where they support each other in 
addressing challenges they face.  
 
In the next chapter, I now look at one of the instruments for development- education. The 
chapter is premised on the understanding that investment in human capability, particularly 
education, is a key factor to development.  
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CHAPTER 10: EDUCATION OUTCOMES OF THE FTLRP 
Education plays a key role in achieving moral, aesthetic, intellectual, ideological, cultural, 
social, scientific and technological development of the people in society as well as the 
national goals of unity, democracy, economic progress and security for all the country’s 
citizens. 
SENATOR DAVID COLTART 
Minister of Education, Sport, Arts and Culture 2009-2013 
 
10.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the FTLRP education outcomes. The reason for 
focusing particularly on education is that human capital development is a centrepiece in 
increasing productivity in any country. As such, in exploring the outcomes of the FTLRP, it is 
imperative to appreciate the extent of human capital investment which subsequently will lead 
to economic development as has been posited by some scholars such as Psacharopoulos (1973; 
1992) and Becker (1993). Beyond contributing to economic development through labour and 
skills, education is an entry point to increasing one’s (capability set) opportunities and options 
to realise one’s full potential. In the first section of the chapter, I provide justification on why 
we need to focus on education in looking at outcomes of FTLRP. I then provide a snapshot 
analysis of the education provisions in the national constitution. I use the Tomaševsk (2001) 
framework on assessing quality education which looks at education availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and adaptability. I argue that the major education outcome of the FTLRP was that 
it increased accessibility of both primary and secondary education in the resettled areas. Access 
to secondary education significantly increased primarily due to the absence of secondary 
schools within the farming communities prior to the land reform program. With the abrupt 
demand for education in the resettled areas, this inevitably compromised the quality of the 
education provided. Some of the factors which compromise the quality of output from the 
satellite schools include; distances which the children have to walk to and from school, poor 
welfare of the teachers thereby affecting their motivation in school, inadequate infrastructure 
and so forth. 
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10.2 Education as an ex ante social policy tool  
The post-colonial African state generally considered education as an instrument for 
development and as a means for reversing the injustices that colonial regimes had perpetuated. 
Obtaining inspiration from Theodore Schultz (1961)’s ideas on investment in human capital as 
the conduit for development, the newly independent governments saw the ‘eradication of the 
unholy trinity of ignorance, poverty, and disease’ (Mkandawire, 2005:13) as being central to 
addressing all the ills of underdevelopment Hendricks, 2007: 121). This approach was 
necessitated by the reality which nationalist governments had to face having inherited very 
weak or non-existent human resource necessary for embarking on a development project which 
would redress the colonial legacy of inequality and injustice (Adesina, 2007:9).  
 
This human resource capacity gap can be exemplified by the fact that at independence, Congo-
Kinshasa had only thirty university graduates while in Zambia, the country did not have a single 
indigenous mining engineer despite the fact that the country’s economy depended on mining 
(Adesina, 2007). As such, social spending on education was not necessarily about the moral 
imperative of overcoming the legacy of colonialism, but a sine qua non for the human resources 
needs of a modern economy in Africa (Adesina, 2007). This notion is corroborated by 
Chachage (2007: 89) when he considered education as ‘a means to social and economic 
development at national level, a way to employment opportunities at personal level and, a 
means to forging national cohesion and reducing inequalities left by the colonial legacy’. 
Chachage’s sentiments dovetail with Sen (1989)’s human capability approach which views 
education as an instrument for social promotion (Carron & Chau, 1996) since it expands the 
freedoms that people have reason to value. Sen further argues that the ability to exercise 
freedom may, to a considerable extent, be directly dependent on the education that one would 
have received.  
 
Becker (1993:7) argues that for individual’s human capital development, training and 
education are the most important investment to be made, because the return to training 
investment can be envisaged in the form of higher income, effective deeds, improved health 
and acquiring better career positions. The human capital developed from work experiences and 
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competency development, may contribute to higher earnings, better chance of promotions and 
acquiring better position (Judge et al, 1995 in Berntson et al, 2006:226). 
 
Thus, beyond contributing to economic growth through labour and skills, education is a 
gateway right that increases one’s (capability set) opportunities and options to realise one’s full 
potential (UNESCO 2002, 32-33). Development economists have confirmed that investments 
in education, nutrition and health care produce net economic gains. Economists like 
Psacharopoulos (1973; 1992) have demonstrated that it is possible to quantify the rate of return 
to these investments, and to manipulate investment decisions to produce the highest rates of 
return on capital. For example, in developing countries, investments in primary education 
produce far higher rates of return than investments in secondary and university level education 
(Psacharopoulos, 1973). In view of the foregoing, education therefore plays intrinsic and 
instrumental roles in the process of development. This process requires the ‘removal of major 
sources of ‘unfreedom’ such as poverty, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic 
social deprivation, neglect of public institutions as well as intolerance or over activity of 
repressive states’ (Sen, 1999: 3).  
 
10.3 Education in Zimbabwe 
Several scholars have written extensively on the progress which Zimbabwe made since 
independence in 1980 (see inter alia Chung, 1989; Colclough et al, 1990; Edwards et al, 1990; 
Chisvo,1993; Hungwe, 1994; Zvobgo, 1994; Cleghorn, 1997; Nziramasanga, 1999; Chitiyo et 
al, 2004; Kariwo, 2007; Mutepfa et al, 2007). In a nutshell however, the trajectory of education 
in Zimbabwe after independence can be divided into three phases. The first decade can be 
regarded as the first phase where the country experienced exponential growth in the education 
sector at all levels. This growth can be epitomised by an increase of 662 percent in secondary 
schools (UNESCO, 2000). Correspondingly, there was a whopping 229 percent increase in the 
number of teachers that were enrolled at the teachers colleges (UNESCO, 2000). School fees 
were abolished during this decade which made access to education easy for children in various 
contexts such as rural, the urban and farming communities. This aggressive progress embodied 
President Robert Mugabe (1990: 9)’s sentiments that; 
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‘(I) believe that a commitment to education is a commitment to development and that 
manpower training is essential for the many development tasks that require a trained 
and enlightened cadre. The prosperity of the SADCC [Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference] region will depend, among other interrelated forces, on the 
effective and efficient utilisation of human resources… (T)he solution of 
unemployment is necessarily related to the education and training programme.’ 
 
The second phase of the trajectory of education is Zimbabwe is the structural adjustment era in 
the 90s. During this time policy advice from the Bretton Wood Institutions sought to cut 
government expenditure in providing basic social services to its people (Garba, 2007: 56). In 
response to this advice, secondary school fees went up by 150 percent in 1992 alone 
(Mokutekwa, 1999: 14). The state sought to shift the burden of education to parents as a cost 
recovery mechanism of adjustment. The salary of teachers fell in real terms from an annual 
average of $4,934 in 1990 to $2,249 in 1996. The structural adjustment policies caused a 
reversal in the gains that had been made in the first decade of independence. Because of the 
introduction of exorbitant fees, children started to drop out of school as their parents could not 
afford the new fees ((Hendricks, 2007:132). 
 
The third phase can be said to be the one when the government was trying to address the effects 
of ESAP within a context of disgruntled, retrenched and agitated population. This led to the 
land reform and the subsequent nose-diving of the economy that Zimbabwe found itself in. The 
consequences of this crisis are the subject of the following sections as the country is yet to 
recover from some of these. 
 
10.4 Education legislative framework in Zimbabwe 
The country has since come up with education guarantees that are justiciable since they are 
enshrined in the national constitution. Section 75 of the 2013 constitution is in the Bill of Rights 
and is dedicated to the right to education. It provides that: 
1. Every citizen and permanent resident of Zimbabwe has a right to— 
a. a basic State-funded education, including adult basic education; and  
b. Further education, which the State, through reasonable legislative and other 
measures, must make progressively available and accessible. 
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2. Every person has the right to establish and maintain, at their own expense, independent 
educational institutions of reasonable standards, provided they do not discriminate on 
any ground prohibited by this Constitution. 
3. A law may provide for the registration of educational institutions referred to in 
subsection (2) and for the closing of any such institutions that do not meet reasonable 
standards prescribed for registration. 
4. The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within the limits of the 
resources available to it, to achieve the progressive realisation of the right set out in 
subsection (1). 
Besides the provisions of the national constitution, the country also has an Education Act, as 
amended in 2006. The Act spells out the obligations of duty bearers in providing education 
for children when it notes that: 
1. Every child in Zimbabwe shall have the right to school education 
2. It is the objective in Zimbabwe, that, primary education for every child of school-
going age shall be compulsory and to this end, it shall be the duty of the parents of 
any such child to ensure that their child attends primary school 
3. It is the objective that tuition in schools in Zimbabwe be provided for the lowest 
possible fees consistent with the maintenance of high standards of education, and the 
Minister shall encourage the attainment of this objective by every appropriate means. 
The legal provisions spell out the state’s commitment to education in principle. The challenge 
however comes at making these a reality to the lives of children in the country. Talking to one 
educationist in the country, she noted that: 
Of course we have good education laws. For me these are a statement of the 
government’s intentions should resources be available. The challenge is that we can’t 
implement some of the provisions of these laws because they require money and there 
is no money. I think in future when the country will be more stable, we will provide 
what is in the constitution and the Education Act [Key Informant Interview with 
Kwekwe District Education Officer, 29/05/2015] 
 
The sentiments of the education officer recognise that at policy level, the country has come up 
with relevant laws. The challenge however is in making sure that the laws are implemented to 
benefit children in various contexts such as those in farming communities.  
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10.5 State of education in satellite schools 
This section interrogates the state of education in the satellite schools using a Tomaševsk 
(2001) framework on assessing quality education which is premised on T.H. Marshal’s theory 
of citizenship where the government has responsibility to deliver to its citizens services such 
as education (Marshall, 1967:6). The framework looks at four key aspects necessary for the 
provision of quality education. These are: 
1. Availability 
2. Accessibility 
3. Acceptability 
4. Adaptability  
 
10.5.1 Availability 
10.5.1.1 Making the schools available 
Before attending to the quality of education in the resettled areas, it is instructive to note that 
one of the major outcomes of the FTLRP was an increase primarily in number of secondary 
schools in the farming communities. Prior to the land reform program, the number of secondary 
schools in Kwekwe District was 40. Most of these secondary schools are in urban and 
communal areas. There were hardly any in the farming communities. After the land reform 
program, there was a 31 percent increase in the number of secondary schools in Kwekwe 
District. All the schools that were established after 1999 were in resettled areas (refer to Figure 
10.1). 
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Figure 10.1: Number of schools between 1999 and 2015 in Kwekwe District 
 
Source: Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, Kwekwe District Report, 2015 
As can be deciphered from the graph above, the number of primary schools prior to 1999 was 
117 compared to 40 of secondary schools. This meant that primary education was easily 
accessible to children in the district. I observed that even in farming communities, there were 
well-furnished primary schools with running water and electricity. This explains why after the 
FTLRP, there was only an increase of 13 percent in the number of primary schools. The FTLRP 
can be commended for making secondary education accessible to the children whose parents 
benefited from the land reform program.  
 
10.5.1.2 Fiscal allocations 
According to Tomaševsk (2001) availability looks at the fiscal allocations that the government 
makes; the presence of hard and soft infrastructure and sufficiency of the materials, equipment 
and other requisite facilities.18 As has been noted, the state made education provisions in the 
legislation, the herculean task that remains is making sure that the laws become a reality. One 
way of ensuring that this happens is through prioritising education when doing budget 
allocations. In 2000, Zimbabwe was one of the countries that agreed to the Dakar Framework 
on Education for all which provides that twenty percent of the national budget should go to 
education. The Dakar Framework therefore provides a benchmark on how countries are 
117
134
13
40
58
31
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
Primary schools
in 1999
Primary schools
in 2015
Percentange
increase
Secondary
schools in 1999
Secondary
schools in 2015
Percentage
increase
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sc
h
o
o
ls
Comparison of Primary and Secondary Schools between 1999 and 2015 
 213 
supposed to structure their fiscal allocations as they relate to education. The challenge with this 
model of looking at how a government invests in education is that it assumes that investment 
in school related activities is the only variable that best reflects the conditions of education (Yi, 
2014: 173). It can be argued that the availability of schools or teachers, which are the major 
indicators of investment in education, do not guarantee high levels of school attendance. As 
shall be noticed later in this chapter, there are several other factor which are not captured by 
merely looking at budget allocations (Ibid). Some of these factors include social attitudes 
towards education, living standards and environmental conditions including geographical 
location. Addressing these issues would improve accessibility of education. Notwithstanding 
the foregoing arguments, it is worth considering the extent to which a government invests in 
education. The graph below shows how Zimbabwe has been faring in this regard. 
 
Figure 10.2: National budget allocation to education in Zimbabwe 
 
Source: Own compilation from Ministry of Finance national budgets 
The graph above shows that from 2009 to 2012, the government did not meet its twenty percent 
obligation to education. 2013 however marked a significant improvement to this where 27 
percent of the USD 3.8 billion national budget went to education. The following years have 
seen the government meeting its obligation. It is important to note that using the benchmark is 
worthwhile in assessing the government’s commitment. What is most important however the 
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size of the budget is since it determines the quantum of 20%. For example, 20 percent of a 
US$100 billion budget is US$20 billion where as 20 percent of a US$10 billion budget is US$2 
billion. Further, the size of the education budget should be analysed in relation to the task that 
needs to be accomplished by the same budget. In light of this, there are two challenges that 
should be considered in view of the graph above. The first issue is that Zimbabwe has been 
living on a cash budget since 2009, when it was introduced by the then Finance Minister, 
Tendai Biti. In his words as was captured in the Revised Budget Statement of March 2009, he 
explained the concept of cash budgeting as: 
The natural law of cash budgeting is ‘what we gather is what we eat’ or ‘we eat what 
we kill’ [emphasis added]. This is the basic economic law of hunter-gatherer economies. 
No ministry or public agency should expect to eat beyond what we have gathered 
through collection of taxes, fees and any other legitimate sources of revenue. ‘What we 
gather, we eat’ unambiguously defines the priority not just in the Ministry of Finance 
but throughout all arms of government. If we want to continue eating, we must all focus 
our minds and energies on maximizing the revenues that are needed first to get those of 
us in the public sector back to work and then to implement all of the pressing issues.” 
Cash budgeting meant that the national budget could only be limited to the resources that the 
country would raise through tax and other means. As a result, budget allocations to various 
ministries were drastically reduced to fit into the revenue that the state would collect. While it 
is commendable that the national budgets from 2013 to 2015 exceeded the Dakar Framework, 
the amounts in question were not much compared to the needs which the ministry would have.19 
One educationist succinctly captured this when she said: 
Don’t be deceived by the 27 percent in budget allocations. 27 percent of peanuts is 
peanuts. If disbursed, the money is not able to address all the challenges in the education 
sector of the country. [Key Informant interview with Kwekwe District Education 
Officer, 29/05/2015] 
 
The sentiments noted above lead to the second issue with the graph above- the issue of 
disbursement of the allocated money. Having the money allocated to the ministry is a welcome 
development, it is even better when it is disbursed. In response to the 27 percent allocation of 
2013, the then Minister of Education, David Coltart resonated with the foregoing when he was 
quoted: 
We are pleased with the theoretical figure that we have gotten, but the theoretical figure 
needs to be matched with actual disbursement. For this year, we only got 15% of the 
non-salary figure and we need to see if we’re actually going to get more. For us that’s 
the real test…20 
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When the disbursement hurdle is overcome, the challenge is on how the money is spent. In the 
2013 education budget, 68.4 percent of it went towards salaries and wages (Ibid). Figure 10.3 
can be an epitome of how national budget allocations are spent by the ministry. 
 
Figure 10.3: Ministry of Education Sport, Art and Culture expenditure categories, in 
2010 
 
Source: Ministry of Education Sport, Arts and Culture, 2011 
Figure 10.3 notes that national budgets primarily address the employment costs of the ministry. 
There is little money that is available to address some of the challenges which schools in 
general face, more so satellite schools. This explains why this research observed that in all the 
schools, there were teachers available for all grades with relevant qualifications albeit 
conducting lessons in dilapidated infrastructure as shall be noted later. For the 2015 budget of 
the Ministry of Education, 98 percent of the allocated USD890 million were taken up by 
employment costs leaving it to rely on donors to cover most of the non-personnel cost.21  
 
Donors intervene however to address other aspects that are not related to employment costs. 
UNICEF supports the Ministry of Education to implement its education sector plan and 
manages the Education Development Fund (EDF) funded to the tune of $115 million from 
2012 to 2015. Donors to the EDF are Germany, DfID, the EU, Sweden, OSISA, Finland and 
Norway. On behalf of the Global Partnership for Education, UNICEF also manages support to 
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Zimbabwe pegged at $23 million for three years.  In 2015, satellite schools would have 
received $6 500 to help improve the schools’ infrastructure.22 
 
10.5.1.3 Status of teachers’ working conditions in satellite schools 
While employment costs take the lion’s share of the education budget, the welfare of teachers 
needs a lot to be desired. According to the Ministry of Education, the average salary of a teacher 
was around USD500 prior to 2008 (MOESAC Strategic Plan, 2011-2015). This figure was hit 
hard by inflation to virtually nothing by end of 2008. In 2009 the government was able to pay 
a flat rate of US$100 per month to all civil servants, including teachers (Ibid). This has been 
gradually increased; a more graduated scale and allowances have been reinstated, so that as of 
July 2011 a diploma-qualified teacher started at a monthly income of US$363 (US$232 basic 
salary, US$66 transport allowance and US$65 housing allowance) (Ibid). The Poverty Datum 
Line in July 2011 was US$540, indicating that the starting salary for a qualified teacher remains 
substantially below the minimum amount required to sustain a small household. Thus teaching 
is no longer the envy of many but the profession of last resort. As a result, the respect for 
teachers by society was undermined (Ibid). This scenario subsequently affected the teachers’ 
motivation. In a focus group discussion, one teacher retorted: 
It’s difficult to give it your all when you are not appreciated. The government does not 
seem to care about our welfare. I am having to do other things to get an extra dollar. 
It’s embarrassing to be a teacher, it’s the profession of scorn. It’s just that I don’t have 
other options seeing there are no jobs if I leave teaching. I am having to rely on my 
husband for subsistence. So coming here to school is just to find something to do as I 
while up time… [Focus group discussion at Mupamombe Secondary School, 
19/06/2015] 
 
Another teacher gesticulated: 
…For me the money I am paid ends when I administer the school assembly. When I 
teach in class, it’s my sheer passion… [Focus group discussion at Mupamombe 
Secondary School, 19/06/2015] 
 
For the teachers who could not stand their working conditions, 2008 was the defining year. 
More than 20 000 teachers left the profession leaving several classes unmanned. The then 
Minister of Education, David Coltart (2013) substantiated this assertion when he noted that: 
…in 2008, there was hardly any teaching that took place in schools. There weren’t 
textbooks and unfortunately there is a batch of children now coming through the system 
whose education was affected by those calamitous times. 
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One teacher at Bonstead Secondary narrated his everyday experience when he lamented that: 
I walk five kilometres to school in the morning, there is no public transport that comes 
into this area. I have to be here on time for assembly at 0730. This means that I have to 
wake up at 4 am. I get to school tired, sweaty and dusty. I have a towel which I now 
keep here at school for freshening up before I start my lessons. I finish the lessons at 
1pm. Because of the distance, I can’t carry any books home so I have to remain behind 
for some hours to mark the work I would have given the students. Then my long march 
will begin. Tomorrow, the cycle is the same… this is tough! [Key Informant Interview 
with Head teacher at Bonstead Secondary, 3/07/2015] 
The opinion of another teacher from Umlala Primary resonated with the Head teacher of 
Bonstead secondary when she postulated: 
We are lucky that our school is 30 kilometres from Kwekwe town. So I commute every 
day to and from home. I don’t have a choice because the school does not have 
accommodation for us here. The challenge then is transport fares every day from town. 
My friends who are teaching in town have it easy. They walk short distances to their 
school where they don’t incur any transport costs. If you calculate, each day I use USD4 
just for transport. By end of month, it’s about USD100 all gone. That’s a third of my 
salary gone, before we talk about food, accommodation and general upkeep. How also 
do we account for the time I spend on the road looking for transport considering the 
fact that transport here is erratic? [Focus group discussion at Umlala Primary School, 
15/06/2015] 
The foregoing personal experiences show that the plight of teachers in satellite schools needs 
to be improved. Since the national budget is spent more on administrative costs, schools are 
incapacitated to provide accommodation or build houses for their teachers even though the land 
for it is provided. Such a teacher, even with the passion to teach ends up fatigued as they almost 
always start the day exhausted already. This also means that the teachers would not have time 
for research and recreation during the school term. 
 
The challenges which teachers face explain why qualified and competent teachers shun rural 
and farm communities’ schools. At Bonstead Secondary, the first term of 2015 saw 4 teachers 
out of the 18 at the school getting transfers. This means that students have to get new teachers 
once in every while should a teacher get an opportunity to transfer to the urban areas or other 
rural schools with the necessary amenities. With such high teacher turnover in satellite schools, 
the education ministry was left with no option than to resort to unqualified individuals. By 
September 2015, the ministry reported that there were almost 22 000 unqualified teachers in 
the system at national level. 10 341 of these were at primary level while 11 519 were at 
secondary level. In Kwekwe District however, all the four schools that participated in this study 
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had qualified teachers. This was primarily because of their proximity to Kwekwe town, despite 
transport and accommodation challenges which teachers faced. 
 
10.5.1.4 Satellite schools infrastructure  
Empirical research in different context have all come to the conclusion that the quality of school 
facilities have an indirect effect on learning (See Fuller, 1999; Carron and Chau, 1996; Willms, 
2000; Pennycuick, 1993). These studies have shown that the quality of the learning 
environment was strongly correlated to pupils’ academic performance. Such factors as on-site 
availability of lavatories and a clean water supply, classroom maintenance, space and furniture 
availability all have an impact on the critical learning factor of time on task (UNICEF, 2000). 
 
I observed that in both Sherwood and Umlala, primary schools had infrastructure that was built 
more than fifty years ago. Umlala Primary school was established in 1952. The white farmer’s 
father, Newbolt Senior, built the school in collaboration with other farmers who were around 
him. The school has a catchment radius spanning more than twenty kilometres. The school had 
electricity and running water when the land reform started. Talking to the deputy headmaster, 
he narrated that: 
This school had all the necessary infrastructure. The white farmer drilled a borehole 
which supplied running water to the toilets. We just had to build new Blair toilets since 
the old ones had filled up. Currently, our major need are houses for the teachers. 
Qualified teachers prefer being in town than to commute every day to school at their 
own expense.  The school even had a telephone line which was connected to long cables 
going to Kwekwe town. Electricity and telephone cables were stolen and the school did 
not have the means to replace them [Key Informant Interview with Umlala Primary 
Deputy Head teacher, 15/06/15].  
 
Sherwood Primary School had a similar story as was told by the headmaster: 
This school has been here since the 50s. It is said that the parents of the Burger Brothers 
put their resources together to build it. They took the pit sand from Sebakwe River. 
They made their farm workers to mould the bricks. Their job was to make sure that the 
project was completed. The school just needs one class room block since the number 
of children in the area is now increasing. There are three teachers’ houses which they 
share. Our school is lucky to have electricity and running water [Key Informant 
Interview with Sherwood Primary Head teacher, 17/ 07/2015].  
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It can be noted however that in both primary schools, there is no library and recreational 
centres. For the latter, the nearest they have are soccer and netball fields only. The story in 
secondary schools is dissimilar to that of primary schools. The white commercial farmers did 
not build any secondary schools. In view of this, it thus can be argued that one of the key 
outcomes of the FTLRP is introduction of secondary schools in the former LSCF. After the 
land reform, more than 1,000 satellite schools were established in response to population 
resettlement (Ministry of Education of Education, 2011-2015 Strategic Plan). The introduction 
of secondary schools however came with some compromises. Since there was no infrastructure, 
the land beneficiaries had to make strategic decisions of using tobacco barns and former white 
farmers’ houses as the secondary schools. Mupamombe Secondary School is one example 
where the resettled farmers turned the white farmers’ residential house into the school. Students 
at this school will be packed in their various classrooms which have limited space. One teacher 
in the focus group discussion noted that 
Introducing secondary schools in the farming communities was a good move. It created 
jobs for some of us. The classrooms are small though. Students have to squeeze 
together. It’s difficult on hot days. Children will be struggling to concentrate because 
the ventilation is poor. When I came the school had constructed Blair toilets some 
hundred meters away. I know that when a child goes there, it takes them about fifteen 
minutes to come back… [Focus group discussion at Mupamombe Secondary School, 
19/06/2015] 
At Bonstead Secondary School, the school is also using the former white farmer’s house 
pending the building of new structures at the identified site. The story is not dissimilar to that 
of Mupamombe Secondary School. Children are crowded in the classrooms. Because of the 
nature of set up, proceedings in one class interfere with those of the next class. When it is 
raining, the roofs leak so learning literary stops. Some window frames were stolen by some 
resettled farmers who wanted to use the window frames for their own houses. This affects 
learning on rainy days as much as it does on windy days. Undisturbed learning is therefore 
subject to the vicissitudes of Mother Nature, with the hope that it does not rain. 
 
For both secondary schools, there are no libraries and laboratories necessary for science classes. 
This means that the students’ options are limited to what is provided. I can only shudder to 
think of those students who may be good in science subjects and yet have no opportunity to do 
them anywhere else except at Bonstead Secondary School. The furniture in the classrooms is 
affected also by the weather. Due to lack of security, the school leaves valuable tables and 
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chairs locked in one lockable room. The rest of the furniture is left in the classrooms that are 
not secure. 
 
 Concerning textbooks, in 2010 through the support of the Education Transitional Fund (ETF), 
every primary school child received what were considered a core set of textbooks, and 
secondary textbooks were distributed at the end of 2011. The table below shows student to 
book ratio at Mupamombe Secondary School.  
 
Table 10. 1: Book to pupil ratio at Mupamombe Secondary School 
  English Shona Science Geography Maths Commerce History Agriculture Fashion 
and 
Fabrics 
Form 
1 
1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:38 1:1 1:13 1:27 
Form 
2 
1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:18 1:1 1:10 1:8 
Form 
3 
1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:20 1:1 1:10 1:8 
Form 
4 
1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:16 1:1 1:10 1:8 
Source: Own fieldwork, 2015 
Each student has access to a textbook in the subjects that the government considered core 
subjects. Schools did not receive any text books in agriculture, fashion and fabrics and 
commerce. Unfortunately, these are also the subjects that are relevant to their immediate 
contexts in farming communities. At Bonstead Secondary School, book to student ratio takes 
the same character as at Mupamombe Secondary School. The headmaster of Bonstead 
Secondary School had different concerns about the textbooks: 
Having the textbooks is a good thing. Now each student can have their own book to use 
at school. We don’t allow the children to take the books home. We tried it when the 
books came in 2011. It didn’t work. Some lost them while others returned them soiled, 
dirty and defaced. The students use these books here at school. The problem however 
is their security. As you can see that the classrooms are not lockable and also if it rains, 
the books will be damaged. We have however built a small storeroom to keep valuables 
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of the school. I know you will ask me about how students then access the books, that’s 
the down side of it now… the books are available by access may be another story. [Key 
Informant with Headmaster at Bonstead Secondary School, 3/07/2015] 
The two secondary schools do not have sports and recreation facilities. For Mupamombe 
Secondary School, they use Umlala Primary School’s soccer and netball pitches. Bonstead 
Secondary School does not have a nearby primary school so the school improvised by putting 
up a soccer pitch with the goal posts made of tree trunks. That is the same for the netball pitch. 
This state of affairs can explain why the two secondary schools have not flourished in sport in 
Kwekwe District. 
 
10.6 Accessibility  
Tomaševsk (2001) notes that accessibility  means  that  education is accessible  to every child, 
while addressing  geographical  accessibility,  economic accessibility (affordability), absence  
of  discrimination and access to information. At national level, the net attendance rates for 
primary school are above 90 percent with gender parity as well. This can be attested by the 
enrolment trends at Sherwood Primary School as can be deciphered from Figure 10.4 below: 
 
Figure 10.4: Gender dynamics in Sherwood Primary School’s Enrolment, 2015 
 
 
Source: Own fieldwork 
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The graph shows that other than in Grades 1, 5, and 7, there are gender disparities in enrolment. 
In Grade 3, girls’ enrolment is only 52.6% of boys. There have been several efforts by 
government to address this anomaly through the government policy for equitable access for 
boys and girls in education. One respondent from Umlala Farm confirmed this argument when 
he said: 
To me there is no difference between my son and my daughter. I treat them all the same. 
They are my children. If the girl is good in school, let her go as far as she can. I will not 
allow my daughter to depend on a man. It will make her a servant to that man. I have 
been teaching my daughter to do her own things just like the way they are taught by the 
examples of some of our female politicians who are leading big men. [In-depth 
interview with Mr Chivhi, Umala Farm, 27/06/2015] 
 
 Another factor can be said to be the work of civil society organisations such as Campaign for 
Female Education (CAMFED) who are promoting education for the girl child. Talking to the 
CAMFED district coordinator, she passionately elucidated that: 
Our job as CAMFED is to make sure that the girl child is not deprived of her right to 
education. We have come up with an educational program which pays fees for all the 
girls at Umlala Primary so that there will not be any excuses for girls dropping out of 
school. We also hold campaigns during farmers ‘monthly meetings so that in the home, 
the girl child and the boy child all receive equal treatment. It’s one thing having the girl 
in school. It’s the other having the home environment not supporting her by loading her 
with all the work as the boy child studies. [In-depth interview with CAMFED 
representative at Umlala Farm, 16/05/2015] 
 
At secondary school, the enrolment figures are almost the same, though the number of girls has 
reduced more as compared to primary school figures. After grade seven, some girls fall through 
the cracks and are not able to proceed to secondary school. The same campaigns happening in 
primary school also happen in secondary school. In Kwekwe District, CAMFED is playing a 
key role in educating the resettled farmers about the importance of having the girl child in 
school. The organisation is also playing a key role in flagging out any practices that would 
undermine the girl child’s education.  
 
Of note also on Figure 10.4 is that the number of both boys and girls drastically reduces when 
the children get to grade 7 which is an examinable class. The primary reasons for this is include 
issues of school fees, the need for children to help with home chores such as taking care of 
livestock as well as helping in the fields. This drastic fall in number of children enrolling for 
grade seven means that the same children cannot proceed to secondary education.  This means 
that the capability set of the children and their families will be compromised. 
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Figure 10.5 below shows Mupamombe Secondary School’s enrolment figures since 2011. 
 
Figure 10.5: Enrolment figures for Mupamombe Secondary School 
 
Source: Own fieldwork, 2015 
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in the vicinity. Some of the children had to confront such creatures to get to school. Table 10.2 
is a catalogue of the distances that children at Sherwood Primary School walk daily: 
 
Table 10.2: Sherwood Primary School Catchment Area 
 
Sherwood Primary Catchment area Distances 
Catchment area Distance in km No. of Students 
Green Diamond 3 35 
Machakwi 0.1 50 
Mbudzi 2 8 
Sable Farms 5 15 
Pricable farm (Mnangagwa) 4 26 
Sherwood area 1 46 
Devilwood Farm 6 40 
Ministry of Transport Camp 6 12 
Prichard 7 7 
Dekel Farm 1 33 
Indarama 3 110 
Source: Own fieldwork 
In all the schools that participated in this study, the issue of children walking long distances 
was not a surprise to the school authorities. At Mupamombe Secondary School, the 
headmistress noted: 
It’s almost impossible for children not to walk long distances. The self-contained A1 
farms are 30 hectares. So if a child lives at the 10th farm, then already that child would 
have walked for more than a kilometre. Because these are farming communities, 
households are far away from each other so it’s easy to have one child walking five 
kilometres to school. But the children are now used. The issue only is about the dangers 
that are along the way, especially for the girl child.  Imagine the distances that a child 
walks if he or she passes A2 farms on their way home… [In-depth Interview with Ms 
Godho, at Mupamombe Secondary School, 19/06/2015] 
 
10.6.2 Early childhood development education (ECD) 
Research by UNICEF (2008) and Willms (2000) has shown that positive early experiences and 
interactions play an important role in preparing a child to be a quality learner. The UNICEF 
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research in Philippines, Sri Lanka and Turkey, and has shown that children who participate in 
early childhood education do better in primary school than those who do not benefit from 
formal early child programmes (UNICEF, 1998). Besides the cognitive effects of ECD 
education, the child also develops much better psychosocially (Ibid). McCain and Mustard 
(1999) further observed that ECD education provides appropriate stimulation to the child’s 
brain development necessary for emotional regulation, arousal, and behavioural management 
(McCain and Mustard, 1999). A child who misses positive stimulation or is subject to chronic 
stress in the pre-school years may have difficulty with psychosocial development later in life 
(ibid).  
 
The government adopted a National Early Childhood Education Policy in the 1990s. The policy 
bestowed responsibility for the ECD centres to the Ministry of Education, Sport and Culture. 
This policy changed practices that existed where ECD was done informally. Subsequently, 
ECD services became more regulated and professionalised using international standards 
(UNESCO, 2005). This change  was  reinforced  by  the  Presidential  Commission  on  
Education  and  Training which carried out extensive consultations with stakeholders into the 
status of Early Childhood Development (ECD) in Zimbabwe (Nziramasanga, 1999). The 
Nziramasanga Commission recommended for ECD to be accessible to all children as a way of 
improving the quality of Zimbabwean education.  Pursuant to this goal, the Ministry of 
Education, Sport and Culture instituted a policy requiring all primary schools to establish two 
ECD classes for 3 to 4 year olds (Class A) and 4  to  5  year  olds (Class  B)  (Secretary’s  
Circular  14:  2004).  The ramifications of this policy meant that more educational staff with 
required training were necessary to serve these children.  
 
 
The Ministry of Education went on an aggressive drive in making sure that all schools in the 
country have ECD education. By 2011, 97 percent of all primary schools have ECD classes 
(MOESAC Strategic Plan, 2011-2015). The primary schools which participated in the study 
both had ECD classes, manned by trained teachers and integrated into the school system. The 
focus on ECD came up in a focus group discussion with farmers from Sherwood Farm. One 
lady who was explaining her chores in the home registered this as a challenge in her doing her 
home chores. I then probed further about this issue and discovered that there was a lot that 
needed to be considered for children in farming communities. She explained that: 
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Crèche is for children between 3 years and 6 years. I have two children who should be 
going to crèche, the first one is 5 years and the second one just turned 3. This age group 
is very active. Sometimes when I want to undertake my chores, I get distracted trying 
to make sure that the children are safe. If the crèche was close by, it would be helping 
me and also help the children with writing and interacting with others… The nearest 
crèche is at Sherwood primary which is 5km from here. Even older children complain 
about the distance so I decided that I can’t let my children walk that long distance. What 
if something happens to them? I am left with no choice except to keep them here until 
they are old enough to join others for the long walk to school… I know they are missing 
out but I have no choice. Their safety comes first… [Focus group discussion at 
Sherwood Farm, 15/08/2015] 
 
The foregoing personal account shows that most children who stay far from the schools miss 
out on ECD education because they will not be able to walk the long distances to and from 
school.  The Umlala FGD raised similar issues when one respondent mentioned that: 
The issue of ECD needs innovative approaches here in farming communities. The 
distances that the children have to walk are too much. It’s not safe for a five year old to 
walk 3 kilometres to school… [Focus group discussion at Umlala Primary School, 
15/06/2015] 
As a result, UNICEF (2008) and Willms (2000)’s findings on the benefits of early childhood 
education will not be realised by a significant number of the children. I observed that for those 
who manage to attend school at Umlala Primary, the school does not have necessary 
equipment, toys and materials which the children would need. The play area at Umlala Primary 
was in a sorry state because there was nothing that the children could use safely. Their options 
for play therefore are limited to field activities such as soccer, running and so forth.  The 
situation at Sherwood Primary was similar to that at Umlala Primary. While ECD education is 
available at all the schools in this research, it cannot be said that it is accessible to all children 
who need it. 
 
10.6.3 The Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) 
The government has however been trying to put mitigatory measures in place to make sure that 
access to education for all children becomes a reality. In 2001, the Government of Zimbabwe 
introduced a program called Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM). The initiative is a 
demand-side response to the cost barriers affecting the ability of OVCs to access education due 
to increasing poverty levels in the country. It is implemented in all the 61 districts of the country 
both urban and rural (Government of Zimbabwe, 2001; 2005). The BEAM Evaluation Report 
of 2012 estimated that there were 3.6 million children of school going age (primary and 
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secondary) in Zimbabwe. Of that number, about 1 million of them were in need of financial 
assistance. For primary school children that need assistance, 28 percent of them needed 
assistance. BEAM however could only reach to 16 percent of them in 2011. For secondary 
schools pupils, the report noted that about 24 percent of the children needed assistance. BEAM 
however could only assist 17 percent of them. 
 
The program has been riddled with many challenges. Some of these challenges include opaque 
selection criteria for students to be on the program, lack of effective coordination between the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, where money for the program is disbursed to, and 
Ministry of Education, Sport, Art and Culture which administers the program. As a result, the 
program does not disburse the money for the students to relevant schools on time. The program 
has also been criticised for only paying school fees without giving consideration to other factors 
that affect attendance in school such as stationery, uniforms and levies. 
 
BEAM’s colossal challenge has been its financing. The biggest chunk of its budget has been 
supported by donors such as Department for International Development (DfID). When the 
country came up with a new constitution in 2013 which provided for free primary education, 
the donors withdrew their financial support on the rationale that there no longer a need for 
BEAM since basic primary education was free and compulsory. Schools however needed 
financial support so they identified their weakest link, the parent. Schools started charging 
levies for their upkeep since BEAM was no longer giving its assistance. The headmistress of 
Mupamombe Secondary elucidated this: 
BEAM was very helpful to this school, though the disbursements where in arrears by 
two years. Because of the US Dollar, whenever the money would come, it would make 
the school progress. But the withdrawal of donors will make a lot of children drop out 
of school. It is unfortunate. For us also, for the school to be functional, we need money 
so we now charge levies to parents… so yes we will not violate the new constitution, 
but we have to be innovative if we should survive. Here we use the School Development 
Committee to enforce the levy requirements because it’s the parents who agreed to the 
levy amount. The SDC chairperson comes to send those who would not have paid back 
home to bring the levies. This is where we lose some of our students because they won’t 
come back. I hope something will be done to make BEAM functional again. [In-depth 
Interview with Mupamombe Secondary School Head teacher, 19/06/2015] 
As can be noted from the sentiments above, BEAM was very helpful both to the schools and 
also to the students who were its beneficiaries. It’s over reliance on external funding made it to 
 228 
be inefficient as disbursement were done late and also it paid fees only, without providing 
stationery needs of the child. The issue of levies also compromises children’s attendance as 
parents would not be able to pay these. The policy of charging levies is against the 
constitutional provisions which provide for free basic education. 
 
The government can however be commended for creating an environment where civil society 
organisations could intervene to cover the gaps. To this end. The CAMFED program that has 
been alluded to earlier played a key role in keeping girls in school. The School Improvement 
Grant (SIG) was key in improving furniture and infrastructure at the schools. At Mupamombe 
Secondary School, the SIG was used to buy desks and chairs for the students while at Umlala 
Primary, the grant was used to repaint toe school and build a storeroom. This grant have proved 
to be helpful to schools considering that the national budget is handicapped to assist in 
infrastructures of schools. 
 
10.7 Acceptability  
10.7.1 Fluid curriculum  
One of the issues that generated a lot of debate among the teachers who participated in a focus 
group discussion was on the reasons why children in farming communities do not perform well 
academically relative to their counterparts in towns. One of the issues of consensus amongst 
the teachers though was that ‘the children in farming communities lacked exposure’. The 
geography teacher gave an example of one of the topics in the syllabus on technology for 
human development. She noted that all her students do not perform well on that topic. As a 
result, their options become limited in an exam because they do not have exposure to some of 
the contemporary technology. This discussion led to an intriguing engagement about the need 
for fluid curriculum which would take into cognisance the various contexts where children 
come from.  
 
A fluid curriculum was described as where curriculum development should not homogenise all 
the children as though they have similar backgrounds and also live in identical settings. The 
discussion agreed that children in farming communities fail, both grade seven and ordinary 
levels because the curriculum is designed for an average urban child who gets a lot of exposure 
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from television, radio, internet and social media. The child in a farm environment, for most in 
Umlala Farm and Sherwood, do not have electricity, do not have phones and the solar charged 
radios which most households have are monopolised by the adults in the home. A comparison 
of Bonstead Secondary School results since 2010 and the national pass rate presented a sorry 
picture where even though the national pass rate is low, like in 2010 when the national pass 
rate was 16.5 percent, the Bonstead Secondary School pass rate was 9 percent for the girls and 
0 percent for the boys.  
Figure 10.6: Bonstead Secondary School and national O Level Pass Rate Comparison
 
Source: Own fieldwork, 2015 
The discussion was unanimous on the point that as long as the curriculum would not be adjusted 
to recognise the contexts of some of the children, the national pass rate will continue to be low 
and also satellite schools would produce failures each year. This line of argument is however 
problematic in that it seeks to address the symptoms. It can be argued that the reason why 
children fail is largely because of the learning conditions that are not conducive. As such, 
attention should be on addressing the learning conditions instead of making the curriculum 
fluid without addressing the underlying issues. 
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10.7.2 Language of instruction 
The issue of language of instruction has been on the international human rights agenda for 
decades. On the one hand, there is a school of thought which argued for making mother tongue 
the language of instruction. On the other hand, there have been scholars who argued that such 
an approach will not help considering globalisation (Tomaševsk, 2009). One teacher argued 
that: 
We are getting the children from primary school where they are being taught in Shona. 
My job in secondary school is not to introduce language to them, that’s what primary 
school is for. We have a challenge with the students because most of them cannot 
construct a grammatically correct sentence in English. How do you help such children? 
All the subjects they do at secondary are taught in English, except Shona… [Focus 
group discussion at Mupamombe Secondary School, 19/06/2015] 
.  
At Sherwood Primary School, the Grade Seven pass rate for the previous two years showed 
that Shona was the subject which most students passed, way above other subjects.  
Figure 10.7: Sherwood Primary School Grade 7 Results 
 
Source: Own fieldwork, 2015 
While the issue of language of instruction has been debated for a long time, in interrogating 
the reasons why children in farming communities perform dismally in exams, one aspect that 
can be attributed to this is the language of instruction. I observed that the delivery by the 
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learners’ understanding of English. The citation in the FGD above noted that teachers use 
Shona to teach all subjects which compromises learners’ comprehension in national 
examinations. 
 
10.7.3 What exposure? Whose exposure? Why exposure? 
I observed that children in farming communities perform better in subjects that relate to them 
more. The graph below shows that while children would fail all other subjects, the majority 
would pass agriculture. This is mainly because they are able to relate with what is being taught.  
Figure 10.8: Mupamombe Secondary School Pass Rate 
 
Source: own fieldwork, 2015 
At Bonstead Secondary School, Form 1 students performed better in Shona, English, Science 
and History. The graph further shows that overall, students in all forms at Bonstead Secondary 
School performed better in agriculture compared to other subjects.   In addressing the issue of 
exposure as was raised by the teachers at the Mupamombe Secondary School focus group 
discussion, it can be observed that children perform better in subjects they can relate with. As 
a result, the need to adapt delivery methods by the teachers will assist the learners in 
understanding concepts. The issue is not solved by adapting curriculum to suit learners in rural 
settings, instead, the teachers need to be innovative in their delivery mechanisms. The graph 
also shows an interesting picture where learners fail Shona, which is the language of command 
by most teachers. In talking to the head teacher at the school, I discovered that teachers for 
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most subjects would come and leave mid-term as they struggled to cope with the working 
conditions. This meant that the students would spend a long time before a replacement is found.  
 
 
 
Figure 10.9: Bonstead Secondary School 2014 Results 
 
Source: Own fieldwork, 2015 
In the context of increasing human capabilities for increased productivity in agriculture, 
better performance by children raises the hope of the reproduction of young farmers who are 
knowledgeable and informed. This realisation also answers the ‘íntergenerationality’ of 
agrarian change of the FTLRP considering the fact that the majority of land beneficiaries are 
in their late fifties and sixties. 
 
10.8 Adaptability 
Education has to be adaptable to the needs of the diverse communities it is serving. It should 
also be responsive to the dynamism of the social and cultural environment. In being adaptable, 
education has to be holistic in nature to address the physical, social and emotional development 
of the individual. The Nziramasanga Commission of 1999 noted that education in Zimbabwe 
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lacked relevant practical training skills since the curriculum is mainly academic and theoretical 
(Raftopoulos, 2003). Glatthorn and Jailall (2000) argue that curriculum should emphasize in-
depth instead of broad coverage of important areas of knowledge, authentic and contextualised 
problems of study, and problem solving that stresses skills development as well as knowledge 
acquisition. Further, curriculum should be able to provide for individual differences, closely 
coordinate and selectively integrate subject matter while focussing on results or standards and 
targets for student learning (Ibid).  The focus group discussion with teachers at Mupamombe 
Secondary School was very instructive to this issue. One of the teachers noted that: 
I think what we teach children should be in line with their interests. It’s not true to think 
that all children are the same and will perform the same way given different subjects. 
Our pass rate for the last five years renders us failures as teachers because our students 
are not passing their ordinary level exams. For me the issue is to make sure that the 
curriculum is flexible to accommodate the areas of aptitude which the children have. 
Our education system does not tolerate difference, every child has to be academic 
otherwise they will be rendered as failures by the system… [Focus group discussion at 
Mupamombe Secondary School, 19/06/2015] 
 
The head teacher at Bonstead Secondary School weighed in on this subject by noting that: 
You do not expect a child at a Harare school and our student here at Bonstead to perform 
the same in any given subjects. Their trajectories are different. A child at Bonstead 
walks approximately 5 kilometres to school. At home the same child will be having a 
lot of chores to do such as fetching water, firewood and taking care of livestock. All 
these factors have to be considered. The rural child has a lot of burdens to bear… it then 
does not make sense to expect this child who also is coming from a school without a 
library, without laboratory and other necessary equipment needful for one to pass, to 
compete at the same level… it’s one thing which powers that be in education have to 
address. [In-depth interview with Bonstead Secondary School Head Teacher, 
3/07/2015] 
 
The foregoing quotes affirms the point that the issue of prior cultural capital that pupils bring 
to school and the impact on performance is something that is widely recognised in the field of 
education. The nature of the problem may be greater in rural farming communities but this is a 
general problem. Beside the need to address the different contexts where children come from, 
respondents were calling for schools system that appreciates what children in farming 
communities go through. One parent in a Sherwood focus group discussion complained that it 
was unrealistic for school to start at 0730 hours when the children are having to walk long 
distances and also undertake some home chores especially during the rainy season. I observed 
that Moyo (2011)’s typologies of a tri-modal agrarian structure had a bearing on the responses 
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which I was getting. For the poor peasants who depend on family labour, during the rainy 
season, children also have a role to play in planting, weeding and protecting crops, especially 
from baboons. One farmer in this category noted that: 
The school should bear in mind that children have responsibilities at home. During the 
planting season, the time they start lessons should be reviewed to 0900. This will make 
me not ask the child to abscond from school. The school should make such decisions 
in consultation with us parents. This child does not live in [a] vacuum; they come from 
a family which also has expectations of them… [Focus group discussion at Sherwood 
Farm, 15/08/2015] 
 
The Ministry of Education has put in place a statutory instrument allowing each school to have 
a School Development Committee (SDC) that is made up of the parents. This SDC is supposed 
to represent the interests of the parents.  In the schools that participated in the study, the SDC 
has been instrumental in setting school levies which parents can afford. One farmer was 
sceptical about their role when she noted that: 
The SDC is made up of political figures who don’t consult us when making decisions 
about the school. For you to be in that committee you will need to have money for 
people to respect you. The decisions that they are now making do not consider poor 
people like us. Now they are the ones who chase our children from school if I fail to 
pay the school levies. They don’t even understand that sometimes money is difficult to 
find because most of them have it [FGD at Sherwood Farm, 15/08/2015]. 
 
In line with this farmer’s complaint, I observed that the parents nominated people who have 
means into the SDC. Their reason was that such people would help the school through 
donations and networks, which can benefit the school. At Umlala Primary, I witnessed the SDC 
chairperson sending the children back home to get school fees. As a result, children missed 
lessons that day because going back home and coming back is not feasible because of the 
distances. One teacher noted that: 
Sometimes when the children are sent home like that, they will take more than a week 
or two weeks to come back, if at all they will come back.  
 
 
10.9 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore FTLRP education outcomes. The reason for 
focusing particularly on education is that human capital development is a centrepiece in 
increasing productivity in any country. As such, in exploring the outcomes of the FTLRP, it is 
imperative to appreciate the extent of human capital investment which subsequently lead to 
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increased productivity which would culminate in economic development. I have argued that 
beyond contributing to economic development through labour and skills, education is an entry 
point to increasing one’s (capability set) opportunities and options to realise one’s full 
potential. In the first section of the chapter, I presented justification on why focusing on 
education is important. I then provided an overview of the education provisions in the national 
constitution of Zimbabwe. In looking at the state of education in resettled farms, I used 
Tomaševsk (2001)’s framework on assessing quality education which looks at education 
availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability. I argued that the major education 
outcome of the FTLRP was increased accessibility of both primary and secondary education in 
the resettled areas. Secondary education significantly increased (31 percent) in Kwekwe 
District mainly due to the absence of secondary schools in the farming communities prior to 
the land reform program. Consequently, the abrupt demand for education in resettled areas 
inevitably compromised quality of the education provided. Some of the factors which 
compromised the quality of output from the satellite schools include inter alia; distances which 
the children have to walk to and from school, poor welfare of the teachers thereby affecting 
their motivation in school, and inadequate infrastructure. 
 
The deplorable state of education in satellite schools affirms the transformative social policy 
conceptual framework which argues that there must be a symbiosis between economic and 
social policies. In this case, the economic challenges bedevilling the country adversely affected 
efforts to improve the quality of education in satellite schools. As a result, the aforementioned 
challenges do not have a solution in sight until the economic conditions of the country improve. 
Subsequently the education provided in the satellite schools is not able to significantly improve 
human capabilities of the learners so that their productive capacities are increased as initially 
envisaged. 
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CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION 
 
11.1 Introduction  
This thesis has explored social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. The thesis has come from an 
appreciation that there has been a lot of academic attention that has been given to the process 
and outcomes of the FTLRP. Various and sometimes antagonistic analytical approaches have 
been employed by different scholars who come from different epistemological stand points. I 
therefore endeavoured to transcend the various analytical frameworks to provide a unique 
perspective of the extent to which the FTLRP achieved social policy outcomes. Some of the 
scholars who have written on this subject have tackled some of the social policy outcomes 
without however a deliberate effort to focus on social policy outcomes.  
 
This concluding chapter consolidates the various arguments from the earlier chapters in order 
to illuminate a conceptual understanding. I have organised this chapter into three broad 
sections. First of all, I provide an outline of the thesis whilst highlighting the major aspects of 
each of the chapters of this thesis. Secondly, I demonstrate how my thesis contributes to the 
body of knowledge on social policy whilst using the transformative social policy conceptual 
framework.  Lastly, through the recommendations provided, I suggest how the findings of the 
thesis can be taken forward in view of the conceptual debates around social policy tools that 
are relevant for the global south.    
 
11.2 Summary of the discussions 
In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the social policy outcomes of the FTLRP, 
it is necessary to recap on the discussion so far. Chapter 2 provided an analysis of the polemical 
literature that has been produced on the FTLRP. The land reform process generated immense 
academic curiosity amongst scholars. Inevitably, this created ideological polarity as the 
scholars analysed both the process and outcomes of land reform using their ideological lenses. 
The following analytical frameworks were interrogated: the neopatrimonial approach; the 
human rights approach; the livelihoods approach and the political economy approach. It is 
instructive to note that each of the scholars produced nuanced arguments anchored on their 
ideological grounding. I however made sure that the key strands of debates and submissions 
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which the scholars made are the ones I used in providing a critique of the analytical framework 
which the scholars chose. 
 
 
Having engaged with the literature attending to both the process and the outcomes of the 
FTLRP, in chapter 3, I unpacked the conceptual framework that I used in writing this thesis. I 
used the transformative social policy framework to analyse the FTLRP as a social policy tool. 
The framework was designed by scholars such as Adesina (2007), Mkandawire (20011) and 
the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (2011) to correct the social 
policy mono tasking (Mkandawire 2005: 6) conceptual malaise as propagated mainly by most 
OECD scholars due to neoliberal bias. These OECD scholars reduced social policy to social 
assistance or social safety nets, (Holzman and Kozel 2007) resulting in literature focusing more 
on ex post interventions not ex ante (Adesina 2011). This mono tasking of social policy has 
reduced it to social protection as enunciated by scholars like Koehler (2011), and Sabates-
Wheeler and Devereaux (2004). The transformative social policy conceptual framework 
therefore helps in conceptualising social policy in its broader functions of production; 
protection; redistribution; reproduction and social cohesion. 
 
The chapter also provided a nexus between social policy and development. The reason for this 
was the realisation that social policy outcomes are measured using social development 
indicators. I demonstrated that social policy instruments are conduits for the achievement of 
social development in any society. I identified five areas of mutuality between development 
and social policy. First, there is a common interest in investing in human capabilities. Secondly, 
both social policy and development emphasise the inseparability of economic and social 
policies. Thirdly, both development and social policy put significance on social justice, which 
can be achieved amongst other means, through redistribution.  Social capital is considered as a 
process and an outcome of development and social policy in view of Midgley’s (2005) 
argument that communities with higher social cohesion have a high degree of social capital 
and economic well-being. Both social policy and development recognise the involvement of 
the state in achieving these desired outcomes. 
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Chapter 4 discusses methodological issues of the thesis. In this chapter, I first tackled issues of 
research philosophy, paying attention to the paradigm wars that exist between interpretivists 
and positivists. I then gave attention to the mixed methods approach, which was the research 
design for this thesis. I noted that whilst the thesis uses the mixed methods approach, it has an 
inclination towards the qualitative mixed methods research design. The methods used for data 
collection include in-depth interviews with land beneficiaries, key informant interviews, focus 
group discussions and systematic observation. I outlined the pros and cons of using these tools 
in data collection. For quantitative data, I relied on the baseline studies that were conducted by 
AIAS in 2008-2009 and 2013-2014. The baselines covered six districts, including Kwekwe 
District. The baseline surveys primarily provided data on what could be considered the 
production and redistribution functions of social policy. In the chapter, I chronicled the 
challenges that I had experienced in data collection, especially in view of the fact that land 
reform is a highly polarised subject in Zimbabwe. I outlined the ethical considerations I 
observed inter alia, confidentiality on the collected data, obtaining informed consent from the 
respondents, voluntary participation of the interviewees and not exposing the research 
participants to any form of risk through the research.  
 
Chapter 5 sets the context for discussing the findings of the research. Having talked to the 
farmers, I realised that there was a general assumption in literature which suggested that the 
period between the time when beneficiaries got land (2000-2001 mostly), the circumstances 
were similar therefore outcomes of the FTLRP should be evident. From interacting with the 
farmers, I observed that there were three phases into which the farmers put their time after 
getting the land. The three phases are 2000-2006; 2007-2008 and 2009 to current. The chapter 
showed that in all the three phases, there were different dynamics which were telling to the 
situation that is prevailing on the farms right now. The first phase was characterised by farmers 
occupying the land and most of them enthusiastically working on the land. The production 
trends showed that whilst productivity drastically dropped between 2001 and 2002, there was 
a gradual increase in productivity up to 2006. This was despite the 2002 drought which affected 
farmers’ yields. The second phase of 2007 to 2008 was observed by the farmers as the one 
when they were taken back to the starting point. This phase was characterised by drought and 
hyperinflation. Due to the latter, the Grain Marketing Board could not pay farmers for the 
agricultural produce which they had sold to the marketing board in good faith. This meant that 
most farmers did not have capital to use for the season that followed, hence they had to start 
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afresh. The third phase is linked to the second one. To salvage the hyper-inflationary 
environment, the government introduced a multicurrency system, with the US Dollar being the 
main currency. This compounded the situation for the farmers as they did not have means to 
get much needed capital to invest in the following agricultural season. Hence, phase three is 
about farmers striving on their own without much help from the state.  I argue therefore that 
understanding social policy outcomes of the FTLRP has to be done in the context of these three 
phases in order to fully appreciate what is happening currently.   
 
Chapter 6 interrogated the redistributive social policy outcomes of the FTLRP. In the chapter, 
I demonstrated that one of the major outcomes of the FTLRP was the changed agrarian 
structure from a bi-modal arrangement to a tri-modal structure. The new agrarian structure has 
about 150 000 households settled under the A1 scheme and 30 000 under the A2 scheme with 
some transnational agro estates still operating around the country. The new agrarian structure 
has created a broad base for the peasantry in its variegated categories. Indeed the process had 
its own short comings since it was mostly a revolution from below. As a result women did not 
get as much access to land on equal footing as men. This was mainly pronounced in A2 
resettlement scheme where in Sherwood Farm, there are no women who were allocated A2 
plots. There is general consensus among scholars that between 13-22% of the land beneficiaries 
are women. The majority of the women then accessed land through their husbands, which 
reinforces the patriarchal nature of the society. I further observed that the land beneficiaries 
brought their cultural values in the way they relate to land. As a result, the allocated plots are 
subdivided by the households to make provision for tsewu for the women and the main field 
for the household. I however observed that this increases the burden of labour on women as 
they are supposed to work on their tsewu at the same time contribute to the household plot. 
 
The chapter also provided detailed accounts of how the land beneficiaries accessed the land in 
Kwekwe District. Some of the beneficiaries got the land during informal farm occupations, 
which were mainly orchestrated by the war veterans as similar to other districts studied by 
scholars such as inter alia Scoones et al (2010), Murisa (2007, 2010), Sadomba (2011) and 
Mkodzongi (2013). The majority of the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District got the land 
through formal allocation by the government. Concerning the profiles of land beneficiaries, the 
data I collected and that of AIAS refutes the narrative that only the elite benefited from the 
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FTLRP. Civil servants, former farm workers, senior politicians, war veterans and ordinary 
citizens all benefited from the FTLRP, albeit to different extents. The beneficiaries also had 
varied education levels ranging from no formal education to tertiary qualifications such as 
degrees. The average age of the land beneficiaries is 55 years. Concerning farm residency 
trends, I observed that most beneficiaries in A1 type of farming, especially the villagised type, 
reside on the farms they were allocated.  
 
Chapter 7 is premised on the understanding that production is centrepiece in the realisation of 
social policy outcomes. Hence, enhancement of the productive potential of members of society 
is a key variable in ensuring that social policy outcomes become a reality for the people. This 
chapter therefore answered the production question of what land beneficiaries are doing with 
the land they got, looking at both agricultural and non-agricultural activities.  I argued that in 
appreciating the productive outcomes of the FTLRP, it is imperative to realise that it was not 
every land beneficiary’s aspiration to consider agriculture as a business which subsequently 
contributes to national development. Some of the farmers I spoke to noted that their motivation 
for participating in the land reform exercise was to be able to get a musha for their children.  
Indeed the government was well aware of this as can be explained by coming up with A1 farms 
meant for family production, compared to A2 and LSCF designed for commercial production.  
 
Overall, production trends showed a slump between 2001 and 2002. This was caused by a 
severe drought as well as the shocks of the land reform exercise. Thereafter, there was a gradual 
rise in production patterns for sorghum, tobacco and maize. In 2008, production of these crops 
fell to unprecedented levels. From 2009, despite the challenges, which farmers faced, there was 
a gradual rise again in production, although the levels of productivity are still lower than those 
of years before 2000. 
 
 I observed that export and cash crops are mostly produced by A2 farmers. Tobacco production 
has been on the rise across all the settlement models because of the support of private 
companies through contract farming. Even in districts such as Kwekwe which had no history 
of tobacco farming, farmers are slowly adopting this export crop. Overall, land utilization is 
still constrained by access to inputs and capital, while recurrent droughts pose challenges to 
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grain production, which is sensitive to rainfall patterns. Diversified markets now exist for a 
wide range of commodities produced by rural households beyond the state marketing system. 
 
In the chapter, I covered the issue of agricultural financing, attending to the question of how 
the land beneficiaries are coping with this aspect. I observed that after the collapse of the 
agricultural marketing board system in 2008, the government has not been able to provide 
adequate support to the farmers. As such, issues of means of production such as inputs, access 
to tools, labour and access to information about agriculture pose challenges to farmers. As a 
coping mechanism, farmers have come up with ways of mitigating the impact by sharing 
productive tools and information. Further, I interrogated the availability and accessibility of 
quality extension services in Kwekwe District. I observed that indeed extension services are 
available and also accessible though their quality is low due to resource constraints. I end the 
chapter by looking at non-farming activities which take place on the resettled farms. In the 
context of Kwekwe District, gold panning is a pronounced activity. In Kwekwe, 72 percent of 
the farmers are also involved in gold panning. 
 
I have argued that the FTLRP created new agrarian labour structure which has resulted in the 
semi-proletarianisation of labour. The farm workers mostly do not have farm tenancy as was 
the case under white farmers. This has made them to be roving from one farm job to another 
while negotiating a wage for each task being based at the compounds where farm workers used 
to stay. Under this arrangement, they are able to engage in gold panning and other productive 
non-agricultural activities. 
 
Alva and Gunner Myrdal posit that social policy should be prophylactic. Chapter 8 
demonstrates that land reform is an ex ante social protection instrument.  I demonstrated that 
even in droughts and periods of economic crises, the severity of vulnerability is reduced for 
land beneficiaries.  The most immediate vulnerability that was reduced as a result of the FTLRP 
was destitution. This is because land beneficiaries have the opportunity to build for themselves 
durable shelter. Some of the land beneficiaries have made the resettlement areas their home 
where they do not have to pay for accommodation. Further, the land beneficiaries have 
significant potential for food security. This is because the land beneficiaries can use the land 
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to produce food for their families, cultivate gardens, and establish other income streams such 
as inter alia, selling firewood, selling grass for thatching houses, gold panning and mould 
bricks. All these options help the land beneficiaries to diversify their livelihoods.  
 
 
I also observed that livestock is a form of insurance against the vagaries of the market and other 
exogenous factors which may affect the farmers. While livestock is a form of accumulation on 
the one hand, it is also a form of insurance when farmers are in dire straits. The farmers can 
sell their cattle, goats or chickens to get the money they may need for other things. They can 
also do batter trade in exchange of the products they need. Lastly, they can use the livestock 
for food. 
 
 
Overall, I discovered that there are different levels of precarity amongst the farmers. These 
levels are characterised according to the tri-modal agrarian structure as posted by Moyo (2011). 
As a result, the farmers are affected differently by such things as droughts and economic crises. 
Farmers who fall into the first category of poor peasants are the hardest hit by droughts and 
economic crises. This is because they do not have diversified livelihoods that are sustainable. 
More often, they end up selling their labour to those with diversified livelihoods. Land 
beneficiaries who receive remittances from their children and are on pensions had lower levels 
of precarity compared to the land beneficiaries who did not have any reliable streams of 
incomes.  
 
 
Despite the challenges which farmers in resettlement areas faced, their levels of precarity were 
lower than in the communal areas. The means of verifying this were the statistics of those 
receiving food aid in a particular year. This was more in communal areas compared to the 
resettlement areas. Further, the AIAS survey showed that land beneficiaries in the resettlement 
areas indicated that a greater proportion of the people in the resettlement areas  eat  three meals 
in a day whilst in communal areas the average number of meals per day was two. These 
observations show that land reform prophylactically reduces the levels of household 
vulnerability for the land beneficiaries in a lot of ways. 
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Chapter 9 explored the social cohesion outcomes of the FTLRP. I used Jenson (1998)’s 
conceptualisation social cohesion which denotes that there is vertical and horizontal cohesion. 
I acknowledged that several scholars had attended to the aspect of social cohesion outcomes of 
the FTLRP albeit using primarily the horizontal cohesion lenses. In the chapter, I showed that 
the FTLRP brought people of different backgrounds, religious beliefs and value systems 
together. Be that as it may, they were faced with similar challenges which made them to 
collaborate as they tried to solve the challenges. Land beneficiaries collaborated, in some 
instances, successfully whilst in other instances without much success. I observed that the 
collaboration of the farmers transcends the tri-modal agrarian structure’s categorisation of the 
farmers. A1 farmers work with A2 farmers in solving common challenges such as water and 
building of schools. The building of Bonstead Secondary School is one example of a project 
where the farmers are working together to make sure that the school is established. This project 
is on the road to succeeding since most of the materials needed have been provided by the 
farmers. The success of this project is because for the A1farmers who are not able to provide 
financial contributions provide their labour. An example of a project that was not so successful 
was the Umlala Water Project. The failure of the project was because when financial 
contributions were needed, most farmers in A1 resettlement scheme were not able to raise the 
required amounts, to the frustration of A2 farmers who could meet their portions of the required 
contributions.  
 
The other major areas of cooperation for the land beneficiaries in Kwekwe District is on sharing 
productive tools and participation in farmer groups. As a result, there has been some solidarity 
amongst the farmers as was noted in the lobbying activities done by those close to government 
leaders on behalf of those who do not have such access. One institution in horizontal cohesion 
that has played an instrumental role in bringing people together is the church. Through it, 
members have come up with mutual aid societies (mikando) where they support each other in 
addressing challenges they face.  
 
Chapter 10 does not necessarily address one of the social policy function as other findings 
chapters. Instead, the chapter explores educations outcomes of the FTLRP since it had 
pronounced outcomes. The reason for focusing particularly on education is that human capital 
development is a centrepiece in increasing productivity in any country. As such, in exploring 
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the outcomes of the FTLRP, it is imperative to appreciate the extent of human capital 
investment, which subsequently lead to increased productivity that would culminate in 
economic development. Beyond contributing to economic development through labour and 
skills, education is an entry point to increasing one’s (capability set) opportunities and options 
to realise one’s full potential.  
 
I argued that the major education outcome of the FTLRP was increased accessibility of both 
primary and secondary education in the resettled areas. Secondary education significantly 
increased (31 percent) in Kwekwe District mainly due to the absence of secondary schools in 
the white farming areas prior to the land reform program. Consequently, the abrupt demand for 
education in resettled areas inevitably compromised quality of the education provided. Some 
of the factors which compromised the quality of output from the satellite schools include inter 
alia; distances which the children have to walk to and from school, poor welfare of the teachers 
thereby affecting their motivation in school and inadequate infrastructure. 
 
I observed that the deplorable state of education in satellite schools affirms the transformative 
social policy conceptual framework which argues that there must be a symbiosis between 
economic and social policies. In this case, the economic challenges bedevilling the country 
adversely affected efforts to improve the quality of education in satellite schools. As a result, 
the aforementioned challenges do not have a solution in sight until the economic conditions of 
the country improve. Subsequently the education provided in the satellite schools is not able to 
significantly improve human capabilities of the learners so that their productive capacities are 
increased as initially envisaged.  
 
11.3 Contribution to debates and knowledge  
11.3.1 Land reform as a social policy tool 
This thesis has provided an important perspective of land reform as a social policy tool. This 
is significant because for a long time, land reform has not been generally considered as a social 
policy tool in the mainstream social policy literature. The reason for the unavailability of self-
conscious literature on the land reform as a social policy tool has been due to the fact that 
literature on social policy has been dominated by Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development (OECD) scholars resulting in the literature having an OECD bias (Mkandawire 
2007). The OECD scholars have also endeavoured to write on social policy in developing 
countries albeit wearing their lenses hence unable to put premium on social policy instruments 
relevant to the developing world such as land reform.  As a result, social policy tools found in 
the global south, such as land reform, have not been given due consideration on how they have 
contributed to the well-being of the people. In trying to return to a ‘wider vision of social 
policy’ (Adesina, 2015), the UNRISD (2006)’s unpacking of social policy elements included 
land reform despite there being little to no self-conscious literature that views land reform as a 
social policy tool, except for researches by Gough (2004); Huch-ju Kwon & Ilcheong Yi 
(2008); Nitya Rao (2014); Mark Alan Hughes & Peter M. Vandoren (1990) and Yi et al (2014). 
 
Land reform researches that have been done by such scholars as Moyo (2005, 2007, 2009, 
2011), Scoones (2010, 2015), Mutopo (2011, 2012), Murisa (2007, 2010), Chiweshe (2014) 
have proven that the FTLRP achieved social policy outcomes. This body of literature does not 
necessarily make a deliberate effort of looking at the outcomes of FTLRP from a social policy 
perspective. It can be argued that even though the land reform program might not have been 
conducted with a full consciousness that it was addressing social policy outcomes, but a 
thorough interrogation of the aforementioned literature demonstrates that the five social policy 
functions namely production, protection, redistribution, reproduction and social cohesion have 
been realised to varying extents.  
 
11.3.2 From bi-modal to tri-modal agrarian structure  
The FTLRP changed the existing agrarian structure from a bi-modal arrangement to a tri-modal 
agrarian structure. Though there have been debates on who benefited from the land, with the 
Neopatrimonial School arguing that only the elites benefited while most of the left scholars 
have been refuting that claim noting that people of all classes benefited. In consonance with 
Moyo (2009) and Scoones et al (2010), I observed that the FTLRP benefited all classes of 
society. Civil servants, former farm workers, senior politicians, war veterans and ordinary 
citizens all benefited from the FTLRP, albeit to different extents. The FTLRP gave 180 000 
households access to land which was previously owned by 6000 white farmers. As I noted in 
Chapter 7 on social protection outcomes of social policy, access to land reduced significantly 
the precarity of these households to vagaries of the market and other exogenous factors such 
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as droughts and economic crises. Having access to land meant that the land beneficiaries could 
diversify their livelihoods. In some instances, working on the land gave the land beneficiaries 
an opportunity to increase their capabilities. 
 
11.3.3 Reproduction in the resettlement areas 
It is imperative to note that the families on the resettlement farms are not a homogenous group. 
There are farm workers who provide labour as families to some of the land beneficiaries. These 
also take care of the properties of the land beneficiaries as the latter are in towns or elsewhere. 
In this set up, both the husband and the wife team up to provide labour to the better off land 
beneficiaries. The wife of the farm worker has double burden of work because she still does 
home chores such as taking care of the children and preparing food after working on their 
employer’s field together with the husband. The men have also their own responsibilities such 
as looking for more jobs like thatching houses, tending after livestock, clearing fields and so 
forth. 
 
For the families that are resettled, I observed that these brought with them their cultural way of 
using the land. The allocated plots are further subdivided by the households to give the women 
tsewu. The tsewu increases burden of labour on women as they are supposed to work on their 
tsewu at the same time contribute to the household plot. The concept of tsewu gives women 
reprieve that they have access to land to carry out any productive activities of their choice. It 
is however worth noting that the tsewu concept does not challenge the patriarchal norms that 
are repressive for women. Whilst allocating a tsewu for women gives access to land, it does 
not address the issues of ownership and control of the land. Women are then left in false 
comfort of having access to land but not having power to make decisions when it matters. The 
tsewu concept reinforces patriarchal system. In this regard, I disagree with Mutopo (2011) who 
posited that the tsewu concept enables women to have access to land so that they can grow 
crops such as Bambara nuts, sweet potatoes and ground nuts. These crops are for the family’s 
consumption and should there be surplus, she sells still to supple the other needs of the home. 
It is my argument that access to land which does not empower the women with ownership and 
control is not empowerment at all. 
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11.3.4 The concept of musha 
I have noted that most scholars writing about the production outcomes of the FTLRP have a 
tendency to make gross generalisations as though the land beneficiaries are homogeneous 
group. I discovered that not all land beneficiaries are there for production purposes. Some of 
the land beneficiaries took the land in order to create a musha for their children who may be in 
towns, diaspora or any other context. In the Shona culture, when children leave their parents’ 
home to start their own families, they always leave provision of coming back should it not work 
out where they will be going. This idea of a young person knowing that there is a safety net 
called kumusha will make them not be destitute. It therefore brings dignity and pride to have a 
home that you can go to. In good times, children visit the home during holidays and special 
occasions such as marriages. The home is also the place where one is usually buried in the 
event of death. Therefore having a musha gives one a sense of belonging and dignity.  
 
Some of the land beneficiaries, especially the former farm workers, did not have a musha for 
their children. For such land beneficiaries, getting allocated a plot which they could transform 
into a musha for their children was a lifetime achievement that would bring them dignity. For 
such a land beneficiary, their aspiration is not necessarily production. Not to say that they 
would not get involved in any productive activity, but their goal is to occupy the place for their 
children. There will be dissonance of expectation if such a land beneficiary is expected to strive 
for increase in productivity. Whose expectation will that be? It is on the basis of this argument 
that this thesis does not call all the people who got land to be ‘farmers’. Some are not farmers 
but certainly all are land beneficiaries.  
 
11.3.5 Livestock as a safety net 
I have noted in the introductory chapter that social policy literature has not provided ample 
attention to social policy tools that are relevant to the global south. One of such tools is 
livestock. In my interaction with land beneficiaries, I observed that cattle are both a form of 
investment as well as a safety net. Livestock, especially cattle, are a resource which almost 
every land beneficiary strives to have many of. I observed that this is because the more the 
cattle, the safer the household from any precarity.  In times of income shortages, households 
sell cattle to pay children’s school fees, to buy food or even to buy other productive assets 
which the family may not have. One farmer sold cattle to have a borehole drilled on his plot. 
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Besides selling, cattle can be exchanged for products or tools which one would not have. In 
years of drought, land beneficiaries exchange cattle for grain. In some instances, the livestock 
are slaughtered for food, with surplus meat sold to neighbours sometimes for cash and in other 
instances for household goods. It is therefore my submission that livestock be considered as 
social policy tool that is relevant for the global south.  
 
11.3.6 Grain marketing board as a social protection tool 
When the GMB collapsed in 2008, farmers were affected significantly resulting in the latter 
struggling to find capital for the seasons that followed. The reason why the farmers were 
affected by the collapse of the GMB was that the parastatal had been put in place as a 
mechanism to cushion farmers against market failures as well as droughts. The GMB was a 
ready market for the farmers which meant that they would not struggle in selling their produce. 
It also gave the GMB an opportunity to redistribute the food to those regions which may not 
have had good harvests. GMB’s selling price for the grain was highly subsidized meaning that 
in years of droughts, farmers could access the grain they had rendered to GMB in years of good 
harvests. This meant that there was consistent food supplies for households around the country.  
The collapse of this facility can be traced back to the neoliberal policies of the World Bank and 
IMF through the structural adjustment programs. After the land reform process in Zimbabwe, 
the GMB had not recovered subsequent to the 2008 economic crisis; this was the last blow. It 
is imperative that this facility be revived as a social protection mechanism for the farmers. 
 
11.3.7 The symbiosis between economic and social policies 
Using education outcomes of the FTLRP, I demonstrated that there is a symbiotic relationship 
between economic and social policies. On the one hand, the quality of education that is 
produced in resettlement areas is a function of the ailing economy of the country. Due to this, 
there is no adequate resources available to invest into improvement of quality of education. 
The realisation of social policy outcomes is directly related to the contribution of the economy 
in sustaining such outcomes. Social policy outcomes are not sustainable when they are not 
supported by the economic policy. On the other hand, economic policy is compromised by 
reduced human capabilities since education will not be able to provide the necessary skills to 
individuals so that they may improve their productive capacities. Increased production in 
agriculture is to some degree dependent on the quality skilled labour power available. 
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11.4 Policy Recommendations 
This section outlines recommendations that follow from the analysis and results of this study. 
This study recognises that there have been efforts already for agrarian reform through the 
Zimbabwe Agricultural Investment Plan (ZAIP 2012-2016). These recommendations therefore 
contribute to some of the initiatives in the ZAIP. 
 
11.4.1 Land audit 
After the completion of the FTLRP, there is need for a comprehensive land audit. The audit 
needs to address issues of multiple farm ownership. Further, the audit needs to conduct a skills 
audit of the land beneficiaries so that tailor made capacity building interventions can be made. 
The audit also needs to address issues of farm sizes, especially on A2 farms. I observed that 
some of the land beneficiaries in this category do not have the capacity to fully utilise the land 
they obtained. Some piece meal audits are being conducted albeit not in a systematic manner 
so they may not pick the trends that transgress districts of the country. 
 
11.4.2 Land tenure security  
The proposals in ZAIP of making A2 leases collaterable and transferable should be executed 
promptly and could be expediently extended to the family farmers under the A1 scheme, where 
it will be most useful to the market-oriented ones. Such reforms would need to be supported 
by enhanced capacity to survey the land subdivisions and issuance of associated leases. 
Completion of the surveying of the new A2 farms would  be  a crucial  initial  step  to  allow  
issuance  of  documents  to  make  land  usable  as collateral. 
 
Further, there is a need to make clear the procedures for the further redistribution of some lands 
owned by government, and unutilized land held by some A2 farmers, and private estates. Other  
elements  that  could  be  strengthened  include  improving administration capacity of the central 
government and districts to consolidate landholding records and their  registration/notarization;  
to  administratively  redress  the  actual  and  potential  threats  of  eviction and boundary 
disputes and to issue the finalized version of the land permits and leases. 
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11.4.3 Agricultural financing modalities 
Firstly, the government needs to improve its fiscal space so that there may be substantial 
resources available for improving agricultural financing. One strategy that could be employed 
is the introduction of an ear-mark tax for agriculture. We have seen such an arrangement 
working in countries like Ethiopia where each citizen contributes to the construction of their 
national dam. Zimbabwe is not new to earmark taxes, previously, the country instituted an 
AIDS Levy where each worker contributed 3percent of their income to efforts meant to address 
HIV and AIDS. A similar initiative can be done, coming up with mechanisms though of those 
in informal employment to contribute. 
 
Secondly, the government needs to improved access by all farmer groups to short-term credit, 
with emphasis on micro-finance for the part time and semi-subsistence farmers and 
cooperative, and commercial bank credit for market oriented farmers, as well as for commercial 
farmers. Contract farming arrangements have the potential to advance further in crops and 
livestock products that are most likely to be perishable, and require major processing or 
packaging near the area where they are produced. The commodity-specific arrangements can 
be very specific to the requirements of  the  crop  or  livestock  product,  and  therefore  need  
to  emerge  out  of  intensive  consultations  of  the producers  and  the  contracting  firms. 
 
11.4.4 Strengthening agronomic services 
The government needs to strengthen agronomic and farm management skills that are provided 
by the AGRITEX workers. The extension workers need continuous training themselves so that 
they can add value to the farmers. The extension workers need reliable modes of transport to 
be able to access the farmers on a regular basis for continuous support. Further, the farmers 
need support for sustainable natural resources management and utilisation. The extension 
workers, if well equipped with both information and work paraphernalia, can be able to provide 
these agronomic services. 
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11.4.5 Investment in irrigation services 
Zimbabwe is a drought prone country. As such, irrigation becomes essential for assuring 
national food security and subsequently food sovereignty. Irrigation will facilitate the growth 
of a full complement of agricultural products. During the FTLRP, irrigation systems and 
irrigation capital was vandalised hence it got ruined significantly, hence reducing areas under 
irrigation. The Zimbabwe  Agricultural  Investment  program  therefore  justly  underscores  
the  rehabilitation  of dilapidated  irrigation  schemes  and  their  redesign  to  suit  the  new  
farm  structure where for example, one farm now has 44 households.  A systematic effort is 
required to adapt irrigation technologies and systems to serve the full range of farm types. For 
example, for A1 farmers, supplying smaller water pumps and water distribution equipment, 
such as mini-center pivots will go a long way in addressing this particular issue.  
 
 In addressing the irrigation challenge, priority should be put on agro-ecological regions that 
face frequent droughts which then result in low crop yields. Prioritizing the marginal areas in 
irrigation development and rehabilitation will be critical in boosting food security and supplies 
in these deficit areas. Kwekwe District predominantly falls in region 3 which generally does 
not receive adequate rainfall for good crop yields. 
 
11.4.6 Access to inputs and product markets 
The government needs to put subsidies on agricultural inputs that differentiate across the 
different agro-ecological zones, not necessarily poor families only. There is need to focus on 
the family farmers in marginal areas which are characterized low use of productivity enhancing 
inputs are thus not prioritized. There is need for improved targeting of input subsidies and 
services advocated for in ZAIP to take into account the differentiation in input use across the 
different agro-ecological zones. Beyond agro-ecological region specific inputs, the government 
should be able to provide inputs to all A1 farmers. The needs of the family farmers in the 
marginal areas which are characterized low use of productivity enhancing inputs need to be 
prioritized. 
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11.5 Conclusion  
Due to the OECD bias in social policy literature, social policy tools that are relevant for the 
global south have not received a lot of academic attention. One of such tools is land reform. 
This thesis explored the extent to which the FTLRP achieved social policy outcomes using the 
transformative social policy framework. The transformative social policy framework seeks to 
correct the neoliberal conceptualisation of social policy, where the latter has been reduced to 
social protection. As such, the transformative social policy framework helps in realising that 
social policy has five main tasks, namely production, redistribution, protection, reproduction 
and social cohesion.   
 
It can be said that the unequivocal social policy outcome of the FTLRP is redistribution. The 
land reform program redistributed land to 180 000 households which used to be owned by some 
6000 white farmers. Having access to land achieves developmental outcomes as it reduces 
vulnerability of the households from destitution and starvation since land reform is a 
prophylactic social policy tool. There were several other outcomes such as social cohesion as 
the land beneficiaries seek to solve common challenges such as access to water and agricultural 
inputs.  
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ANNEXURES 
 
Annexure 1: Schedule of Interviews  
 
The names of the interviewees are given only in the case of those who granted me the 
permission to do so 
 
Mr Dube, ZANU PF Sherwood Ward Chairperson, (Sherwood Farm), 08/08/2015] 
Ms Dhebhu, Kwekwe District Education Officer, (Kwekwe District Offices) 29/05/2015 
Mr Koki, Bonstead Secondary School Headmaster, (Bonstead Secondary School) 3/07/2015  
Mr. Makina, Umlala Primary Deputy Head Teacher, (Umlala Primary School), 15/06/15 
Mr. Moyo, Kwekwe District War Veterans Chairperson, (Umlala Farm), 17/06/15 
Ms. Chavhi, CAMFED Representative (Umlala Farm), 16/05/2015 
Mr. Gomba, Sherwood Primary Head teacher, (Sherwood Primary School), 17/ 07/2015 
Mr. Nyama, Umlala Ward Agricultural Exetnsion Officer, (Umlala Farm), 14/4/15 
Ms. Madamombe, Sherwood Ward Agricultural Extension Officer, (Sherwood Farm), 23/7/15 
Ms. Samambwa, Bonstead Headwoman, (Bonstead Village), 20/08/2015 
Chief Samambwa, (Sherwood Farm), 19/08/2015 
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Annexure 2: Schedule of the Focus Group Discussions 
 
Location Name of group  Number of 
participants 
Date  
Sherwood Farm Sherwood A2 farmers 7 15/08/2015 
Sherwood Farm Sherwood A1 farmers 5 16/08/2015 
Mupamombe 
Secondary School 
Mupamombe Secondary School 
Teachers 
5 19/06/2015 
Umlala Farm Umlala A1 and A2 Farmers 8 14/04/2015 
Umlala Primary 
School 
Umlala Primary School Teachers 6 15/06/2015 
Bonstead Secondary 
School 
Bonstead Secondary School 
Teachers 
7  3/07/2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 294 
 
 
 
 
 
 
End Notes 
1 Gough only noted land reform as a social policy instrument but did not discuss it further. 
Chung devoted a portion of his chapter to land reform. Other scholars who recognised land 
reform as a social policy instrument include:  Huch-ju Kwon & Ilcheong Yi. (2008); Nitya 
Rao. (2014); Mark Alan Hughes & Peter M. Vandoren. (1990). Like Chung, Kwon & Yi noted 
land reform as a social policy instrument in Korea, Rao mentioned land reform as having the 
same objectives as social policy—rather as a social policy instrument. Whilst Hughes and 
Vandoren’s paper has the title “social policy through land reform”, the focus however was on 
the equity outcome of the Mount Laurel ruling by the US Supreme Court. 
  
 
2 See Grotius 1583-1645) on the right of acquiring things taken in war (as discussed by 
Friedman 1972). For contrary views, see Brownlie (1959) and Dugard (1983). 
 
3 The Lancaster House Agreement precluded the post-colonial Zimbabwe government from 
taking the land for the first ten years. 
 
4 The Svosve invasions were not the first as stated by one author: “Between 1983 and 1997, 
villagers from Mutasa, Chihwiti, Mhondoro and Nyamatsitu, communal lands that the state had 
leased to white commercial farmers were repeatedly invaded by those seeking to exert 
historical claims. In each instance, the government evicted these landless villagers by force. In 
June 1998, the Svosve people of the Marondera and Wedza districts undertook a series of illegal 
farm occupations. Earlier in October 1996, the land issue came to a head when a group of 200 
land hungry peasants invaded an idle state farm adjacent to the Matobo Research Station in 
Matabeleland in defiance of the government. The unilateral action by citizens was an 
illustration of the growing impatience among thousands of landless Zimbabweans over the 
implementation of the nation-wide land redistribution programme to correct pre-independence 
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imbalances.” Chikuhwa J. The Haphazard Land Reform at 
http://chikuhwa.net/zimbabwelandreform.htm 
5 The number of farms gazetted shifted over time. Between June 2000 and Feb 2001 some 2 
706 farms were gazetted. By Jan 2002 6 481 farms were listed. After discounting for double 
counting (918) and those removed from the list because of litigation or negotiation (689), 
there remained 4 874 farms on 9.23 million hectares (HRW 2002:11, UNDP 2002:12). 
 
6 These figures are for the six districts where AIAS conducted its research. The districts are 
the following; Kwekwe, Mangwe, Zvimba, Chiredzi, Goromonzi and Chipinge 
 
7 See the observer, 18.5.2003, JAG Zimbabwe, 
http://www.justiceforagriculture.com/newsrelease131202.shtml 
 
8 See Onyekachi Wambui’s article in the New African titled Ending Colonial Impunity: The 
News That the British Government Has Agreed in Principle to Compensate the Torture 
Victims of the 1950s Land Wars in Kenya, Otherwise Known as Mau Mau, Is Earth-Shaking  
 
9 Details on the bimodal and tri-modal arrangements are covered in the Chapter 6 on 
Redistribution outcomes of the FTLRP. 
 
10 The Fabian influence on the immediate post-WWII Labour government and its programme 
of social reform is significant but the actual British social policy architecture is a patch work 
that reflect the reform of those immediate post-WWII as well as long rule of the Conservative 
Party from 1951 to 1964, and the years since Thatcher in 1979. 
 
11 The capability approach defines poverty as the absence or inadequate realization of certain 
basic freedoms (such as the freedoms to avoid hunger, disease, illiteracy, and so on) owing at 
least in part to lack of command over resources. 
 
12 Note that in the categorisation of the land beneficiaries, there is no category called 
‘political elites’ as is posited especially by the neopatrimonial school. The elites are however 
scattered in the categories of war veterans, civil servants and self-employed.  
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13 the following are the four types of droughts: 1)Meteorological drought: A reduction in 
rainfall supply compared with a specified average condition over some specified period; 
defined as a period during which less than a certain amount (e.g. 70 percent) of the normal 
precipitation is received over any large area for an extended period. 2) Agricultural drought: A 
reduction in water availability below the optimal level required by a crop during each different 
growth stage, resulting in impaired growth and reduced yields. Agricultural drought relates to 
an imbalance in the water content of the soil during the growing season, which although 
influenced by other variables such as the crop water requirement, the water-holding capacity 
and degree of evaporation, is also largely dependent upon rainfall amount and distribution. 3) 
Hydrological drought: The impact of a reduction in precipitation on natural and artificial 
surface and subsurface water resources. It occurs when there is substantial deficit in surface 
runoff below normal conditions or when there is a depletion of groundwater supplies. 
Hydrological drought reduces the supply of water for irrigation, hydroelectrically power 
generation, and other household and industrial uses. 4) Socio-economic drought: The impact 
of drought on human activities, including both indirect and direct impacts. This relates to a 
meteorological anomaly or extreme event of intensity and/or duration outside the normal range 
of events taken into account by enterprises and public regulatory bodies in economic decision-
making, thereby affecting production and the wider economy. 
 
14 It is important to note that NGOs gave food aid whilst the government provided grain loan 
schemes through the GMB.  
 
15 Jenson, 1998: 15-17) outlines five dimensions of social cohesion which are the following: 
(1) Belonging v.  Isolation.  This  refers  to  the  existence  or  absence  of shared  values  and  
a  sense  of identity  (Jenson, 1998: 15). (2) Inclusion v.  Exclusion.  This dimension looks at 
the equality of opportunity among citizens in economic realm, that is, the market (Jenson, 1998: 
15). (3)  Participation v.  Non-involvement.  This  focuses  on people's political  participation 
at  both  the  central  and  the  local  levels  of government  (Jenson, 1998: 16). (4)  Recognition 
v. rejection. This dimension concerns the respect for difference or tolerance for diversity in 
society (Jenson, 1998: 16). (5)  Legitimacy v. illegitimacy. This  refers  to  the  maintenance  
of legitimacy of major  political and  social  institutions - the  state  in particular - as  mediators 
among individuals  of  different  interests (Jenson, 1998: 16-17). 
 297 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
16 White man here is used as a symbol of power, someone with means, not needing any help 
from people around. It also depicts a mind-set of individualism with no regard of the 
vulnerabilities of people around. 
 
17 This is a form of storage where farmers put their maize cobs to dry before graining it. It has 
to be built high so that livestock will not reach.  
 
18 Hard infrastructure refers to the buildings, furniture and equipment necessary for education 
to happen. Soft infrastructure refers to availability of competent and motivated teachers and 
ancillary support staff able to support the students in their learning experience in the school.  
 
19 The total budget for 2013 was USD 3.8 Billion. For 2014, the total budget was USD3.6 Billion. For 
2015, the total budget was USD 4 Billion. The figure remained constant for 2016 at USD4 Billion.  
 
20 http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2012/11/23/2013-budget-disbursements-the-real-test/ 
 
21 http://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2015/02/27/increase-education-budget-unicef 
http://www.herald.co.zw/budget-allocates-close-to-us1bn-to-education/ 
 
22 http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2014/12/19/chinamasas-us6bn-budget-dream/ 
 
 
 
 
 
